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git/transport.c

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#include "cache.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "transport.h"
#include "run-command.h"
#include "pkt-line.h"
#include "fetch-pack.h"
#include "remote.h"
#include "connect.h"
#include "send-pack.h"
#include "walker.h"
#include "bundle.h"
#include "dir.h"
#include "refs.h"
#include "branch.h"
#include "url.h"
#include "submodule.h"
#include "string-list.h"
#include "sha1-array.h"
#include "sigchain.h"
static void set_upstreams(struct transport *transport, struct ref *refs,
int pretend)
{
struct ref *ref;
for (ref = refs; ref; ref = ref->next) {
const char *localname;
const char *tmp;
const char *remotename;
int flag = 0;
/*
* Check suitability for tracking. Must be successful /
* already up-to-date ref create/modify (not delete).
*/
if (ref->status != REF_STATUS_OK &&
ref->status != REF_STATUS_UPTODATE)
continue;
if (!ref->peer_ref)
continue;
if (is_null_oid(&ref->new_oid))
continue;
/* Follow symbolic refs (mainly for HEAD). */
localname = ref->peer_ref->name;
remotename = ref->name;
tmp = resolve_ref_unsafe(localname, RESOLVE_REF_READING,
NULL, &flag);
if (tmp && flag & REF_ISSYMREF &&
starts_with(tmp, "refs/heads/"))
localname = tmp;
/* Both source and destination must be local branches. */
if (!localname || !starts_with(localname, "refs/heads/"))
continue;
if (!remotename || !starts_with(remotename, "refs/heads/"))
continue;
if (!pretend)
install_branch_config(BRANCH_CONFIG_VERBOSE,
localname + 11, transport->remote->name,
remotename);
else
printf(_("Would set upstream of '%s' to '%s' of '%s'\n"),
localname + 11, remotename + 11,
transport->remote->name);
}
}
struct bundle_transport_data {
int fd;
struct bundle_header header;
};
static struct ref *get_refs_from_bundle(struct transport *transport, int for_push)
{
struct bundle_transport_data *data = transport->data;
struct ref *result = NULL;
int i;
if (for_push)
return NULL;
if (data->fd > 0)
close(data->fd);
data->fd = read_bundle_header(transport->url, &data->header);
if (data->fd < 0)
die ("Could not read bundle '%s'.", transport->url);
for (i = 0; i < data->header.references.nr; i++) {
struct ref_list_entry *e = data->header.references.list + i;
struct ref *ref = alloc_ref(e->name);
oidcpy(&ref->old_oid, &e->oid);
ref->next = result;
result = ref;
}
return result;
}
static int fetch_refs_from_bundle(struct transport *transport,
int nr_heads, struct ref **to_fetch)
{
struct bundle_transport_data *data = transport->data;
return unbundle(&data->header, data->fd,
transport->progress ? BUNDLE_VERBOSE : 0);
}
static int close_bundle(struct transport *transport)
{
struct bundle_transport_data *data = transport->data;
if (data->fd > 0)
close(data->fd);
free(data);
return 0;
}
struct git_transport_data {
struct git_transport_options options;
struct child_process *conn;
int fd[2];
unsigned got_remote_heads : 1;
struct oid_array extra_have;
struct oid_array shallow;
};
static int set_git_option(struct git_transport_options *opts,
const char *name, const char *value)
{
if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_UPLOADPACK)) {
opts->uploadpack = value;
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_RECEIVEPACK)) {
opts->receivepack = value;
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_THIN)) {
opts->thin = !!value;
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_FOLLOWTAGS)) {
opts->followtags = !!value;
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_KEEP)) {
opts->keep = !!value;
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_UPDATE_SHALLOW)) {
opts->update_shallow = !!value;
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_DEPTH)) {
if (!value)
opts->depth = 0;
else {
char *end;
opts->depth = strtol(value, &end, 0);
if (*end)
die(_("transport: invalid depth option '%s'"), value);
}
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_DEEPEN_SINCE)) {
opts->deepen_since = value;
return 0;
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_DEEPEN_NOT)) {
opts->deepen_not = (const struct string_list *)value;
return 0;
fetch, upload-pack: --deepen=N extends shallow boundary by N commits In git-fetch, --depth argument is always relative with the latest remote refs. This makes it a bit difficult to cover this use case, where the user wants to make the shallow history, say 3 levels deeper. It would work if remote refs have not moved yet, but nobody can guarantee that, especially when that use case is performed a couple months after the last clone or "git fetch --depth". Also, modifying shallow boundary using --depth does not work well with clones created by --since or --not. This patch fixes that. A new argument --deepen=<N> will add <N> more (*) parent commits to the current history regardless of where remote refs are. Have/Want negotiation is still respected. So if remote refs move, the server will send two chunks: one between "have" and "want" and another to extend shallow history. In theory, the client could send no "want"s in order to get the second chunk only. But the protocol does not allow that. Either you send no want lines, which means ls-remote; or you have to send at least one want line that carries deep-relative to the server.. The main work was done by Dongcan Jiang. I fixed it up here and there. And of course all the bugs belong to me. (*) We could even support --deepen=<N> where <N> is negative. In that case we can cut some history from the shallow clone. This operation (and --depth=<shorter depth>) does not require interaction with remote side (and more complicated to implement as a result). Helped-by: Duy Nguyen <pclouds@gmail.com> Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Dongcan Jiang <dongcan.jiang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-06-12 12:54:09 +02:00
} else if (!strcmp(name, TRANS_OPT_DEEPEN_RELATIVE)) {
opts->deepen_relative = !!value;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int connect_setup(struct transport *transport, int for_push)
{
struct git_transport_data *data = transport->data;
int flags = transport->verbose > 0 ? CONNECT_VERBOSE : 0;
if (data->conn)
return 0;
switch (transport->family) {
case TRANSPORT_FAMILY_ALL: break;
case TRANSPORT_FAMILY_IPV4: flags |= CONNECT_IPV4; break;
case TRANSPORT_FAMILY_IPV6: flags |= CONNECT_IPV6; break;
}
data->conn = git_connect(data->fd, transport->url,
for_push ? data->options.receivepack :
data->options.uploadpack,
flags);
return 0;
}
static struct ref *get_refs_via_connect(struct transport *transport, int for_push)
{
struct git_transport_data *data = transport->data;
struct ref *refs;
connect_setup(transport, for_push);
get_remote_heads(data->fd[0], NULL, 0, &refs,
for_push ? REF_NORMAL : 0,
&data->extra_have,
&data->shallow);
data->got_remote_heads = 1;
return refs;
}
static int fetch_refs_via_pack(struct transport *transport,
int nr_heads, struct ref **to_fetch)
{
int ret = 0;
struct git_transport_data *data = transport->data;
struct ref *refs;
char *dest = xstrdup(transport->url);
struct fetch_pack_args args;
struct ref *refs_tmp = NULL;
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(args));
args.uploadpack = data->options.uploadpack;
args.keep_pack = data->options.keep;
args.lock_pack = 1;
args.use_thin_pack = data->options.thin;
args.include_tag = data->options.followtags;
make "git push -v" actually verbose Providing a single "-v" to "git push" currently does nothing. Giving two flags ("git push -v -v") turns on the first level of verbosity. This is caused by a regression introduced in 8afd8dc (push: support multiple levels of verbosity, 2010-02-24). Before the series containing 8afd8dc, the verbosity handling for fetching and pushing was completely separate. Commit bde873c refactored the verbosity handling out of the fetch side, and then 8afd8dc converted push to use the refactored code. However, the fetch and push sides numbered and passed along their verbosity levels differently. For both, a verbosity level of "-1" meant "quiet", and "0" meant "default output". But from there they differed. For fetch, a verbosity level of "1" indicated to the "fetch" program that it should make the status table slightly more verbose, showing up-to-date entries. A verbosity level of "2" meant that we should pass a verbose flag to the transport; in the case of fetch-pack, this displays protocol debugging information. As a result, the refactored code in bde873c checks for "verbosity >= 2", and only then passes it on to the transport. From the transport code's perspective, a verbosity of 0 or 1 both meant "0". Push, on the other hand, does not show its own status table; that is always handled by the transport layer or below (originally send-pack itself, but these days it is done by the transport code). So a verbosity level of 1 meant that we should pass the verbose flag to send-pack, so that it knows we want a verbose status table. However, once 8afd8dc switched it to the refactored fetch code, a verbosity level of 1 was now being ignored. Thus, you needed to artificially bump the verbosity to 2 (via "-v -v") to have any effect. We can fix this by letting the transport code know about the true verbosity level (i.e., let it distinguish level 0 or 1). We then have to also make an adjustment to any transport methods that assumed "verbose > 0" meant they could spew lots of debugging information. Before, they could only get "0" or "2", but now they will also receive "1". They need to adjust their condition for turning on such spew from "verbose > 0" to "verbose > 1". Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2011-12-17 10:37:15 +01:00
