mirror of
https://github.com/containers/youki
synced 2024-05-05 23:26:32 +02:00
29cf869c68
Signed-off-by: utam0k <k0ma@utam0k.jp>
850 lines
29 KiB
Rust
850 lines
29 KiB
Rust
use super::args::{ContainerArgs, ContainerType};
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use crate::apparmor;
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use crate::syscall::{Syscall, SyscallError};
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use crate::{
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capabilities, hooks, namespaces::Namespaces, process::channel, rootfs::RootFS,
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rootless::Rootless, tty, utils,
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};
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use anyhow::{bail, Context, Ok, Result};
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use nix::mount::MsFlags;
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use nix::sched::CloneFlags;
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use nix::sys::stat::Mode;
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use nix::unistd::setsid;
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use nix::unistd::{self, Gid, Uid};
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use oci_spec::runtime::{LinuxNamespaceType, Spec, User};
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
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use std::{
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env, fs,
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path::{Path, PathBuf},
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};
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#[cfg(feature = "libseccomp")]
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use crate::seccomp;
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#[cfg(not(feature = "libseccomp"))]
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use log::warn;
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fn sysctl(kernel_params: &HashMap<String, String>) -> Result<()> {
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let sys = PathBuf::from("/proc/sys");
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for (kernel_param, value) in kernel_params {
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let path = sys.join(kernel_param.replace('.', "/"));
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log::debug!(
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"apply value {} to kernel parameter {}.",
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value,
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kernel_param
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);
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fs::write(path, value.as_bytes())
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to set sysctl {kernel_param}={value}"))?;
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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// make a read only path
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// The first time we bind mount, other flags are ignored,
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// so we need to mount it once and then remount it with the necessary flags specified.
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// https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mount.2.html
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fn readonly_path(path: &Path, syscall: &dyn Syscall) -> Result<()> {
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if let Err(err) = syscall.mount(
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Some(path),
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path,
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None,
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MsFlags::MS_BIND | MsFlags::MS_REC,
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None,
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) {
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match err {
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SyscallError::MountFailed { errno, .. } => {
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// ignore error if path is not exist.
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if matches!(errno, nix::errno::Errno::ENOENT) {
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return Ok(());
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}
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}
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_ => bail!(err),
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}
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}
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syscall.mount(
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Some(path),
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path,
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None,
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MsFlags::MS_NOSUID
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| MsFlags::MS_NODEV
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| MsFlags::MS_NOEXEC
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| MsFlags::MS_BIND
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| MsFlags::MS_REMOUNT
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| MsFlags::MS_RDONLY,
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None,
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)?;
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log::debug!("readonly path {:?} mounted", path);
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Ok(())
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}
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// For files, bind mounts /dev/null over the top of the specified path.
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// For directories, mounts read-only tmpfs over the top of the specified path.
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fn masked_path(path: &Path, mount_label: &Option<String>, syscall: &dyn Syscall) -> Result<()> {
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if let Err(err) = syscall.mount(
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Some(Path::new("/dev/null")),
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path,
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None,
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MsFlags::MS_BIND,
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None,
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) {
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match err {
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SyscallError::MountFailed { errno, .. } => match errno {
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nix::errno::Errno::ENOENT => {
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log::warn!("masked path {:?} not exist", path);
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}
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nix::errno::Errno::ENOTDIR => {
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let label = match mount_label {
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Some(l) => format!("context=\"{l}\""),
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None => "".to_string(),
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};
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syscall.mount(
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Some(Path::new("tmpfs")),
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path,
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Some("tmpfs"),
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MsFlags::MS_RDONLY,
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Some(label.as_str()),
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)?;
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}
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_ => {
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bail!(err)
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}
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},
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_ => bail!(err),
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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// Enter into rest of namespace. Note, we already entered into user and pid
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// namespace. We also have to enter into mount namespace last since
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// namespace may be bind to /proc path. The /proc path will need to be
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// accessed before pivot_root.
