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transport: add protocol policy config option

Previously the `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` environment variable was used to
specify a whitelist of protocols to be used in clone/fetch/push
commands.  This patch introduces new configuration options for more
fine-grained control for allowing/disallowing protocols.  This also has
the added benefit of allowing easier construction of a protocol
whitelist on systems where setting an environment variable is
non-trivial.

Now users can specify a policy to be used for each type of protocol via
the 'protocol.<name>.allow' config option.  A default policy for all
unconfigured protocols can be set with the 'protocol.allow' config
option.  If no user configured default is made git will allow known-safe
protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file), disallow known-dangerous
protocols (ext), and have a default policy of `user` for all other
protocols.

The supported policies are `always`, `never`, and `user`.  The `user`
policy can be used to configure a protocol to be usable when explicitly
used by a user, while disallowing it for commands which run
clone/fetch/push commands without direct user intervention (e.g.
recursive initialization of submodules).  Commands which can potentially
clone/fetch/push from untrusted repositories without user intervention
can export `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` with a value of '0' to prevent
protocols configured to the `user` policy from being used.

Fix remote-ext tests to use the new config to allow the ext
protocol to be tested.

Based on a patch by Jeff King <peff@peff.net>

Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Brandon Williams 2016-12-14 14:39:52 -08:00 committed by Junio C Hamano
parent f962ddf6ed
commit f1762d772e
7 changed files with 263 additions and 38 deletions

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@ -2260,6 +2260,52 @@ pretty.<name>::
Note that an alias with the same name as a built-in format
will be silently ignored.
protocol.allow::
If set, provide a user defined default policy for all protocols which
don't explicitly have a policy (`protocol.<name>.allow`). By default,
if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file) have a
default policy of `always`, known-dangerous protocols (ext) have a
default policy of `never`, and all other protocols have a default
policy of `user`. Supported policies:
+
--
* `always` - protocol is always able to be used.
* `never` - protocol is never able to be used.
* `user` - protocol is only able to be used when `GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER` is
either unset or has a value of 1. This policy should be used when you want a
protocol to be directly usable by the user but don't want it used by commands which
execute clone/fetch/push commands without user input, e.g. recursive
submodule initialization.
--
protocol.<name>.allow::
Set a policy to be used by protocol `<name>` with clone/fetch/push
commands. See `protocol.allow` above for the available policies.
+
The protocol names currently used by git are:
+
--
- `file`: any local file-based path (including `file://` URLs,
or local paths)
- `git`: the anonymous git protocol over a direct TCP
connection (or proxy, if configured)
- `ssh`: git over ssh (including `host:path` syntax,
`ssh://`, etc).
- `http`: git over http, both "smart http" and "dumb http".
Note that this does _not_ include `https`; if you want to configure
both, you must do so individually.
- any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
`hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
--
pull.ff::
By default, Git does not create an extra merge commit when merging
a commit that is a descendant of the current commit. Instead, the

View File

@ -1129,30 +1129,20 @@ of clones and fetches.
cloning a repository to make a backup).
`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`::
If set, provide a colon-separated list of protocols which are
allowed to be used with fetch/push/clone. This is useful to
restrict recursive submodule initialization from an untrusted
repository. Any protocol not mentioned will be disallowed (i.e.,
this is a whitelist, not a blacklist). If the variable is not
set at all, all protocols are enabled. The protocol names
currently used by git are:
- `file`: any local file-based path (including `file://` URLs,
or local paths)
- `git`: the anonymous git protocol over a direct TCP
connection (or proxy, if configured)
- `ssh`: git over ssh (including `host:path` syntax,
`ssh://`, etc).
- `http`: git over http, both "smart http" and "dumb http".
Note that this does _not_ include `https`; if you want both,
you should specify both as `http:https`.
- any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
`hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
If set to a colon-separated list of protocols, behave as if
`protocol.allow` is set to `never`, and each of the listed
protocols has `protocol.<name>.allow` set to `always`
(overriding any existing configuration). In other words, any
protocol not mentioned will be disallowed (i.e., this is a
whitelist, not a blacklist). See the description of
`protocol.allow` in linkgit:git-config[1] for more details.
`GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER`::
Set to 0 to prevent protocols used by fetch/push/clone which are
configured to the `user` state. This is useful to restrict recursive
submodule initialization from an untrusted repository or for programs
which feed potentially-untrusted URLS to git commands. See
linkgit:git-config[1] for more details.
Discussion[[Discussion]]
------------------------