args.verbose = (transport->verbose > 1);
args.quiet = (transport->verbose < 0);
args.no_progress = !transport->progress;
args.depth = data->options.depth;
args.deepen_since = data->options.deepen_since;
args.deepen_not = data->options.deepen_not;
fetch, upload-pack: --deepen=N extends shallow boundary by N commits In git-fetch, --depth argument is always relative with the latest remote refs. This makes it a bit difficult to cover this use case, where the user wants to make the shallow history, say 3 levels deeper. It would work if remote refs have not moved yet, but nobody can guarantee that, especially when that use case is performed a couple months after the last clone or "git fetch --depth". Also, modifying shallow boundary using --depth does not work well with clones created by --since or --not. This patch fixes that. A new argument --deepen=<N> will add <N> more (*) parent commits to the current history regardless of where remote refs are. Have/Want negotiation is still respected. So if remote refs move, the server will send two chunks: one between "have" and "want" and another to extend shallow history. In theory, the client could send no "want"s in order to get the second chunk only. But the protocol does not allow that. Either you send no want lines, which means ls-remote; or you have to send at least one want line that carries deep-relative to the server.. The main work was done by Dongcan Jiang. I fixed it up here and there. And of course all the bugs belong to me. (*) We could even support --deepen=<N> where <N> is negative. In that case we can cut some history from the shallow clone. This operation (and --depth=<shorter depth>) does not require interaction with remote side (and more complicated to implement as a result). Helped-by: Duy Nguyen <pclouds@gmail.com> Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Dongcan Jiang <dongcan.jiang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-06-12 12:54:09 +02:00
args.deepen_relative = data->options.deepen_relative;
clone: open a shortcut for connectivity check In order to make sure the cloned repository is good, we run "rev-list --objects --not --all $new_refs" on the repository. This is expensive on large repositories. This patch attempts to mitigate the impact in this special case. In the "good" clone case, we only have one pack. If all of the following are met, we can be sure that all objects reachable from the new refs exist, which is the intention of running "rev-list ...": - all refs point to an object in the pack - there are no dangling pointers in any object in the pack - no objects in the pack point to objects outside the pack The second and third checks can be done with the help of index-pack as a slight variation of --strict check (which introduces a new condition for the shortcut: pack transfer must be used and the number of objects large enough to call index-pack). The first is checked in check_everything_connected after we get an "ok" from index-pack. "index-pack + new checks" is still faster than the current "index-pack + rev-list", which is the whole point of this patch. If any of the conditions fail, we fall back to the good old but expensive "rev-list ..". In that case it's even more expensive because we have to pay for the new checks in index-pack. But that should only happen when the other side is either buggy or malicious. Cloning linux-2.6 over file:// before after real 3m25.693s 2m53.050s user 5m2.037s 4m42.396s sys 0m13.750s 0m16.574s A more realistic test with ssh:// over wireless before after real 11m26.629s 10m4.213s user 5m43.196s 5m19.444s sys 0m35.812s 0m37.630s This shortcut is not applied to shallow clones, partly because shallow clones should have no more objects than a usual fetch and the cost of rev-list is acceptable, partly to avoid dealing with corner cases when grafting is involved. This shortcut does not apply to unpack-objects code path either because the number of objects must be small in order to trigger that code path. Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-05-26 03:16:17 +02:00
args.check_self_contained_and_connected =
data->options.check_self_contained_and_connected;
args.cloning = transport->cloning;
args.update_shallow = data->options.update_shallow;
if (!data->got_remote_heads) {
connect_setup(transport, 0);
get_remote_heads(data->fd[0], NULL, 0, &refs_tmp, 0,
NULL, &data->shallow);
data->got_remote_heads = 1;
}
refs = fetch_pack(&args, data->fd, data->conn,
refs_tmp ? refs_tmp : transport->remote_refs,
dest, to_fetch, nr_heads, &data->shallow,
&transport->pack_lockfile);
close(data->fd[0]);
close(data->fd[1]);
if (finish_connect(data->conn))
ret = -1;
data->conn = NULL;
data->got_remote_heads = 0;
clone: open a shortcut for connectivity check In order to make sure the cloned repository is good, we run "rev-list --objects --not --all $new_refs" on the repository. This is expensive on large repositories. This patch attempts to mitigate the impact in this special case. In the "good" clone case, we only have one pack. If all of the following are met, we can be sure that all objects reachable from the new refs exist, which is the intention of running "rev-list ...": - all refs point to an object in the pack - there are no dangling pointers in any object in the pack - no objects in the pack point to objects outside the pack The second and third checks can be done with the help of index-pack as a slight variation of --strict check (which introduces a new condition for the shortcut: pack transfer must be used and the number of objects large enough to call index-pack). The first is checked in check_everything_connected after we get an "ok" from index-pack. "index-pack + new checks" is still faster than the current "index-pack + rev-list", which is the whole point of this patch. If any of the conditions fail, we fall back to the good old but expensive "rev-list ..". In that case it's even more expensive because we have to pay for the new checks in index-pack. But that should only happen when the other side is either buggy or malicious. Cloning linux-2.6 over file:// before after real 3m25.693s 2m53.050s user 5m2.037s 4m42.396s sys 0m13.750s 0m16.574s A more realistic test with ssh:// over wireless before after real 11m26.629s 10m4.213s user 5m43.196s 5m19.444s sys 0m35.812s 0m37.630s This shortcut is not applied to shallow clones, partly because shallow clones should have no more objects than a usual fetch and the cost of rev-list is acceptable, partly to avoid dealing with corner cases when grafting is involved. This shortcut does not apply to unpack-objects code path either because the number of objects must be small in order to trigger that code path. Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-05-26 03:16:17 +02:00
data->options.self_contained_and_connected =
args.self_contained_and_connected;
if (refs == NULL)
ret = -1;
if (report_unmatched_refs(to_fetch, nr_heads))
ret = -1;
free_refs(refs_tmp);
free_refs(refs);
free(dest);
return ret;
}
static int push_had_errors(struct ref *ref)
{
for (; ref; ref = ref->next) {
switch (ref->status) {
case REF_STATUS_NONE:
case REF_STATUS_UPTODATE:
case REF_STATUS_OK:
break;
default:
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int transport_refs_pushed(struct ref *ref)
{
for (; ref; ref = ref->next) {
switch(ref->status) {
case REF_STATUS_NONE:
case REF_STATUS_UPTODATE:
break;
default:
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
void transport_update_tracking_ref(struct remote *remote, struct ref *ref, int verbose)
{
struct refspec rs;
if (ref->status != REF_STATUS_OK && ref->status != REF_STATUS_UPTODATE)
return;
rs.src = ref->name;
rs.dst = NULL;
if (!remote_find_tracking(remote, &rs)) {
if (verbose)
fprintf(stderr, "updating local tracking ref '%s'\n", rs.dst);
if (ref->deletion) {
delete_ref(NULL, rs.dst, NULL, 0);
} else
update_ref("update by push", rs.dst,
ref->new_oid.hash, NULL, 0, 0);
free(rs.dst);
}
}
static void print_ref_status(char flag, const char *summary,
struct ref *to, struct ref *from, const char *msg,
int porcelain, int summary_width)
{
if (porcelain) {
if (from)
fprintf(stdout, "%c\t%s:%s\t", flag, from->name, to->name);
else
fprintf(stdout, "%c\t:%s\t", flag, to->name);
if (msg)
fprintf(stdout, "%s (%s)\n", summary, msg);
else
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", summary);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, " %c %-*s ", flag, summary_width, summary);
if (from)
fprintf(stderr, "%s -> %s", prettify_refname(from->name), prettify_refname(to->name));
else
fputs(prettify_refname(to->name), stderr);
if (msg) {
fputs(" (", stderr);
fputs(msg, stderr);
fputc(')', stderr);
}
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
}
static void print_ok_ref_status(struct ref *ref, int porcelain, int summary_width)
{
if (ref->deletion)
print_ref_status('-', "[deleted]", ref, NULL, NULL,
porcelain, summary_width);
else if (is_null_oid(&ref->old_oid))
print_ref_status('*',
(starts_with(ref->name, "refs/tags/") ? "[new tag]" :