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fn apply_rest_namespaces(
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namespaces: &Namespaces,
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spec: &Spec,
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syscall: &dyn Syscall,
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) -> Result<()> {
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namespaces
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.apply_namespaces(|ns_type| -> bool {
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ns_type != CloneFlags::CLONE_NEWUSER && ns_type != CloneFlags::CLONE_NEWPID
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})
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.with_context(|| "failed to apply namespaces")?;
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// Only set the host name if entering into a new uts namespace
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if let Some(uts_namespace) = namespaces.get(LinuxNamespaceType::Uts) {
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if uts_namespace.path().is_none() {
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if let Some(hostname) = spec.hostname() {
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syscall.set_hostname(hostname)?;
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}
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if let Some(domainname) = spec.domainname() {
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syscall.set_domainname(domainname)?;
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}
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn reopen_dev_null() -> Result<()> {
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// At this point we should be inside of the container and now
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// we can re-open /dev/null if it is in use to the /dev/null
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// in the container.
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let dev_null = fs::File::open("/dev/null")?;
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let dev_null_fstat_info = nix::sys::stat::fstat(dev_null.as_raw_fd())?;
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// Check if stdin, stdout or stderr point to /dev/null
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for fd in 0..3 {
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let fstat_info = nix::sys::stat::fstat(fd)?;
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if dev_null_fstat_info.st_rdev == fstat_info.st_rdev {
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// This FD points to /dev/null outside of the container.
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// Let's point to /dev/null inside of the container.
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nix::unistd::dup2(dev_null.as_raw_fd(), fd)?;
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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#[allow(unused_variables)]
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pub fn container_init_process(
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args: &ContainerArgs,
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main_sender: &mut channel::MainSender,
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init_receiver: &mut channel::InitReceiver,
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) -> Result<()> {
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let syscall = args.syscall;
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let spec = args.spec;
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let linux = spec.linux().as_ref().context("no linux in spec")?;
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let proc = spec.process().as_ref().context("no process in spec")?;
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let mut envs: Vec<String> = proc.env().as_ref().unwrap_or(&vec![]).clone();
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let rootfs_path = args.rootfs;
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let hooks = spec.hooks().as_ref();
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let container = args.container.as_ref();
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let namespaces = Namespaces::from(linux.namespaces().as_ref());
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setsid().context("failed to create session")?;
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// set up tty if specified
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if let Some(csocketfd) = args.console_socket {
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tty::setup_console(&csocketfd).with_context(|| "failed to set up tty")?;
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}
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apply_rest_namespaces(&namespaces, spec, syscall)?;
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if let Some(true) = proc.no_new_privileges() {
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let _ = prctl::set_no_new_privileges(true);
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}
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if matches!(args.container_type, ContainerType::InitContainer) {
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// create_container hook needs to be called after the namespace setup, but
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// before pivot_root is called. This runs in the container namespaces.
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if let Some(hooks) = hooks {
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hooks::run_hooks(hooks.create_container().as_ref(), container)
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.context("failed to run create container hooks")?;
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}
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let bind_service = namespaces.get(LinuxNamespaceType::User).is_some();
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let rootfs = RootFS::new();
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rootfs
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.prepare_rootfs(
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spec,
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rootfs_path,
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bind_service,
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namespaces.get(LinuxNamespaceType::Cgroup).is_some(),
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)
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.with_context(|| "failed to prepare rootfs")?;
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// Entering into the rootfs jail. If mount namespace is specified, then
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// we use pivot_root, but if we are on the host mount namespace, we will
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// use simple chroot. Scary things will happen if you try to pivot_root
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// in the host mount namespace...
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if namespaces.get(LinuxNamespaceType::Mount).is_some() {
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// change the root of filesystem of the process to the rootfs
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syscall
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.pivot_rootfs(rootfs_path)
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to pivot root to {rootfs_path:?}"))?;
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} else {
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syscall
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.chroot(rootfs_path)
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to chroot to {rootfs_path:?}"))?;
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}
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rootfs
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.adjust_root_mount_propagation(linux)
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.context("failed to set propagation type of root mount")?;
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reopen_dev_null()?;
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if let Some(kernel_params) = linux.sysctl() {
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sysctl(kernel_params)
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to sysctl: {kernel_params:?}"))?;
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}
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}
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if let Some(profile) = proc.apparmor_profile() {
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apparmor::apply_profile(profile)
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to apply apparmor profile {profile}"))?;
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}
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if let Some(true) = spec.root().as_ref().map(|r| r.readonly().unwrap_or(false)) {
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syscall.mount(
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None,
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Path::new("/"),
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None,
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MsFlags::MS_RDONLY | MsFlags::MS_REMOUNT | MsFlags::MS_BIND,
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None,
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)?