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@ -22,14 +22,10 @@ require_work_tree
wt_prefix=$(git rev-parse --show-prefix)
cd_to_toplevel
# Restrict ourselves to a vanilla subset of protocols; the URLs
# we get are under control of a remote repository, and we do not
# want them kicking off arbitrary git-remote-* programs.
#
# If the user has already specified a set of allowed protocols,
# we assume they know what they're doing and use that instead.
: ${GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=file:git:http:https:ssh}
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
# Tell the rest of git that any URLs we get don't come
# directly from the user, so it can apply policy as appropriate.
GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER=0
export GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER
command=
branch=

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@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
# Test routines for checking protocol disabling.
# test cloning a particular protocol
# $1 - description of the protocol
# $2 - machine-readable name of the protocol
# $3 - the URL to try cloning
test_proto () {
# Test clone/fetch/push with GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL whitelist
test_whitelist () {
desc=$1
proto=$2
url=$3
@ -62,6 +59,129 @@ test_proto () {
test_must_fail git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
)
'
test_expect_success "clone $desc (env var has precedence)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
(
GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
test_must_fail git -c protocol.allow=always clone --bare "$url" tmp.git &&
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
)
'
}
test_config () {
desc=$1
proto=$2
url=$3
# Test clone/fetch/push with protocol.<type>.allow config
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled with config)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always fetch
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=always push origin HEAD:pushed
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=never push origin HEAD:pushed
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=never fetch
'
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=never clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
'
# Test clone/fetch/push with protocol.user.allow and its env var
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user fetch
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
git -C tmp.git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user push origin HEAD:pushed
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
(
cd tmp.git &&
GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER=0 &&
export GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER &&
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user push origin HEAD:pushed
)
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
(
cd tmp.git &&
GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER=0 &&
export GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER &&
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user fetch
)
'
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
(
GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER=0 &&
export GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER &&
test_must_fail git -c protocol.$proto.allow=user clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
)
'
# Test clone/fetch/push with protocol.allow user defined default
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
git config --global protocol.allow always &&
git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
git -C tmp.git fetch
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
git -C tmp.git push origin HEAD:pushed
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
git config --global protocol.allow never &&
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git push origin HEAD:pushed
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git fetch
'
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
test_must_fail git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
'
}
# test cloning a particular protocol
# $1 - description of the protocol
# $2 - machine-readable name of the protocol
# $3 - the URL to try cloning
test_proto () {
test_whitelist "$@"
test_config "$@"
}
# set up an ssh wrapper that will access $host/$repo in the

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@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ test_description='fetch/push involving ref namespaces'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success setup '
git config --global protocol.ext.allow user &&
test_tick &&
git init original &&
(

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@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ test_description='ext::cmd remote "connect" helper'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success setup '
git config --global protocol.ext.allow user &&
test_tick &&
git commit --allow-empty -m initial &&
test_tick &&

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@ -617,10 +617,81 @@ static const struct string_list *protocol_whitelist(void)
return enabled ? &allowed : NULL;
}
enum protocol_allow_config {
PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER = 0,
PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY,
PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS
};
static enum protocol_allow_config parse_protocol_config(const char *key,
const char *value)
{
if (!strcasecmp(value, "always"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS;
else if (!strcasecmp(value, "never"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER;
else if (!strcasecmp(value, "user"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY;
die("unknown value for config '%s': %s", key, value);
}
static enum protocol_allow_config get_protocol_config(const char *type)
{
char *key = xstrfmt("protocol.%s.allow", type);
char *value;
/* first check the per-protocol config */
if (!git_config_get_string(key, &value)) {
enum protocol_allow_config ret =
parse_protocol_config(key, value);
free(key);
free(value);
return ret;
}
free(key);
/* if defined, fallback to user-defined default for unknown protocols */
if (!git_config_get_string("protocol.allow", &value)) {
enum protocol_allow_config ret =
parse_protocol_config("protocol.allow", value);
free(value);
return ret;
}
/* fallback to built-in defaults */
/* known safe */
if (!strcmp(type, "http") ||
!strcmp(type, "https") ||
!strcmp(type, "git") ||
!strcmp(type, "ssh") ||
!strcmp(type, "file"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS;
/* known scary; err on the side of caution */
if (!strcmp(type, "ext"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER;
/* unknown; by default let them be used only directly by the user */
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY;
}
int is_transport_allowed(const char *type)
{
const struct string_list *allowed = protocol_whitelist();
return !allowed || string_list_has_string(allowed, type);
const struct string_list *whitelist = protocol_whitelist();
if (whitelist)
return string_list_has_string(whitelist, type);
switch (get_protocol_config(type)) {
case PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS:
return 1;
case PROTOCOL_ALLOW_NEVER:
return 0;
case PROTOCOL_ALLOW_USER_ONLY:
return git_env_bool("GIT_PROTOCOL_FROM_USER", 1);
}
die("BUG: invalid protocol_allow_config type");
}
void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)