"[new branch]"),
ref, ref->peer_ref, NULL, porcelain, summary_width);
else {
struct strbuf quickref = STRBUF_INIT;
char type;
const char *msg;
strbuf_add_unique_abbrev(&quickref, ref->old_oid.hash,
DEFAULT_ABBREV);
if (ref->forced_update) {
strbuf_addstr(&quickref, "...");
type = '+';
msg = "forced update";
} else {
strbuf_addstr(&quickref, "..");
type = ' ';
msg = NULL;
}
strbuf_add_unique_abbrev(&quickref, ref->new_oid.hash,
DEFAULT_ABBREV);
print_ref_status(type, quickref.buf, ref, ref->peer_ref, msg,
porcelain, summary_width);
strbuf_release(&quickref);
}
}
static int print_one_push_status(struct ref *ref, const char *dest, int count,
int porcelain, int summary_width)
{
if (!count) {
char *url = transport_anonymize_url(dest);
fprintf(porcelain ? stdout : stderr, "To %s\n", url);
free(url);
}
switch(ref->status) {
case REF_STATUS_NONE:
print_ref_status('X', "[no match]", ref, NULL, NULL,
porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_REJECT_NODELETE:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, NULL,
"remote does not support deleting refs",
porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_UPTODATE:
print_ref_status('=', "[up to date]", ref,
ref->peer_ref, NULL, porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_REJECT_NONFASTFORWARD:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, ref->peer_ref,
"non-fast-forward", porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_REJECT_ALREADY_EXISTS:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, ref->peer_ref,
"already exists", porcelain, summary_width);
break;
push: introduce REJECT_FETCH_FIRST and REJECT_NEEDS_FORCE When we push to update an existing ref, if: * the object at the tip of the remote is not a commit; or * the object we are pushing is not a commit, it won't be correct to suggest to fetch, integrate and push again, as the old and new objects will not "merge". We should explain that the push must be forced when there is a non-committish object is involved in such a case. If we do not have the current object at the tip of the remote, we do not even know that object, when fetched, is something that can be merged. In such a case, suggesting to pull first just like non-fast-forward case may not be technically correct, but in practice, most such failures are seen when you try to push your work to a branch without knowing that somebody else already pushed to update the same branch since you forked, so "pull first" would work as a suggestion most of the time. And if the object at the tip is not a commit, "pull first" will fail, without making any permanent damage. As a side effect, it also makes the error message the user will get during the next "push" attempt easier to understand, now the user is aware that a non-commit object is involved. In these cases, the current code already rejects such a push on the client end, but we used the same error and advice messages as the ones used when rejecting a non-fast-forward push, i.e. pull from there and integrate before pushing again. Introduce new rejection reasons and reword the messages appropriately. [jc: with help by Peff on message details] Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-23 22:55:30 +01:00
case REF_STATUS_REJECT_FETCH_FIRST:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, ref->peer_ref,
"fetch first", porcelain, summary_width);
push: introduce REJECT_FETCH_FIRST and REJECT_NEEDS_FORCE When we push to update an existing ref, if: * the object at the tip of the remote is not a commit; or * the object we are pushing is not a commit, it won't be correct to suggest to fetch, integrate and push again, as the old and new objects will not "merge". We should explain that the push must be forced when there is a non-committish object is involved in such a case. If we do not have the current object at the tip of the remote, we do not even know that object, when fetched, is something that can be merged. In such a case, suggesting to pull first just like non-fast-forward case may not be technically correct, but in practice, most such failures are seen when you try to push your work to a branch without knowing that somebody else already pushed to update the same branch since you forked, so "pull first" would work as a suggestion most of the time. And if the object at the tip is not a commit, "pull first" will fail, without making any permanent damage. As a side effect, it also makes the error message the user will get during the next "push" attempt easier to understand, now the user is aware that a non-commit object is involved. In these cases, the current code already rejects such a push on the client end, but we used the same error and advice messages as the ones used when rejecting a non-fast-forward push, i.e. pull from there and integrate before pushing again. Introduce new rejection reasons and reword the messages appropriately. [jc: with help by Peff on message details] Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-23 22:55:30 +01:00
break;
case REF_STATUS_REJECT_NEEDS_FORCE:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, ref->peer_ref,
"needs force", porcelain, summary_width);
push: introduce REJECT_FETCH_FIRST and REJECT_NEEDS_FORCE When we push to update an existing ref, if: * the object at the tip of the remote is not a commit; or * the object we are pushing is not a commit, it won't be correct to suggest to fetch, integrate and push again, as the old and new objects will not "merge". We should explain that the push must be forced when there is a non-committish object is involved in such a case. If we do not have the current object at the tip of the remote, we do not even know that object, when fetched, is something that can be merged. In such a case, suggesting to pull first just like non-fast-forward case may not be technically correct, but in practice, most such failures are seen when you try to push your work to a branch without knowing that somebody else already pushed to update the same branch since you forked, so "pull first" would work as a suggestion most of the time. And if the object at the tip is not a commit, "pull first" will fail, without making any permanent damage. As a side effect, it also makes the error message the user will get during the next "push" attempt easier to understand, now the user is aware that a non-commit object is involved. In these cases, the current code already rejects such a push on the client end, but we used the same error and advice messages as the ones used when rejecting a non-fast-forward push, i.e. pull from there and integrate before pushing again. Introduce new rejection reasons and reword the messages appropriately. [jc: with help by Peff on message details] Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-23 22:55:30 +01:00
break;
case REF_STATUS_REJECT_STALE:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, ref->peer_ref,
"stale info", porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_REJECT_SHALLOW:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, ref->peer_ref,
"new shallow roots not allowed",
porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_REMOTE_REJECT:
print_ref_status('!', "[remote rejected]", ref,
ref->deletion ? NULL : ref->peer_ref,
ref->remote_status, porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_EXPECTING_REPORT:
print_ref_status('!', "[remote failure]", ref,
ref->deletion ? NULL : ref->peer_ref,
"remote failed to report status",
porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_ATOMIC_PUSH_FAILED:
print_ref_status('!', "[rejected]", ref, ref->peer_ref,
"atomic push failed", porcelain, summary_width);
break;
case REF_STATUS_OK:
print_ok_ref_status(ref, porcelain, summary_width);
break;
}
return 1;
}
static int measure_abbrev(const struct object_id *oid, int sofar)
{
char hex[GIT_MAX_HEXSZ + 1];
int w = find_unique_abbrev_r(hex, oid->hash, DEFAULT_ABBREV);
return (w < sofar) ? sofar : w;
}
int transport_summary_width(const struct ref *refs)
{
int maxw = -1;
for (; refs; refs = refs->next) {
maxw = measure_abbrev(&refs->old_oid, maxw);
maxw = measure_abbrev(&refs->new_oid, maxw);
}
if (maxw < 0)
maxw = FALLBACK_DEFAULT_ABBREV;
return (2 * maxw + 3);
}
void transport_print_push_status(const char *dest, struct ref *refs,
int verbose, int porcelain, unsigned int *reject_reasons)
{
struct ref *ref;
int n = 0;
push: Provide situational hints for non-fast-forward errors Pushing a non-fast-forward update to a remote repository will result in an error, but the hint text doesn't provide the correct resolution in every case. Give better resolution advice in three push scenarios: 1) If you push your current branch and it triggers a non-fast-forward error, you should merge remote changes with 'git pull' before pushing again. 2) If you push to a shared repository others push to, and your local tracking branches are not kept up to date, the 'matching refs' default will generate non-fast-forward errors on outdated branches. If this is your workflow, the 'matching refs' default is not for you. Consider setting the 'push.default' configuration variable to 'current' or 'upstream' to ensure only your current branch is pushed. 3) If you explicitly specify a ref that is not your current branch or push matching branches with ':', you will generate a non-fast-forward error if any pushed branch tip is out of date. You should checkout the offending branch and merge remote changes before pushing again. Teach transport.c to recognize these scenarios and configure push.c to hint for them. If 'git push's default behavior changes or we discover more scenarios, extension is easy. Standardize on the advice API and add three new advice variables, 'pushNonFFCurrent', 'pushNonFFDefault', and 'pushNonFFMatching'. Setting any of these to 'false' will disable their affiliated advice. Setting 'pushNonFastForward' to false will disable all three, thus preserving the config option for users who already set it, but guaranteeing new users won't disable push advice accidentally. Based-on-patch-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Christopher Tiwald <christiwald@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-03-20 05:31:33 +01:00