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}
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if let Some(umask) = proc.user().umask() {
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if let Some(mode) = Mode::from_bits(umask) {
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nix::sys::stat::umask(mode);
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} else {
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bail!("invalid umask {}", umask);
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}
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}
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if let Some(paths) = linux.readonly_paths() {
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// mount readonly path
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for path in paths {
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readonly_path(Path::new(path), syscall)
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to set read only path {path:?}"))?;
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}
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}
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if let Some(paths) = linux.masked_paths() {
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// mount masked path
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for path in paths {
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masked_path(Path::new(path), linux.mount_label(), syscall)
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to set masked path {path:?}"))?;
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}
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}
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let cwd = format!("{}", proc.cwd().display());
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let do_chdir = if cwd.is_empty() {
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false
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} else {
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// This chdir must run before setting up the user.
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// This may allow the user running youki to access directories
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// that the container user cannot access.
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match unistd::chdir(proc.cwd()) {
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std::result::Result::Ok(_) => false,
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Err(nix::Error::EPERM) => true,
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Err(e) => bail!("failed to chdir: {}", e),
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}
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};
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set_supplementary_gids(proc.user(), args.rootless, syscall)
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.context("failed to set supplementary gids")?;
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syscall
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.set_id(
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Uid::from_raw(proc.user().uid()),
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Gid::from_raw(proc.user().gid()),
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)
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.context("failed to configure uid and gid")?;
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// Take care of LISTEN_FDS used for systemd-active-socket. If the value is
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// not 0, then we have to preserve those fds as well, and set up the correct
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// environment variables.
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let preserve_fds: i32 = match env::var("LISTEN_FDS") {
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std::result::Result::Ok(listen_fds_str) => {
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let listen_fds = match listen_fds_str.parse::<i32>() {
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std::result::Result::Ok(v) => v,
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Err(error) => {
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log::warn!(
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"LISTEN_FDS entered is not a fd. Ignore the value. {:?}",
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error
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);
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0
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}
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};
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// The LISTEN_FDS will have to be passed to container init process.
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// The LISTEN_PID will be set to PID 1. Based on the spec, if
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// LISTEN_FDS is 0, the variable should be unset, so we just ignore
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// it here, if it is 0.
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if listen_fds > 0 {
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envs.append(&mut vec![
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format!("LISTEN_FDS={listen_fds}"),
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"LISTEN_PID=1".to_string(),
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]);
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}
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args.preserve_fds + listen_fds
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}
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Err(env::VarError::NotPresent) => args.preserve_fds,
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Err(env::VarError::NotUnicode(value)) => {
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log::warn!(
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"LISTEN_FDS entered is malformed: {:?}. Ignore the value.",
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&value
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);
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args.preserve_fds
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}
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};
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// Cleanup any extra file descriptors, so the new container process will not
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// leak a file descriptor from before execve gets executed. The first 3 fd will
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// stay open: stdio, stdout, and stderr. We would further preserve the next
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// "preserve_fds" number of fds. Set the rest of fd with CLOEXEC flag, so they
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// will be closed after execve into the container payload. We can't close the
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// fds immediately since we at least still need it for the pipe used to wait on
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// starting the container.
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syscall
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.close_range(preserve_fds)
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.with_context(|| "failed to clean up extra fds")?;
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// Without no new privileges, seccomp is a privileged operation. We have to
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// do this before dropping capabilities. Otherwise, we should do it later,
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// as close to exec as possible.
