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BitSwap start

This commit is contained in:
Juan Batiz-Benet 2014-02-11 05:38:19 -08:00
parent 45d400d6e6
commit 8a46313703
2 changed files with 140 additions and 7 deletions

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# Galactic File System # Galactic File System
Modules
- go-kademlia
- go-coral
- go-trader
BitFlow to implement:
- PropShare
- BEP0026-
- BEP0040
- BEP0042

@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
\documentclass{sig-alternate} \documentclass{sig-alternate}
\usepackage{array}
\usepackage{amstext}
\usepackage{mathtools} \usepackage{mathtools}
\DeclarePairedDelimiter{\ceil}{\lceil}{\rceil} \DeclarePairedDelimiter{\ceil}{\lceil}{\rceil}
@ -50,16 +52,34 @@ DHash
SFS SFS
Ori Ori
\section{GFS Overview} \section{Design}
GFS is a distributed file system where all nodes are the same. Together, the \subsection{GFS Nodes}
nodes store the GFS files in local storage, and send the files to each other.
GFS is a distributed file system where all nodes are the same. They are
identified by a \texttt{NodeId}, the cryptographic hash of a public-key
(note that \textit{checksum} will henceforth refer specifically to crypographic
hashes of an object). Nodes also store their public + private keys. Clients are
free to instatiate a new node on every launch, though that means losing any
accrued benefits. It is recommended that nodes remain the same.
\begin{verbatim}
type Node struct {
id NodeID
pubkey PublicKey
prikey PrivateKey
}
\end{verbatim}
Together, the
nodes store the GFS files in local storage, and send files to each other.
GFS implements its features by combining several subsystems with many GFS implements its features by combining several subsystems with many
desirable properties: desirable properties:
\begin{enumerate} \begin{enumerate}
\item A Coral-based \textbf{Distributed Sloppy Hash Table} (DSHT) to link and \item A Coral-based \textbf{Distributed Sloppy Hash Table}\\
coordinate peer-to-peer nodes. (DSHT) to link and coordinate peer-to-peer nodes.
\item A Bittorrent-like peer-to-peer \textbf{Block Exchange} (BE) distribute \item A Bittorrent-like peer-to-peer \textbf{Block Exchange} (BE) distribute
Blocks efficiently, and to incentivize replication. Blocks efficiently, and to incentivize replication.
\item A Git-inspired \textbf{Object Model} (OM) to represent the filesystem. \item A Git-inspired \textbf{Object Model} (OM) to represent the filesystem.
@ -137,6 +157,108 @@ The GFS DSHT supports four RPC calls:
\subsection{Block Exchange - BitSwap Protocol}
The exchange of data in GFS happens by exchanging blocks with peers using a
BitTorrent inspired protocol: BitSwap. Like BitTorrent, BitSwap peers are
looking to acquire a set of blocks, and have blocks to offer in exchange.
Unlike BitTorrent, BitSwap is not limited to the blocks in one torrent.
BitSwap operates as a persistent marketplace where node can acquire the
blocks they need, regardless of what files the blocks are part of. The
blocks could come from completely unrelated files in the filesystem.
But nodes come together to barter in the marketplace.
While the notion of a barter system implies a virtual currency could be
created, this would require a global ledger (blockchain) to track ownership
and transfer of the currency. This will be explored in a future paper.
Instead, BitSwap nodes have to provide direct value to each other
in the form of blocks. This works fine when the distribution of blocks across
nodes is such that they have the complements, what each other wants. This will
seldom be the case. Instead, it is more likely that nodes must \textit{work}
for their blocks. In the case that a node has nothing that its peers want (or
nothing at all), it seeks the pieces its peers might want, with lower
priority. This incentivizes nodes to cache and disseminate rare pieces, even
if they are not interested in them directly.
\subsubsection{BitSwap Credit}
The protocol must also incentivize nodes to seed when they do not need
anything in particular, as they might have the blocks others want. Thus,
BitFlow nodes send blocks to their peers, optimistically expecting the debt to
be repaid. But, leeches (free-loading nodes that never share) must be avoided. A simple credit-like system solves the problem:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Peers track their balance (in bytes verified) with other nodes.
\item Peers send blocks to each other probabilistically, according to
a function, that falls when owed and rises when owing.
\item The sigmoid (scaled by a comparison of the ownership) provides such a
function:
\[ P(send) = \dfrac{1}{1 + exp(-r)} \]
where the \textit{debt ratio} $ r $ is
\[ r = \dfrac{\texttt{bytes\_recv} - \texttt{bytes\_sent}}{\texttt{bytes\_sent}} \]
\end{enumerate}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ >{$}c<{$} >{$}c<{$}}
P_{send}(\;\;\;r) =& likelihood \\
\hline
\hline
P_{send}(-5) =& 0.01 \\
P_{send}(-4) =& 0.02 \\
P_{send}(-3) =& 0.05 \\
P_{send}(-2) =& 0.12 \\
P_{send}(-1) =& 0.27 \\
P_{send}(\;\;\;0) =& 0.50 \\
P_{send}(\;\;\;1) =& 0.73 \\
P_{send}(\;\;\;2) =& 0.88 \\
P_{send}(\;\;\;3) =& 0.95 \\
P_{send}(\;\;\;4) =& 0.98 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
As you can see in Table 1, this function drops off quickly as the nodes' \
\textit{debt ratio} surpasses twice the established credit.
This \textit{debt ratio} is a measure of trust:
lenient to debts between nodes that have previously exchanged lots of data
successfully, and merciless to unknown, untrusted nodes. This
(a) provides resistane to attackers who would create lots of new nodes,
(b) protects previously successful trade relationships, even if one of the
nodes is temporarily unable to provide value, and
(c) eventually chokes relationships that have deteriorated until they
improve.
\subsubsection{BitSwap Ledger}
BitSwap nodes keep ledgers accounting the transfers with other nodes.
A ledger snapshot contains a pointer to the previous snapshot (its checksum),
forming a hash-chain. This allows nodes to keep track of history, and to avoid
tampering. At initializing, BitSwap nodes exchange their ledger information.
If it does not match exactly, the ledger is reinitialized from scratch,
loosing the accrued credit or debt. It is possible for malicious nodes to
purposefully ``loose'' the Ledger, hoping the erase debts. It is unlikely that
nodes will have accrued enough debt to warrant also losing the accrued trust,
however the partner node is free to count it as \textit{misconduct} (discussed
later).
\begin{verbatim}
var Ledgers = map[NodeId]Ledger
type Ledger struct {
parent Checksum
owner NodeId
partner NodeId
bytes_sent int
bytes_recv int
}
\end{verbatim}
Nodes are free to keep the ledger history, though it is not necessary for
correct operation. Only the current ledger entries are useful.
\subsubsection{Protocol Specification}
\subsection{Object Model} \subsection{Object Model}
@ -235,8 +357,6 @@ Users can publish branches (filesystems) with:
publickey -> signed tree of branches publickey -> signed tree of branches
\subsection{Chunk Exchange}
\subsection{Object Distribution} \subsection{Object Distribution}
\subsubsection{Spreading Objects} \subsubsection{Spreading Objects}