char *head;
int summary_width = transport_summary_width(refs);
push: Provide situational hints for non-fast-forward errors Pushing a non-fast-forward update to a remote repository will result in an error, but the hint text doesn't provide the correct resolution in every case. Give better resolution advice in three push scenarios: 1) If you push your current branch and it triggers a non-fast-forward error, you should merge remote changes with 'git pull' before pushing again. 2) If you push to a shared repository others push to, and your local tracking branches are not kept up to date, the 'matching refs' default will generate non-fast-forward errors on outdated branches. If this is your workflow, the 'matching refs' default is not for you. Consider setting the 'push.default' configuration variable to 'current' or 'upstream' to ensure only your current branch is pushed. 3) If you explicitly specify a ref that is not your current branch or push matching branches with ':', you will generate a non-fast-forward error if any pushed branch tip is out of date. You should checkout the offending branch and merge remote changes before pushing again. Teach transport.c to recognize these scenarios and configure push.c to hint for them. If 'git push's default behavior changes or we discover more scenarios, extension is easy. Standardize on the advice API and add three new advice variables, 'pushNonFFCurrent', 'pushNonFFDefault', and 'pushNonFFMatching'. Setting any of these to 'false' will disable their affiliated advice. Setting 'pushNonFastForward' to false will disable all three, thus preserving the config option for users who already set it, but guaranteeing new users won't disable push advice accidentally. Based-on-patch-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Christopher Tiwald <christiwald@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-03-20 05:31:33 +01:00
head = resolve_refdup("HEAD", RESOLVE_REF_READING, NULL, NULL);
if (verbose) {
for (ref = refs; ref; ref = ref->next)
if (ref->status == REF_STATUS_UPTODATE)
n += print_one_push_status(ref, dest, n,
porcelain, summary_width);
}
for (ref = refs; ref; ref = ref->next)
if (ref->status == REF_STATUS_OK)
n += print_one_push_status(ref, dest, n,
porcelain, summary_width);
*reject_reasons = 0;
for (ref = refs; ref; ref = ref->next) {
if (ref->status != REF_STATUS_NONE &&
ref->status != REF_STATUS_UPTODATE &&
ref->status != REF_STATUS_OK)
n += print_one_push_status(ref, dest, n,
porcelain, summary_width);
if (ref->status == REF_STATUS_REJECT_NONFASTFORWARD) {
if (head != NULL && !strcmp(head, ref->name))
*reject_reasons |= REJECT_NON_FF_HEAD;
push: Provide situational hints for non-fast-forward errors Pushing a non-fast-forward update to a remote repository will result in an error, but the hint text doesn't provide the correct resolution in every case. Give better resolution advice in three push scenarios: 1) If you push your current branch and it triggers a non-fast-forward error, you should merge remote changes with 'git pull' before pushing again. 2) If you push to a shared repository others push to, and your local tracking branches are not kept up to date, the 'matching refs' default will generate non-fast-forward errors on outdated branches. If this is your workflow, the 'matching refs' default is not for you. Consider setting the 'push.default' configuration variable to 'current' or 'upstream' to ensure only your current branch is pushed. 3) If you explicitly specify a ref that is not your current branch or push matching branches with ':', you will generate a non-fast-forward error if any pushed branch tip is out of date. You should checkout the offending branch and merge remote changes before pushing again. Teach transport.c to recognize these scenarios and configure push.c to hint for them. If 'git push's default behavior changes or we discover more scenarios, extension is easy. Standardize on the advice API and add three new advice variables, 'pushNonFFCurrent', 'pushNonFFDefault', and 'pushNonFFMatching'. Setting any of these to 'false' will disable their affiliated advice. Setting 'pushNonFastForward' to false will disable all three, thus preserving the config option for users who already set it, but guaranteeing new users won't disable push advice accidentally. Based-on-patch-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Christopher Tiwald <christiwald@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-03-20 05:31:33 +01:00
else
*reject_reasons |= REJECT_NON_FF_OTHER;
} else if (ref->status == REF_STATUS_REJECT_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
*reject_reasons |= REJECT_ALREADY_EXISTS;
push: introduce REJECT_FETCH_FIRST and REJECT_NEEDS_FORCE When we push to update an existing ref, if: * the object at the tip of the remote is not a commit; or * the object we are pushing is not a commit, it won't be correct to suggest to fetch, integrate and push again, as the old and new objects will not "merge". We should explain that the push must be forced when there is a non-committish object is involved in such a case. If we do not have the current object at the tip of the remote, we do not even know that object, when fetched, is something that can be merged. In such a case, suggesting to pull first just like non-fast-forward case may not be technically correct, but in practice, most such failures are seen when you try to push your work to a branch without knowing that somebody else already pushed to update the same branch since you forked, so "pull first" would work as a suggestion most of the time. And if the object at the tip is not a commit, "pull first" will fail, without making any permanent damage. As a side effect, it also makes the error message the user will get during the next "push" attempt easier to understand, now the user is aware that a non-commit object is involved. In these cases, the current code already rejects such a push on the client end, but we used the same error and advice messages as the ones used when rejecting a non-fast-forward push, i.e. pull from there and integrate before pushing again. Introduce new rejection reasons and reword the messages appropriately. [jc: with help by Peff on message details] Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-23 22:55:30 +01:00
} else if (ref->status == REF_STATUS_REJECT_FETCH_FIRST) {
*reject_reasons |= REJECT_FETCH_FIRST;
} else if (ref->status == REF_STATUS_REJECT_NEEDS_FORCE) {
*reject_reasons |= REJECT_NEEDS_FORCE;
push: Provide situational hints for non-fast-forward errors Pushing a non-fast-forward update to a remote repository will result in an error, but the hint text doesn't provide the correct resolution in every case. Give better resolution advice in three push scenarios: 1) If you push your current branch and it triggers a non-fast-forward error, you should merge remote changes with 'git pull' before pushing again. 2) If you push to a shared repository others push to, and your local tracking branches are not kept up to date, the 'matching refs' default will generate non-fast-forward errors on outdated branches. If this is your workflow, the 'matching refs' default is not for you. Consider setting the 'push.default' configuration variable to 'current' or 'upstream' to ensure only your current branch is pushed. 3) If you explicitly specify a ref that is not your current branch or push matching branches with ':', you will generate a non-fast-forward error if any pushed branch tip is out of date. You should checkout the offending branch and merge remote changes before pushing again. Teach transport.c to recognize these scenarios and configure push.c to hint for them. If 'git push's default behavior changes or we discover more scenarios, extension is easy. Standardize on the advice API and add three new advice variables, 'pushNonFFCurrent', 'pushNonFFDefault', and 'pushNonFFMatching'. Setting any of these to 'false' will disable their affiliated advice. Setting 'pushNonFastForward' to false will disable all three, thus preserving the config option for users who already set it, but guaranteeing new users won't disable push advice accidentally. Based-on-patch-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Christopher Tiwald <christiwald@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-03-20 05:31:33 +01:00
}
}
free(head);
}
void transport_verify_remote_names(int nr_heads, const char **heads)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_heads; i++) {