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#[cfg(feature = "libseccomp")]
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if let Some(seccomp) = linux.seccomp() {
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if proc.no_new_privileges().is_none() {
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let notify_fd =
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seccomp::initialize_seccomp(seccomp).context("failed to execute seccomp")?;
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sync_seccomp(notify_fd, main_sender, init_receiver)
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.context("failed to sync seccomp")?;
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}
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}
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#[cfg(not(feature = "libseccomp"))]
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if proc.no_new_privileges().is_none() {
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warn!("seccomp not available, unable to enforce no_new_privileges!")
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}
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capabilities::reset_effective(syscall).context("failed to reset effective capabilities")?;
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if let Some(caps) = proc.capabilities() {
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capabilities::drop_privileges(caps, syscall).context("failed to drop capabilities")?;
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}
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// Change directory to process.cwd if process.cwd is not empty
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if do_chdir {
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unistd::chdir(proc.cwd()).with_context(|| format!("failed to chdir {:?}", proc.cwd()))?;
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}
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// add HOME into envs if not exists
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let home_in_envs = envs.iter().any(|x| x.starts_with("HOME="));
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if !home_in_envs {
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if let Some(dir_home) = utils::get_user_home(proc.user().uid()) {
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envs.push(format!("HOME={}", dir_home.to_string_lossy()));
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}
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}
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// Reset the process env based on oci spec.
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env::vars().for_each(|(key, _value)| env::remove_var(key));
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utils::parse_env(&envs)
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.iter()
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.for_each(|(key, value)| env::set_var(key, value));
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// Initialize seccomp profile right before we are ready to execute the
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// payload so as few syscalls will happen between here and payload exec. The
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// notify socket will still need network related syscalls.
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#[cfg(feature = "libseccomp")]
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if let Some(seccomp) = linux.seccomp() {
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if proc.no_new_privileges().is_some() {
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let notify_fd =
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seccomp::initialize_seccomp(seccomp).context("failed to execute seccomp")?;
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sync_seccomp(notify_fd, main_sender, init_receiver)
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.context("failed to sync seccomp")?;
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}
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}
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#[cfg(not(feature = "libseccomp"))]
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if proc.no_new_privileges().is_some() {
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warn!("seccomp not available, unable to set seccomp privileges!")
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}
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// this checks if the binary to run actually exists and if we have permissions to run it.
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// Taken from https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/25c9e888686773e7e06429133578038a9abc091d/libcontainer/standard_init_linux.go#L195-L206
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if let Some(args) = proc.args() {
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let path_var = {
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let mut ret: &str = "";
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for var in &envs {
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if var.starts_with("PATH=") {
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ret = var;
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}
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}
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ret
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};
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let executable_path = utils::get_executable_path(&args[0], path_var);
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match executable_path {
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None => bail!(
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"executable '{}' for container process does not exist",
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args[0]
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),
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Some(path) => {
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if !utils::is_executable(&path)? {
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bail!("file {:?} does not have executable permission set", path);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// Notify main process that the init process is ready to execute the
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// payload. Note, because we are already inside the pid namespace, the pid
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// outside the pid namespace should be recorded by the intermediate process
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// already.
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main_sender.init_ready()?;
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main_sender
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.close()
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.context("failed to close down main sender in init process")?;
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// listing on the notify socket for container start command
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args.notify_socket.wait_for_container_start()?;
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args.notify_socket.close()?;
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|
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// create_container hook needs to be called after the namespace setup, but
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// before pivot_root is called. This runs in the container namespaces.
|
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if matches!(args.container_type, ContainerType::InitContainer) {
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if let Some(hooks) = hooks {
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hooks::run_hooks(hooks.start_container().as_ref(), container)?
