1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings.git synced 2024-04-23 12:25:09 +02:00

Web Cache Deception Methodology

This commit is contained in:
Swissky 2023-03-28 21:53:53 +02:00
parent fddd094ee1
commit d040c0e677
2 changed files with 57 additions and 9 deletions

View File

@ -23,16 +23,20 @@
## Tools
- [KeyFinder - is a tool that let you find keys while surfing the web!](https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder)
- [KeyHacks - is a repository which shows quick ways in which API keys leaked by a bug bounty program can be checked to see if they're valid.](https://github.com/streaak/keyhacks)
- [TruffleHog - Find credentials all over the place](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/truffleHog)
- [momenbasel/KeyFinder](https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder) - is a tool that let you find keys while surfing the web
- [streaak/keyhacks](https://github.com/streaak/keyhacks) - is a repository which shows quick ways in which API keys leaked by a bug bounty program can be checked to see if they're valid
- [trufflesecurity/truffleHog](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/truffleHog) - Find credentials all over the place
```ps1
docker run -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --repo https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys
docker run -it -v "$PWD:/pwd" trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest github --org=trufflesecurity
trufflehog git https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog.git
trufflehog github --endpoint https://api.github.com --org trufflesecurity --token GITHUB_TOKEN --debug --concurrency 2
```
- [Trivy - General purpose vulnerability and misconfiguration scanner which also searches for API keys/secrets](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy)
- [aquasecurity/trivy](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy) - General purpose vulnerability and misconfiguration scanner which also searches for API keys/secrets
- [projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates) - Use these templates to test an API token against many API service endpoints
```powershell
nuclei -t token-spray/ -var token=token_list.txt
```
## Exploit

View File

@ -1,30 +1,51 @@
# Web Cache Deception
## Summary
* [Tools](#tools)
* [Exploit](#exploit)
* [Methodology - Caching Sensitive Data](#methodology---caching-sensitive-data)
* [Methodology - Caching Custom JavaScript](#methodology---caching-custom-javascript)
* [CloudFlare Caching](#cloudflare-caching)
* [Labs](#labs)
* [References](#references)
## Tools
* [Param Miner - PortSwigger](https://github.com/PortSwigger/param-miner)
* [PortSwigger/param-miner](https://github.com/PortSwigger/param-miner)
> This extension identifies hidden, unlinked parameters. It's particularly useful for finding web cache poisoning vulnerabilities.
## Exploit
1. Browser requests `http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css`.
1. Browser requests a resource such as `http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css`.
2. Server returns the content of `http://www.example.com/home.php`, most probably with HTTP caching headers that instruct to not cache this page.
3. The response goes through the proxy.
4. The proxy identifies that the file has a css extension.
5. Under the cache directory, the proxy creates a directory named home.php, and caches the imposter "CSS" file (non-existent.css) inside.
## Methodology of the attack - example
## Methodology - Caching Sensitive Data
**Example 1** - Web Cache Deception on PayPal Home Page
1. Normal browsing, visit home : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/`
2. Open the malicious link : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/malicious.css`
3. The page is displayed as /home and the cache is saving the page
4. Open a private tab with the previous URL : `https://www.paypal.com/myaccount/home/malicous.css`
4. Open a private tab with the previous URL : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/malicous.css`
5. The content of the cache is displayed
Video of the attack by Omer Gil - Web Cache Deception Attack in PayPal Home Page
[![DEMO](https://i.vimeocdn.com/video/674856618.jpg)](https://vimeo.com/249130093)
## Methodology 2
**Example 2** - Web Cache Deception on OpenAI
1. Attacker crafts a dedicated .css path of the `/api/auth/session` endpoint.
2. Attacker distributes the link
3. Victims visit the legitimate link.
4. Response is cached.
5. Attacker harvests JWT Credentials.
## Methodology - Caching Custom JavaScript
1. Find an un-keyed input for a Cache Poisoning
```js
@ -49,6 +70,28 @@ Video of the attack by Omer Gil - Web Cache Deception Attack in PayPal Home Page
<meta property="og:image" content="https://test"><script>alert(1)</script>">
```
## CloudFlare Caching
CloudFlare caches the resource when the `Cache-Control` header is set to `public` and `max-age` is greater than 0.
- The Cloudflare CDN does not cache HTML by default
- Cloudflare only caches based on file extension and not by MIME type: [cloudflare/default-cache-behavior](https://developers.cloudflare.com/cache/about/default-cache-behavior/)
CloudFlare has a list of default extensions that gets cached behind their Load Balancers.
| | | | | | | |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| 7Z | CSV | GIF | MIDI | PNG | TIF | ZIP |
| AVI | DOC | GZ | MKV | PPT | TIFF | ZST |
| AVIF | DOCX | ICO | MP3 | PPTX | TTF | CSS |
| APK | DMG | ISO | MP4 | PS | WEBM | FLAC |
| BIN | EJS | JAR | OGG | RAR | WEBP | MID |
| BMP | EOT | JPG | OTF | SVG | WOFF | PLS |
| BZ2 | EPS | JPEG | PDF | SVGZ | WOFF2 | TAR |
| CLASS | EXE | JS | PICT | SWF | XLS | XLSX |
## Labs
* [PortSwigger Labs for Web cache deception](https://portswigger.net/web-security/all-labs#web-cache-poisoning)
@ -62,3 +105,4 @@ Video of the attack by Omer Gil - Web Cache Deception Attack in PayPal Home Page
* [Web cache poisoning - Web Security Academy learning materials](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning)
- [Exploiting cache design flaws](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-design-flaws)
- [Exploiting cache implementation flaws](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-implementation-flaws)
* [OpenAI Account Takeover - @naglinagli - Mar 24, 2023](https://twitter.com/naglinagli/status/1639343866313601024)