const char *local = heads[i];
const char *remote = strrchr(heads[i], ':');
if (*local == '+')
local++;
/* A matching refspec is okay. */
if (remote == local && remote[1] == '\0')
continue;
remote = remote ? (remote + 1) : local;
if (check_refname_format(remote,
REFNAME_ALLOW_ONELEVEL|REFNAME_REFSPEC_PATTERN))
die("remote part of refspec is not a valid name in %s",
heads[i]);
}
}
static int git_transport_push(struct transport *transport, struct ref *remote_refs, int flags)
{
struct git_transport_data *data = transport->data;
struct send_pack_args args;
int ret;
if (!data->got_remote_heads) {
struct ref *tmp_refs;
connect_setup(transport, 1);
get_remote_heads(data->fd[0], NULL, 0, &tmp_refs, REF_NORMAL,
NULL, &data->shallow);
data->got_remote_heads = 1;
}
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(args));
args.send_mirror = !!(flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_MIRROR);
args.force_update = !!(flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_FORCE);
args.use_thin_pack = data->options.thin;
args.verbose = (transport->verbose > 0);
args.quiet = (transport->verbose < 0);
args.progress = transport->progress;
args.dry_run = !!(flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_DRY_RUN);
args.porcelain = !!(flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_PORCELAIN);
args.atomic = !!(flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_ATOMIC);
args.push_options = transport->push_options;
args.url = transport->url;
if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_CERT_ALWAYS)
args.push_cert = SEND_PACK_PUSH_CERT_ALWAYS;
else if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_CERT_IF_ASKED)
args.push_cert = SEND_PACK_PUSH_CERT_IF_ASKED;
else
args.push_cert = SEND_PACK_PUSH_CERT_NEVER;
ret = send_pack(&args, data->fd, data->conn, remote_refs,
&data->extra_have);
close(data->fd[1]);
close(data->fd[0]);
ret |= finish_connect(data->conn);
data->conn = NULL;
data->got_remote_heads = 0;
return ret;
}
static int connect_git(struct transport *transport, const char *name,
const char *executable, int fd[2])
{
struct git_transport_data *data = transport->data;
data->conn = git_connect(data->fd, transport->url,
executable, 0);
fd[0] = data->fd[0];
fd[1] = data->fd[1];
return 0;
}
static int disconnect_git(struct transport *transport)
{
struct git_transport_data *data = transport->data;
if (data->conn) {
if (data->got_remote_heads)
packet_flush(data->fd[1]);
close(data->fd[0]);
close(data->fd[1]);
finish_connect(data->conn);
}
free(data);
return 0;
}
void transport_take_over(struct transport *transport,
struct child_process *child)
{
struct git_transport_data *data;
if (!transport->smart_options)
die("BUG: taking over transport requires non-NULL "
"smart_options field.");
data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
data->options = *transport->smart_options;
data->conn = child;
data->fd[0] = data->conn->out;
data->fd[1] = data->conn->in;
data->got_remote_heads = 0;
transport->data = data;
transport->set_option = NULL;
transport->get_refs_list = get_refs_via_connect;
transport->fetch = fetch_refs_via_pack;
transport->push = NULL;
transport->push_refs = git_transport_push;
transport->disconnect = disconnect_git;
transport->smart_options = &(data->options);
fetch: work around "transport-take-over" hack A Git-aware "connect" transport allows the "transport_take_over" to redirect generic transport requests like fetch(), push_refs() and get_refs_list() to the native Git transport handling methods. The take-over process replaces transport->data with a fake data that these method implementations understand. While this hack works OK for a single request, it breaks when the transport needs to make more than one requests. transport->data that used to hold necessary information for the specific helper to work correctly is destroyed during the take-over process. One codepath that this matters is "git fetch" in auto-follow mode; when it does not get all the tags that ought to point at the history it got (which can be determined by looking at the peeled tags in the initial advertisement) from the primary transfer, it internally makes a second request to complete the fetch. Because "take-over" hack has already destroyed the data necessary to talk to the transport helper by the time this happens, the second request cannot make a request to the helper to make another connection to fetch these additional tags. Mark such a transport as "cannot_reuse", and use a separate transport to perform the backfill fetch in order to work around this breakage. Note that this problem does not manifest itself when running t5802, because our upload-pack gives you all the necessary auto-followed tags during the primary transfer. You would need to step through "git fetch" in a debugger, stop immediately after the primary transfer finishes and writes these auto-followed tags, remove the tag references and repack/prune the repository to convince the "find-non-local-tags" procedure that the primary transfer failed to give us all the necessary tags, and then let it continue, in order to trigger the bug in the secondary transfer this patch fixes. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-08-08 00:47:18 +02:00
transport->cannot_reuse = 1;
}
static int is_file(const char *url)
{
struct stat buf;
if (stat(url, &buf))
return 0;
return S_ISREG(buf.st_mode);
}
static int external_specification_len(const char *url)
{
return strchr(url, ':') - url;
}
static const struct string_list *protocol_whitelist(void)
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
{
static int enabled = -1;
static struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
if (enabled < 0) {
const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
if (v) {
string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
string_list_sort(&allowed);
enabled = 1;
} else {
enabled = 0;
}
}
return enabled ? &allowed : NULL;
}
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
enum protocol_allow_config {
PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER = 0,
PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY,
PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS
};
static enum protocol_allow_config parse_protocol_config(const char *key,
const char *value)
{
transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
if (!strcasecmp(value, "always"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS;
else if (!strcasecmp(value, "never"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER;
else if (!strcasecmp(value, "user"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY;
die("unknown value for config '%s': %s", key, value);
}
transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
static enum protocol_allow_config get_protocol_config(const char *type)
{
transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
char *key = xstrfmt("protocol.%s.allow", type);
char *value;
/* first check the per-protocol config */
if (!git_config_get_string(key, &value)) {
enum protocol_allow_config ret =
parse_protocol_config(key, value);
free(key);
free(value);
return ret;
}
free(key);
/* if defined, fallback to user-defined default for unknown protocols */
if (!git_config_get_string("protocol.allow", &value)) {
enum protocol_allow_config ret =
parse_protocol_config("protocol.allow", value);
free(value);
return ret;
}
/* fallback to built-in defaults */
/* known safe */
if (!strcmp(type, "http") ||
!strcmp(type, "https") ||
!strcmp(type, "git") ||
!strcmp(type, "ssh") ||
!strcmp(type, "file"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS;
/* known scary; err on the side of caution */
if (!strcmp(type, "ext"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER;
/* unknown; by default let them be used only directly by the user */
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY;
}
int is_transport_allowed(const char *type, int from_user)
{
transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
const struct string_list *whitelist = protocol_whitelist();
if (whitelist)
return string_list_has_string(whitelist, type);
switch (get_protocol_config(type)) {
case PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS:
return 1;
case PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER:
return 0;
case PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY:
if (from_user < 0)
from_user = git_env_bool("GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER", 1);
return from_user;
transport: add protocol policy config option Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push commands. This patch introduces new configuration options for more fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols. This also has the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is non-trivial. Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option. A default policy for all unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config option. If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other protocols. The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`. The `user` policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g. recursive initialization of submodules). Commands which can potentially clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used. Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext protocol to be tested. Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-12-14 23:39:52 +01:00