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}
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}
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if proc.args().is_some() {
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args.executor_manager.exec(spec)?;
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unreachable!("should not be back here");
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} else {
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bail!("on non-Windows, at least one process arg entry is required")
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}
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}
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// Before 3.19 it was possible for an unprivileged user to enter an user namespace,
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// become root and then call setgroups in order to drop membership in supplementary
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// groups. This allowed access to files which blocked access based on being a member
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// of these groups (see CVE-2014-8989)
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//
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// This leaves us with three scenarios:
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//
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// Unprivileged user starting a rootless container: The main process is running as an
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// unprivileged user and therefore cannot write the mapping until "deny" has been written
|
|
// to /proc/{pid}/setgroups. Once written /proc/{pid}/setgroups cannot be reset and the
|
|
// setgroups system call will be disabled for all processes in this user namespace. This
|
|
// also means that we should detect if the user is unprivileged and additional gids have
|
|
// been specified and bail out early as this can never work. This is not handled here,
|
|
// but during the validation for rootless containers.
|
|
//
|
|
// Privileged user starting a rootless container: It is not necessary to write "deny" to
|
|
// /proc/setgroups in order to create the gid mapping and therefore we don't. This means
|
|
// that setgroups could be used to drop groups, but this is fine as the user is privileged
|
|
// and could do so anyway.
|
|
// We already have checked during validation if the specified supplemental groups fall into
|
|
// the range that are specified in the gid mapping and bail out early if they do not.
|
|
//
|
|
// Privileged user starting a normal container: Just add the supplementary groups.
|
|
//
|
|
fn set_supplementary_gids(
|
|
user: &User,
|
|
rootless: &Option<Rootless>,
|
|
syscall: &dyn Syscall,
|
|
) -> Result<()> {
|
|
if let Some(additional_gids) = user.additional_gids() {
|
|
if additional_gids.is_empty() {
|
|
return Ok(());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let setgroups =
|
|
fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/setgroups").context("failed to read setgroups")?;
|
|
if setgroups.trim() == "deny" {
|
|
bail!("cannot set supplementary gids, setgroup is disabled");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let gids: Vec<Gid> = additional_gids
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.map(|gid| Gid::from_raw(*gid))
|
|
.collect();
|
|
|
|
match rootless {
|
|
Some(r) if r.privileged => {
|
|
syscall.set_groups(&gids).with_context(|| {
|
|
format!("failed to set privileged supplementary gids: {gids:?}")
|
|
})?;
|
|
}
|
|
None => {
|
|
syscall.set_groups(&gids).with_context(|| {
|
|
format!("failed to set unprivileged supplementary gids: {gids:?}")
|
|
})?;
|
|
}
|
|
// this should have been detected during validation
|
|
_ => unreachable!(
|
|
"unprivileged users cannot set supplementary gids in rootless container"
|
|
),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "libseccomp")]
|
|
fn sync_seccomp(
|
|
fd: Option<i32>,
|
|
main_sender: &mut channel::MainSender,
|
|
init_receiver: &mut channel::InitReceiver,
|
|
) -> Result<()> {
|
|
if let Some(fd) = fd {
|
|
log::debug!("init process sync seccomp, notify fd: {}", fd);
|
|
main_sender.seccomp_notify_request(fd)?;
|
|
init_receiver.wait_for_seccomp_request_done()?;
|
|
// Once we are sure the seccomp notify fd is sent, we can safely close
|
|
// it. The fd is now duplicated to the main process and sent to seccomp
|
|
// listener.
