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Web Cache Deception Methodology

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Swissky 2023-03-28 21:53:53 +02:00
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## Tools ## Tools
- [KeyFinder - is a tool that let you find keys while surfing the web!](https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder) - [momenbasel/KeyFinder](https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder) - is a tool that let you find keys while surfing the web
- [KeyHacks - is a repository which shows quick ways in which API keys leaked by a bug bounty program can be checked to see if they're valid.](https://github.com/streaak/keyhacks) - [streaak/keyhacks](https://github.com/streaak/keyhacks) - is a repository which shows quick ways in which API keys leaked by a bug bounty program can be checked to see if they're valid
- [TruffleHog - Find credentials all over the place](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/truffleHog) - [trufflesecurity/truffleHog](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/truffleHog) - Find credentials all over the place
```ps1 ```ps1
docker run -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys docker run -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys
docker run -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity docker run -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity
trufflehog git https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog.git trufflehog git https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog.git
trufflehog github --endpoint https://api.github.com --org trufflesecurity --token GITHUB_TOKEN --debug --concurrency 2 trufflehog github --endpoint https://api.github.com --org trufflesecurity --token GITHUB_TOKEN --debug --concurrency 2
``` ```
- [Trivy - General purpose vulnerability and misconfiguration scanner which also searches for API keys/secrets](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy) - [aquasecurity/trivy](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy) - General purpose vulnerability and misconfiguration scanner which also searches for API keys/secrets
- [projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates) - Use these templates to test an API token against many API service endpoints
```powershell
nuclei -t token-spray/ -var token=token_list.txt
```
## Exploit ## Exploit

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# Web Cache Deception # Web Cache Deception
## Summary
* [Tools](#tools)
* [Exploit](#exploit)
* [Methodology - Caching Sensitive Data](#methodology---caching-sensitive-data)
* [Methodology - Caching Custom JavaScript](#methodology---caching-custom-javascript)
* [CloudFlare Caching](#cloudflare-caching)
* [Labs](#labs)
* [References](#references)
## Tools ## Tools
* [Param Miner - PortSwigger](https://github.com/PortSwigger/param-miner) * [PortSwigger/param-miner](https://github.com/PortSwigger/param-miner)
> This extension identifies hidden, unlinked parameters. It's particularly useful for finding web cache poisoning vulnerabilities. > This extension identifies hidden, unlinked parameters. It's particularly useful for finding web cache poisoning vulnerabilities.
## Exploit ## Exploit
1. Browser requests `http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css`. 1. Browser requests a resource such as `http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css`.
2. Server returns the content of `http://www.example.com/home.php`, most probably with HTTP caching headers that instruct to not cache this page. 2. Server returns the content of `http://www.example.com/home.php`, most probably with HTTP caching headers that instruct to not cache this page.
3. The response goes through the proxy. 3. The response goes through the proxy.
4. The proxy identifies that the file has a css extension. 4. The proxy identifies that the file has a css extension.
5. Under the cache directory, the proxy creates a directory named home.php, and caches the imposter "CSS" file (non-existent.css) inside. 5. Under the cache directory, the proxy creates a directory named home.php, and caches the imposter "CSS" file (non-existent.css) inside.
## Methodology of the attack - example
## Methodology - Caching Sensitive Data
**Example 1** - Web Cache Deception on PayPal Home Page
1. Normal browsing, visit home : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/` 1. Normal browsing, visit home : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/`
2. Open the malicious link : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/malicious.css` 2. Open the malicious link : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/malicious.css`
3. The page is displayed as /home and the cache is saving the page 3. The page is displayed as /home and the cache is saving the page
4. Open a private tab with the previous URL : `https://www.paypal.com/myaccount/home/malicous.css` 4. Open a private tab with the previous URL : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/malicous.css`
5. The content of the cache is displayed 5. The content of the cache is displayed
Video of the attack by Omer Gil - Web Cache Deception Attack in PayPal Home Page Video of the attack by Omer Gil - Web Cache Deception Attack in PayPal Home Page
[![DEMO](https://i.vimeocdn.com/video/674856618.jpg)](https://vimeo.com/249130093) [![DEMO](https://i.vimeocdn.com/video/674856618.jpg)](https://vimeo.com/249130093)
## Methodology 2 **Example 2** - Web Cache Deception on OpenAI
1. Attacker crafts a dedicated .css path of the `/api/auth/session` endpoint.
2. Attacker distributes the link
3. Victims visit the legitimate link.
4. Response is cached.
5. Attacker harvests JWT Credentials.
## Methodology - Caching Custom JavaScript
1. Find an un-keyed input for a Cache Poisoning 1. Find an un-keyed input for a Cache Poisoning
```js ```js
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<meta property="og:image" content="https://test"><script>alert(1)</script>"> <meta property="og:image" content="https://test"><script>alert(1)</script>">
``` ```
## CloudFlare Caching
CloudFlare caches the resource when the `Cache-Control` header is set to `public` and `max-age` is greater than 0.
- The Cloudflare CDN does not cache HTML by default
- Cloudflare only caches based on file extension and not by MIME type: [cloudflare/default-cache-behavior](https://developers.cloudflare.com/cache/about/default-cache-behavior/)
CloudFlare has a list of default extensions that gets cached behind their Load Balancers.
| | | | | | | |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| 7Z | CSV | GIF | MIDI | PNG | TIF | ZIP |
| AVI | DOC | GZ | MKV | PPT | TIFF | ZST |
| AVIF | DOCX | ICO | MP3 | PPTX | TTF | CSS |
| APK | DMG | ISO | MP4 | PS | WEBM | FLAC |
| BIN | EJS | JAR | OGG | RAR | WEBP | MID |
| BMP | EOT | JPG | OTF | SVG | WOFF | PLS |
| BZ2 | EPS | JPEG | PDF | SVGZ | WOFF2 | TAR |
| CLASS | EXE | JS | PICT | SWF | XLS | XLSX |
## Labs ## Labs
* [PortSwigger Labs for Web cache deception](https://portswigger.net/web-security/all-labs#web-cache-poisoning) * [PortSwigger Labs for Web cache deception](https://portswigger.net/web-security/all-labs#web-cache-poisoning)
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* [Web cache poisoning - Web Security Academy learning materials](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning) * [Web cache poisoning - Web Security Academy learning materials](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning)
- [Exploiting cache design flaws](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-design-flaws) - [Exploiting cache design flaws](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-design-flaws)
- [Exploiting cache implementation flaws](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-implementation-flaws) - [Exploiting cache implementation flaws](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-implementation-flaws)
* [OpenAI Account Takeover - @naglinagli - Mar 24, 2023](https://twitter.com/naglinagli/status/1639343866313601024)