}
die("BUG: invalid protocol_allow_config type");
}
void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
{
if (!is_transport_allowed(type, -1))
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
die("transport '%s' not allowed", type);
}
struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
{
const char *helper;
struct transport *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->progress = isatty(2);
if (!remote)
die("No remote provided to transport_get()");
ret->got_remote_refs = 0;
ret->remote = remote;
helper = remote->foreign_vcs;
if (!url && remote->url)
url = remote->url[0];
ret->url = url;
/* maybe it is a foreign URL? */
if (url) {
const char *p = url;
while (is_urlschemechar(p == url, *p))
p++;
if (starts_with(p, "::"))
helper = xstrndup(url, p - url);
}
if (helper) {
transport_helper_init(ret, helper);
} else if (starts_with(url, "rsync:")) {
transport: drop support for git-over-rsync The git-over-rsync protocol is inefficient and broken, and has been for a long time. It transfers way more objects than it needs (grabbing all of the remote's "objects/", regardless of which objects we need). It does its own ad-hoc parsing of loose and packed refs from the remote, but doesn't properly override packed refs with loose ones, leading to garbage results (e.g., expecting the other side to have an object pointed to by a stale packed-refs entry, or complaining that the other side has two copies of the refs[1]). This latter breakage means that nobody could have successfully pulled from a moderately active repository since cd547b4 (fetch/push: readd rsync support, 2007-10-01). We never made an official deprecation notice in the release notes for git's rsync protocol, but the tutorial has marked it as such since 914328a (Update tutorial., 2005-08-30). And on the mailing list as far back as Oct 2005, we can find Junio mentioning it as having "been deprecated for quite some time."[2,3,4]. So it was old news then; cogito had deprecated the transport in July of 2005[5] (though it did come back briefly when Linus broke git-http-pull!). Of course some people professed their love of rsync through 2006, but Linus clarified in his usual gentle manner[6]: > Thanks! This is why I still use rsync, even though > everybody and their mother tells me "Linus says rsync is > deprecated." No. You're using rsync because you're actively doing something _wrong_. The deprecation sentiment was reinforced in 2008, with a mention that cloning via rsync is broken (with no fix)[7]. Even the commit porting rsync over to C from shell (cd547b4) lists it as deprecated! So between the 10 years of informal warnings, and the fact that it has been severely broken since 2007, it's probably safe to simply remove it without further deprecation warnings. [1] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/285101 [2] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/10093 [3] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/17734 [4] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/18911 [5] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/5617 [6] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/19354 [7] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/103635 Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2016-01-30 08:21:26 +01:00
die("git-over-rsync is no longer supported");
} else if (url_is_local_not_ssh(url) && is_file(url) && is_bundle(url, 1)) {
struct bundle_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
transport_check_allowed("file");
ret->data = data;
ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_from_bundle;
ret->fetch = fetch_refs_from_bundle;
ret->disconnect = close_bundle;
ret->smart_options = NULL;
} else if (!is_url(url)
|| starts_with(url, "file://")
|| starts_with(url, "git://")
|| starts_with(url, "ssh://")
|| starts_with(url, "git+ssh://") /* deprecated - do not use */
|| starts_with(url, "ssh+git://") /* deprecated - do not use */
) {
transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in order to get the complete view as intended by the other side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself, but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that exposes them to the attacker). Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others). We can help this case by providing a way to restrict particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment. This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but since the minority of users will want this sandboxing effect, it is the only sensible one). A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be unable to test the file-local code on machines without apache. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-09-16 19:12:52 +02:00
/*
* These are builtin smart transports; "allowed" transports
* will be checked individually in git_connect.
*/
struct git_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
ret->data = data;
ret->set_option = NULL;
ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_via_connect;
ret->fetch = fetch_refs_via_pack;
ret->push_refs = git_transport_push;
ret->connect = connect_git;
ret->disconnect = disconnect_git;
ret->smart_options = &(data->options);
data->conn = NULL;
data->got_remote_heads = 0;
} else {
/* Unknown protocol in URL. Pass to external handler. */
int len = external_specification_len(url);
char *handler = xmemdupz(url, len);
transport_helper_init(ret, handler);
}
if (ret->smart_options) {
ret->smart_options->thin = 1;
ret->smart_options->uploadpack = "git-upload-pack";
if (remote->uploadpack)
ret->smart_options->uploadpack = remote->uploadpack;
ret->smart_options->receivepack = "git-receive-pack";
if (remote->receivepack)
ret->smart_options->receivepack = remote->receivepack;
}
return ret;
}
int transport_set_option(struct transport *transport,
const char *name, const char *value)
{
int git_reports = 1, protocol_reports = 1;
if (transport->smart_options)
git_reports = set_git_option(transport->smart_options,
name, value);
if (transport->set_option)
protocol_reports = transport->set_option(transport, name,
value);
/* If either report is 0, report 0 (success). */
if (!git_reports || !protocol_reports)
return 0;
/* If either reports -1 (invalid value), report -1. */
if ((git_reports == -1) || (protocol_reports == -1))
return -1;
/* Otherwise if both report unknown, report unknown. */
return 1;
}
void transport_set_verbosity(struct transport *transport, int verbosity,
int force_progress)
{
make "git push -v" actually verbose Providing a single "-v" to "git push" currently does nothing. Giving two flags ("git push -v -v") turns on the first level of verbosity. This is caused by a regression introduced in 8afd8dc (push: support multiple levels of verbosity, 2010-02-24). Before the series containing 8afd8dc, the verbosity handling for fetching and pushing was completely separate. Commit bde873c refactored the verbosity handling out of the fetch side, and then 8afd8dc converted push to use the refactored code. However, the fetch and push sides numbered and passed along their verbosity levels differently. For both, a verbosity level of "-1" meant "quiet", and "0" meant "default output". But from there they differed. For fetch, a verbosity level of "1" indicated to the "fetch" program that it should make the status table slightly more verbose, showing up-to-date entries. A verbosity level of "2" meant that we should pass a verbose flag to the transport; in the case of fetch-pack, this displays protocol debugging information. As a result, the refactored code in bde873c checks for "verbosity >= 2", and only then passes it on to the transport. From the transport code's perspective, a verbosity of 0 or 1 both meant "0". Push, on the other hand, does not show its own status table; that is always handled by the transport layer or below (originally send-pack itself, but these days it is done by the transport code). So a verbosity level of 1 meant that we should pass the verbose flag to send-pack, so that it knows we want a verbose status table. However, once 8afd8dc switched it to the refactored fetch code, a verbosity level of 1 was now being ignored. Thus, you needed to artificially bump the verbosity to 2 (via "-v -v") to have any effect. We can fix this by letting the transport code know about the true verbosity level (i.e., let it distinguish level 0 or 1). We then have to also make an adjustment to any transport methods that assumed "verbose > 0" meant they could spew lots of debugging information. Before, they could only get "0" or "2", but now they will also receive "1". They need to adjust their condition for turning on such spew from "verbose > 0" to "verbose > 1". Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2011-12-17 10:37:15 +01:00
if (verbosity >= 1)
transport->verbose = verbosity <= 3 ? verbosity : 3;
if (verbosity < 0)
transport->verbose = -1;
/**
* Rules used to determine whether to report progress (processing aborts
* when a rule is satisfied):
*
* . Report progress, if force_progress is 1 (ie. --progress).
* . Don't report progress, if force_progress is 0 (ie. --no-progress).
* . Don't report progress, if verbosity < 0 (ie. -q/--quiet ).
* . Report progress if isatty(2) is 1.