|
|
let _ = unistd::close(fd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
use crate::syscall::{
|
|
syscall::create_syscall,
|
|
test::{ArgName, MountArgs, TestHelperSyscall},
|
|
};
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "libseccomp")]
|
|
use nix::unistd;
|
|
use oci_spec::runtime::{LinuxNamespaceBuilder, SpecBuilder, UserBuilder};
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "libseccomp")]
|
|
use serial_test::serial;
|
|
use std::fs;
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_readonly_path() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let syscall = create_syscall();
|
|
readonly_path(Path::new("/proc/sys"), syscall.as_ref())?;
|
|
|
|
let want = vec![
|
|
MountArgs {
|
|
source: Some(PathBuf::from("/proc/sys")),
|
|
target: PathBuf::from("/proc/sys"),
|
|
fstype: None,
|
|
flags: MsFlags::MS_BIND | MsFlags::MS_REC,
|
|
data: None,
|
|
},
|
|
MountArgs {
|
|
source: Some(PathBuf::from("/proc/sys")),
|
|
target: PathBuf::from("/proc/sys"),
|
|
fstype: None,
|
|
flags: MsFlags::MS_NOSUID
|
|
| MsFlags::MS_NODEV
|
|
| MsFlags::MS_NOEXEC
|
|
| MsFlags::MS_BIND
|
|
| MsFlags::MS_REMOUNT
|
|
| MsFlags::MS_RDONLY,
|
|
data: None,
|
|
},
|
|
];
|
|
let got = syscall
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.get_mount_args();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(want, *got);
|
|
assert_eq!(got.len(), 2);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_apply_rest_namespaces() -> Result<()> {
|
|
let syscall = create_syscall();
|
|
let spec = SpecBuilder::default().build()?;
|
|
let linux_spaces = vec![
|
|
LinuxNamespaceBuilder::default()
|
|
.typ(LinuxNamespaceType::Uts)
|
|
.build()?,
|
|
LinuxNamespaceBuilder::default()
|
|
.typ(LinuxNamespaceType::Pid)
|
|
.build()?,
|
|
];
|
|
let namespaces = Namespaces::from(Some(&linux_spaces));
|
|
|
|
apply_rest_namespaces(&namespaces, &spec, syscall.as_ref())?;
|
|
|
|
let got_hostnames = syscall
|
|
.as_ref()
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.get_hostname_args();
|
|
assert_eq!(1, got_hostnames.len());
|
|
assert_eq!("youki".to_string(), got_hostnames[0]);
|
|
|
|
let got_domainnames = syscall
|
|
.as_ref()
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.get_domainname_args();
|
|
assert_eq!(0, got_domainnames.len());
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_set_supplementary_gids() -> Result<()> {
|
|
// gids additional gids is empty case
|
|
let user = UserBuilder::default().build().unwrap();
|
|
assert!(set_supplementary_gids(&user, &None, create_syscall().as_ref()).is_ok());
|
|
|
|
let tests = vec![
|
|
(
|
|
UserBuilder::default()
|
|
.additional_gids(vec![33, 34])
|
|
.build()?,
|
|
None::<Rootless>,
|
|
vec![vec![Gid::from_raw(33), Gid::from_raw(34)]],
|
|
),
|
|
// unreachable case
|
|
(
|
|
UserBuilder::default().build()?,
|
|
Some(Rootless::default()),
|
|
vec![],
|
|
),
|
|
(
|
|
UserBuilder::default()
|
|
.additional_gids(vec![37, 38])
|
|
.build()?,
|
|
Some(Rootless {
|
|
privileged: true,
|
|
gid_mappings: None,
|
|
newgidmap: None,
|
|
newuidmap: None,
|
|
uid_mappings: None,
|
|
user_namespace: None,
|
|
}),
|
|
vec![vec![Gid::from_raw(37), Gid::from_raw(38)]],
|
|
),
|
|
];
|
|
for (user, rootless, want) in tests.into_iter() {
|
|
let syscall = create_syscall();
|
|
let result = set_supplementary_gids(&user, &rootless, syscall.as_ref());
|
|
match fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/setgroups")?.trim() {
|
|
"deny" => {
|
|
assert!(result.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
"allow" => {
|
|
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
|
let got = syscall
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.get_groups_args();
|
|
assert_eq!(want, got);
|
|
}
|
|
_ => unreachable!("setgroups value unknown"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "libseccomp")]
|
|
fn test_sync_seccomp() -> Result<()> {
|
|
use std::os::unix::io::IntoRawFd;
|
|
use std::thread;
|
|
use utils::create_temp_dir;
|
|
|
|
let tmp_dir = create_temp_dir("test_sync_seccomp")?;
|
|
let tmp_file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
|
|
.write(true)
|
|
.create(true)
|
|
.open(tmp_dir.path().join("temp_file"))
|
|
.expect("create temp file failed");
|
|
|
|
let (mut main_sender, mut main_receiver) = channel::main_channel()?;
|
|
let (mut init_sender, mut init_receiver) = channel::init_channel()?;
|
|
|
|
let fd = tmp_file.into_raw_fd();
|
|
let th = thread::spawn(move || {
|
|
assert!(main_receiver.wait_for_seccomp_request().is_ok());
|
|
assert!(init_sender.seccomp_notify_done().is_ok());
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// sync_seccomp close the fd,
|
|
sync_seccomp(Some(fd), &mut main_sender, &mut init_receiver)?;
|
|
// so expecting close the same fd again will causing EBADF error.