**/
if (force_progress >= 0)
transport->progress = !!force_progress;
else
transport->progress = verbosity >= 0 && isatty(2);
}
static void die_with_unpushed_submodules(struct string_list *needs_pushing)
{
int i;
fprintf(stderr, _("The following submodule paths contain changes that can\n"
"not be found on any remote:\n"));
for (i = 0; i < needs_pushing->nr; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %s\n", needs_pushing->items[i].string);
fprintf(stderr, _("\nPlease try\n\n"
" git push --recurse-submodules=on-demand\n\n"
"or cd to the path and use\n\n"
" git push\n\n"
"to push them to a remote.\n\n"));
string_list_clear(needs_pushing, 0);
die(_("Aborting."));
}
static int run_pre_push_hook(struct transport *transport,
struct ref *remote_refs)
{
int ret = 0, x;
struct ref *r;
struct child_process proc = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
struct strbuf buf;
const char *argv[4];
if (!(argv[0] = find_hook("pre-push")))
return 0;
argv[1] = transport->remote->name;
argv[2] = transport->url;
argv[3] = NULL;
proc.argv = argv;
proc.in = -1;
if (start_command(&proc)) {
finish_command(&proc);
return -1;
}
sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
strbuf_init(&buf, 256);
for (r = remote_refs; r; r = r->next) {
if (!r->peer_ref) continue;
if (r->status == REF_STATUS_REJECT_NONFASTFORWARD) continue;
if (r->status == REF_STATUS_REJECT_STALE) continue;
if (r->status == REF_STATUS_UPTODATE) continue;
strbuf_reset(&buf);
strbuf_addf( &buf, "%s %s %s %s\n",
r->peer_ref->name, oid_to_hex(&r->new_oid),
r->name, oid_to_hex(&r->old_oid));
if (write_in_full(proc.in, buf.buf, buf.len) < 0) {
/* We do not mind if a hook does not read all refs. */
if (errno != EPIPE)
ret = -1;
break;
}
}
strbuf_release(&buf);
x = close(proc.in);
if (!ret)
ret = x;
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
x = finish_command(&proc);
if (!ret)
ret = x;
return ret;
}
int transport_push(struct transport *transport,
int refspec_nr, const char **refspec, int flags,
unsigned int *reject_reasons)
{
*reject_reasons = 0;
transport_verify_remote_names(refspec_nr, refspec);
if (transport->push) {
/* Maybe FIXME. But no important transport uses this case. */
if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_SET_UPSTREAM)
die("This transport does not support using --set-upstream");
return transport->push(transport, refspec_nr, refspec, flags);
} else if (transport->push_refs) {
struct ref *remote_refs;
struct ref *local_refs = get_local_heads();
int match_flags = MATCH_REFS_NONE;
int verbose = (transport->verbose > 0);
int quiet = (transport->verbose < 0);
int porcelain = flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_PORCELAIN;
int pretend = flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_DRY_RUN;
int push_ret, ret, err;
if (check_push_refs(local_refs, refspec_nr, refspec) < 0)
return -1;
remote_refs = transport->get_refs_list(transport, 1);
if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_ALL)
match_flags |= MATCH_REFS_ALL;
if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_MIRROR)
match_flags |= MATCH_REFS_MIRROR;
if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_PRUNE)
match_flags |= MATCH_REFS_PRUNE;
if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_FOLLOW_TAGS)
match_flags |= MATCH_REFS_FOLLOW_TAGS;
if (match_push_refs(local_refs, &remote_refs,
refspec_nr, refspec, match_flags)) {
return -1;
}
if (transport->smart_options &&
transport->smart_options->cas &&
!is_empty_cas(transport->smart_options->cas))
apply_push_cas(transport->smart_options->cas,
transport->remote, remote_refs);
set_ref_status_for_push(remote_refs,
flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_MIRROR,
flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_FORCE);
if (!(flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_NO_HOOK))
if (run_pre_push_hook(transport, remote_refs))
return -1;
if ((flags & (TRANSPORT_RECURSE_SUBMODULES_ON_DEMAND |
TRANSPORT_RECURSE_SUBMODULES_ONLY)) &&
!is_bare_repository()) {
struct ref *ref = remote_refs;
struct oid_array commits = OID_ARRAY_INIT;
for (; ref; ref = ref->next)
if (!is_null_oid(&ref->new_oid))
oid_array_append(&commits,
&ref->new_oid);
if (!push_unpushed_submodules(&commits,
transport->remote,
refspec, refspec_nr,
transport->push_options,
pretend)) {
oid_array_clear(&commits);
die("Failed to push all needed submodules!");
}
oid_array_clear(&commits);
}
if (((flags & TRANSPORT_RECURSE_SUBMODULES_CHECK) ||
((flags & (TRANSPORT_RECURSE_SUBMODULES_ON_DEMAND |
TRANSPORT_RECURSE_SUBMODULES_ONLY)) &&
!pretend)) && !is_bare_repository()) {
struct ref *ref = remote_refs;
struct string_list needs_pushing = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
struct oid_array commits = OID_ARRAY_INIT;
for (; ref; ref = ref->next)
if (!is_null_oid(&ref->new_oid))
oid_array_append(&commits,
&ref->new_oid);
if (find_unpushed_submodules(&commits, transport->remote->name,
&needs_pushing)) {
oid_array_clear(&commits);
die_with_unpushed_submodules(&needs_pushing);
}
string_list_clear(&needs_pushing, 0);
oid_array_clear(&commits);
}
if (!(flags & TRANSPORT_RECURSE_SUBMODULES_ONLY))
push_ret = transport->push_refs(transport, remote_refs, flags);
else
push_ret = 0;
err = push_had_errors(remote_refs);
ret = push_ret | err;
if (!quiet || err)
transport_print_push_status(transport->url, remote_refs,
verbose | porcelain, porcelain,
reject_reasons);
if (flags & TRANSPORT_PUSH_SET_UPSTREAM)
set_upstreams(transport, remote_refs, pretend);
if (!(flags & (TRANSPORT_PUSH_DRY_RUN |
TRANSPORT_RECURSE_SUBMODULES_ONLY))) {
struct ref *ref;
for (ref = remote_refs; ref; ref = ref->next)
transport_update_tracking_ref(transport->remote, ref, verbose);
}
if (porcelain && !push_ret)
puts("Done");
else if (!quiet && !ret && !transport_refs_pushed(remote_refs))
fprintf(stderr, "Everything up-to-date\n");
return ret;
}
return 1;
}
const struct ref *transport_get_remote_refs(struct transport *transport)
{
if (!transport->got_remote_refs) {
transport->remote_refs = transport->get_refs_list(transport, 0);
transport->got_remote_refs = 1;
}
return transport->remote_refs;
}
int transport_fetch_refs(struct transport *transport, struct ref *refs)
{
int rc;
int nr_heads = 0, nr_alloc = 0, nr_refs = 0;
struct ref **heads = NULL;
struct ref *rm;
for (rm = refs; rm; rm = rm->next) {
nr_refs++;
if (rm->peer_ref &&
!is_null_oid(&rm->old_oid) &&
!oidcmp(&rm->peer_ref->old_oid, &rm->old_oid))
continue;
ALLOC_GROW(heads, nr_heads + 1, nr_alloc);
heads[nr_heads++] = rm;
}
if (!nr_heads) {
/*
* When deepening of a shallow repository is requested,
* then local and remote refs are likely to still be equal.
* Just feed them all to the fetch method in that case.
* This condition shouldn't be met in a non-deepening fetch
* (see builtin/fetch.c:quickfetch()).
*/
ALLOC_ARRAY(heads, nr_refs);
for (rm = refs; rm; rm = rm->next)
heads[nr_heads++] = rm;
}
rc = transport->fetch(transport, nr_heads, heads);
free(heads);
return rc;
}
void transport_unlock_pack(struct transport *transport)
{
if (transport->pack_lockfile) {
unlink_or_warn(transport->pack_lockfile);
FREE_AND_NULL(transport->pack_lockfile);
}
}
int transport_connect(struct transport *transport, const char *name,
const char *exec, int fd[2])
{
if (transport->connect)
return transport->connect(transport, name, exec, fd);
else
die("Operation not supported by protocol");
}
int transport_disconnect(struct transport *transport)
{
int ret = 0;
if (transport->disconnect)
ret = transport->disconnect(transport);
free(transport);
return ret;
}
/*
* Strip username (and password) from a URL and return
* it in a newly allocated string.
*/
char *transport_anonymize_url(const char *url)
{
char *scheme_prefix, *anon_part;
size_t anon_len, prefix_len = 0;
anon_part = strchr(url, '@');
if (url_is_local_not_ssh(url) || !anon_part)
goto literal_copy;
anon_len = strlen(++anon_part);
scheme_prefix = strstr(url, "://");
if (!scheme_prefix) {
if (!strchr(anon_part, ':'))
/* cannot be "me@there:/path/name" */
goto literal_copy;
} else {
const char *cp;
/* make sure scheme is reasonable */
for (cp = url; cp < scheme_prefix; cp++) {
switch (*cp) {
/* RFC 1738 2.1 */
case '+': case '.': case '-':
break; /* ok */
default:
if (isalnum(*cp))
break;
/* it isn't */
goto literal_copy;
}
}
/* @ past the first slash does not count */
cp = strchr(scheme_prefix + 3, '/');
if (cp && cp < anon_part)
goto literal_copy;
prefix_len = scheme_prefix - url + 3;
}
return xstrfmt("%.*s%.*s", (int)prefix_len, url,
(int)anon_len, anon_part);
literal_copy:
return xstrdup(url);
}
for_each_alternate_ref: replace transport code with for-each-ref The current method for getting the refs from an alternate is to run upload-pack in the alternate and parse its output using the normal transport code. This works and is reasonably short, but it has a very bad memory footprint when there are a lot of refs in the alternate. There are two problems: 1. It reads in all of the refs before passing any back to us. Which means that our peak memory usage has to store every ref (including duplicates for peeled variants), even if our callback could determine that some are not interesting (e.g., because they point to the same sha1 as another ref). 2. It allocates a "struct ref" for each one. Among other things, this contains 3 separate 20-byte oids, along with the name and various pointers. That can add up, especially if the callback is only interested in the sha1 (which it can store in a sha1_array as just 20 bytes). On a particularly pathological case, where the alternate had over 80 million refs pointing to only around 60,000 unique objects, the peak heap usage of "git clone --reference" grew to over 25GB. This patch instead calls git-for-each-ref in the alternate repository, and passes each line to the callback as we read it. That drops the peak heap of the same command to 50MB. I considered and rejected a few alternatives. We could read all of the refs in the alternate using our own ref code, just as we do with submodules. However, as memory footprint is one of the concerns here, we want to avoid loading those refs into our own memory as a whole. It's possible that this will be a better technique in the future when the ref code can more easily iterate without loading all of packed-refs into memory. Another option is to keep calling upload-pack, and just parse its output ourselves in a streaming fashion. Besides for-each-ref being simpler (we get to define the format ourselves, and don't have to deal with speaking the git protocol), it's more flexible for possible future changes. For instance, it might be useful for the caller to be able to limit the set of "interesting" alternate refs. The motivating example is one where many "forks" of a particular repository share object storage, and the shared storage has refs for each fork (which is why so many of the refs are duplicates; each fork has the same tags). A plausible future optimization would be to ask for the alternate refs for just _one_ fork (if you had some out-of-band way of knowing which was the most interesting or important for the current operation). Similarly, no callbacks actually care about the symref value of alternate refs, and as before, this patch ignores them entirely. However, if we wanted to add them, for-each-ref's "%(symref)" is going to be more flexible than upload-pack, because the latter only handles the HEAD symref due to historical constraints. There is one potential downside, though: unlike upload-pack, our for-each-ref command doesn't report the peeled value of refs. The existing code calls the alternate_ref_fn callback twice for tags: once for the tag, and once for the peeled value with the refname set to "ref^{}". For the callers in fetch-pack, this doesn't matter at all. We immediately peel each tag down to a commit either way (so there's a slight improvement, as do not bother passing the redundant data over the pipe). For the caller in receive-pack, it means we will not advertise the peeled values of tags in our alternate. However, we also don't advertise peeled values for our _own_ tags, so this is actually making things more consistent. It's unclear whether receive-pack advertising peeled values is a win or not. On one hand, giving more information to the other side may let it omit some objects from the push. On the other hand, for tags which both sides have, they simply bloat the advertisement. The upload-pack advertisement of git.git is about 30% larger than the receive-pack advertisement due to its peeled information. This patch omits the peeled information from for_each_alternate_ref entirely, and leaves it up to the caller whether they want to dig up the information. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2017-02-08 21:53:00 +01:00
static void read_alternate_refs(const char *path,
alternate_ref_fn *cb,
void *data)
{
struct child_process cmd = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
FILE *fh;
cmd.git_cmd = 1;
argv_array_pushf(&cmd.args, "--git-dir=%s", path);
argv_array_push(&cmd.args, "for-each-ref");
argv_array_push(&cmd.args, "--format=%(objectname) %(refname)");
cmd.env = local_repo_env;
cmd.out = -1;
if (start_command(&cmd))
return;
fh = xfdopen(cmd.out, "r");
while (strbuf_getline_lf(&line, fh) != EOF) {
struct object_id oid;
if (get_oid_hex(line.buf, &oid) ||
line.buf[GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ] != ' ') {
warning("invalid line while parsing alternate refs: %s",
line.buf);
break;
}
cb(line.buf + GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ + 1, &oid, data);
}
fclose(fh);
finish_command(&cmd);
}
struct alternate_refs_data {
alternate_ref_fn *fn;
void *data;
};
static int refs_from_alternate_cb(struct alternate_object_database *e,
void *data)
{
struct strbuf path = STRBUF_INIT;
size_t base_len;
struct alternate_refs_data *cb = data;
if (!strbuf_realpath(&path, e->path, 0))
goto out;
if (!strbuf_strip_suffix(&path, "/objects"))
goto out;
base_len = path.len;
/* Is this a git repository with refs? */
strbuf_addstr(&path, "/refs");
if (!is_directory(path.buf))
goto out;
strbuf_setlen(&path, base_len);
for_each_alternate_ref: replace transport code with for-each-ref The current method for getting the refs from an alternate is to run upload-pack in the alternate and parse its output using the normal transport code. This works and is reasonably short, but it has a very bad memory footprint when there are a lot of refs in the alternate. There are two problems: 1. It reads in all of the refs before passing any back to us. Which means that our peak memory usage has to store every ref (including duplicates for peeled variants), even if our callback could determine that some are not interesting (e.g., because they point to the same sha1 as another ref). 2. It allocates a "struct ref" for each one. Among other things, this contains 3 separate 20-byte oids, along with the name and various pointers. That can add up, especially if the callback is only interested in the sha1 (which it can store in a sha1_array as just 20 bytes). On a particularly pathological case, where the alternate had over 80 million refs pointing to only around 60,000 unique objects, the peak heap usage of "git clone --reference" grew to over 25GB. This patch instead calls git-for-each-ref in the alternate repository, and passes each line to the callback as we read it. That drops the peak heap of the same command to 50MB. I considered and rejected a few alternatives. We could read all of the refs in the alternate using our own ref code, just as we do with submodules. However, as memory footprint is one of the concerns here, we want to avoid loading those refs into our own memory as a whole. It's possible that this will be a better technique in the future when the ref code can more easily iterate without loading all of packed-refs into memory. Another option is to keep calling upload-pack, and just parse its output ourselves in a streaming fashion. Besides for-each-ref being simpler (we get to define the format ourselves, and don't have to deal with speaking the git protocol), it's more flexible for possible future changes. For instance, it might be useful for the caller to be able to limit the set of "interesting" alternate refs. The motivating example is one where many "forks" of a particular repository share object storage, and the shared storage has refs for each fork (which is why so many of the refs are duplicates; each fork has the same tags). A plausible future optimization would be to ask for the alternate refs for just _one_ fork (if you had some out-of-band way of knowing which was the most interesting or important for the current operation). Similarly, no callbacks actually care about the symref value of alternate refs, and as before, this patch ignores them entirely. However, if we wanted to add them, for-each-ref's "%(symref)" is going to be more flexible than upload-pack, because the latter only handles the HEAD symref due to historical constraints. There is one potential downside, though: unlike upload-pack, our for-each-ref command doesn't report the peeled value of refs. The existing code calls the alternate_ref_fn callback twice for tags: once for the tag, and once for the peeled value with the refname set to "ref^{}". For the callers in fetch-pack, this doesn't matter at all. We immediately peel each tag down to a commit either way (so there's a slight improvement, as do not bother passing the redundant data over the pipe). For the caller in receive-pack, it means we will not advertise the peeled values of tags in our alternate. However, we also don't advertise peeled values for our _own_ tags, so this is actually making things more consistent. It's unclear whether receive-pack advertising peeled values is a win or not. On one hand, giving more information to the other side may let it omit some objects from the push. On the other hand, for tags which both sides have, they simply bloat the advertisement. The upload-pack advertisement of git.git is about 30% larger than the receive-pack advertisement due to its peeled information. This patch omits the peeled information from for_each_alternate_ref entirely, and leaves it up to the caller whether they want to dig up the information. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2017-02-08 21:53:00 +01:00
read_alternate_refs(path.buf, cb->fn, cb->data);
out:
strbuf_release(&path);
return 0;
}
void for_each_alternate_ref(alternate_ref_fn fn, void *data)
{
struct alternate_refs_data cb;
cb.fn = fn;
cb.data = data;
foreach_alt_odb(refs_from_alternate_cb, &cb);
}