|
|
assert_eq!(nix::errno::Errno::EBADF, unistd::close(fd).unwrap_err());
|
|
assert!(th.join().is_ok());
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_masked_path_does_not_exist() {
|
|
let syscall = create_syscall();
|
|
let mocks = syscall
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
mocks.set_ret_err(ArgName::Mount, || {
|
|
Err(SyscallError::MountFailed {
|
|
mount_source: None,
|
|
mount_target: PathBuf::new(),
|
|
fstype: None,
|
|
flags: MsFlags::empty(),
|
|
data: None,
|
|
errno: nix::errno::Errno::ENOENT,
|
|
})
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert!(masked_path(Path::new("/proc/self"), &None, syscall.as_ref()).is_ok());
|
|
let got = mocks.get_mount_args();
|
|
assert_eq!(0, got.len());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_masked_path_is_file_with_no_label() {
|
|
let syscall = create_syscall();
|
|
let mocks = syscall
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
mocks.set_ret_err(ArgName::Mount, || {
|
|
Err(SyscallError::MountFailed {
|
|
mount_source: None,
|
|
mount_target: PathBuf::new(),
|
|
fstype: None,
|
|
flags: MsFlags::empty(),
|
|
data: None,
|
|
errno: nix::errno::Errno::ENOTDIR,
|
|
})
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert!(masked_path(Path::new("/proc/self"), &None, syscall.as_ref()).is_ok());
|
|
|
|
let got = mocks.get_mount_args();
|
|
let want = MountArgs {
|
|
source: Some(PathBuf::from("tmpfs")),
|
|
target: PathBuf::from("/proc/self"),
|
|
fstype: Some("tmpfs".to_string()),
|
|
flags: MsFlags::MS_RDONLY,
|
|
data: Some("".to_string()),
|
|
};
|
|
assert_eq!(1, got.len());
|
|
assert_eq!(want, got[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_masked_path_is_file_with_label() {
|
|
let syscall = create_syscall();
|
|
let mocks = syscall
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
mocks.set_ret_err(ArgName::Mount, || {
|
|
Err(SyscallError::MountFailed {
|
|
mount_source: None,
|
|
mount_target: PathBuf::new(),
|
|
fstype: None,
|
|
flags: MsFlags::empty(),
|
|
data: None,
|
|
errno: nix::errno::Errno::ENOTDIR,
|
|
})
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert!(masked_path(
|
|
Path::new("/proc/self"),
|
|
&Some("default".to_string()),
|
|
syscall.as_ref()
|
|
)
|
|
.is_ok());
|
|
|
|
let got = mocks.get_mount_args();
|
|
let want = MountArgs {
|
|
source: Some(PathBuf::from("tmpfs")),
|
|
target: PathBuf::from("/proc/self"),
|
|
fstype: Some("tmpfs".to_string()),
|
|
flags: MsFlags::MS_RDONLY,
|
|
data: Some("context=\"default\"".to_string()),
|
|
};
|
|
assert_eq!(1, got.len());
|
|
assert_eq!(want, got[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_masked_path_with_unknown_error() {
|
|
let syscall = create_syscall();
|
|
let mocks = syscall
|
|
.as_any()
|
|
.downcast_ref::<TestHelperSyscall>()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
mocks.set_ret_err(ArgName::Mount, || {
|
|
Err(SyscallError::MountFailed {
|
|
mount_source: None,
|
|
mount_target: PathBuf::new(),
|
|
fstype: None,
|
|
flags: MsFlags::empty(),
|
|
data: None,
|
|
errno: nix::errno::Errno::UnknownErrno,
|
|
})
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert!(masked_path(Path::new("/proc/self"), &None, syscall.as_ref()).is_err());
|
|
let got = mocks.get_mount_args();
|
|
assert_eq!(0, got.len());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|