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git/builtin/credential-store.c
brian m. carlson ca9ccbf674 credential: gate new fields on capability
We support the new credential and authtype fields, but we lack a way to
indicate to a credential helper that we'd like them to be used.  Without
some sort of indication, the credential helper doesn't know if it should
try to provide us a username and password, or a pre-encoded credential.
For example, the helper might prefer a more restricted Bearer token if
pre-encoded credentials are possible, but might have to fall back to
more general username and password if not.

Let's provide a simple way to indicate whether Git (or, for that matter,
the helper) is capable of understanding the authtype and credential
fields.  We send this capability when we generate a request, and the
other side may reply to indicate to us that it does, too.

For now, don't enable sending capabilities for the HTTP code.  In a
future commit, we'll introduce appropriate handling for that code,
which requires more in-depth work.

The logic for determining whether a capability is supported may seem
complex, but it is not.  At each stage, we emit the capability to the
following stage if all preceding stages have declared it.  Thus, if the
caller to git credential fill didn't declare it, then we won't send it
to the helper, and if fill's caller did send but the helper doesn't
understand it, then we won't send it on in the response.  If we're an
internal user, then we know about all capabilities and will request
them.

For "git credential approve" and "git credential reject", we set the
helper capability before calling the helper, since we assume that the
input we're getting from the external program comes from a previous call
to "git credential fill", and thus we'll invoke send a capability to the
helper if and only if we got one from the standard input, which is the
correct behavior.

Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2024-04-16 22:39:06 -07:00

223 lines
5.9 KiB
C

#include "builtin.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "gettext.h"
#include "lockfile.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "path.h"
#include "string-list.h"
#include "parse-options.h"
#include "write-or-die.h"
static struct lock_file credential_lock;
static int parse_credential_file(const char *fn,
struct credential *c,
void (*match_cb)(struct credential *),
void (*other_cb)(struct strbuf *),
int match_password)
{
FILE *fh;
struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
struct credential entry = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
int found_credential = 0;
fh = fopen(fn, "r");
if (!fh) {
if (errno != ENOENT && errno != EACCES)
die_errno("unable to open %s", fn);
return found_credential;
}
while (strbuf_getline_lf(&line, fh) != EOF) {
if (!credential_from_url_gently(&entry, line.buf, 1) &&
entry.username && entry.password &&
credential_match(c, &entry, match_password)) {
found_credential = 1;
if (match_cb) {
match_cb(&entry);
break;
}
}
else if (other_cb)
other_cb(&line);
}
credential_clear(&entry);
strbuf_release(&line);
fclose(fh);
return found_credential;
}
static void print_entry(struct credential *c)
{
printf("username=%s\n", c->username);
printf("password=%s\n", c->password);
}
static void print_line(struct strbuf *buf)
{
strbuf_addch(buf, '\n');
write_or_die(get_lock_file_fd(&credential_lock), buf->buf, buf->len);
}
static void rewrite_credential_file(const char *fn, struct credential *c,
struct strbuf *extra, int match_password)
{
int timeout_ms = 1000;
git_config_get_int("credentialstore.locktimeoutms", &timeout_ms);
if (hold_lock_file_for_update_timeout(&credential_lock, fn, 0, timeout_ms) < 0)
die_errno(_("unable to get credential storage lock in %d ms"), timeout_ms);
if (extra)
print_line(extra);
parse_credential_file(fn, c, NULL, print_line, match_password);
if (commit_lock_file(&credential_lock) < 0)
die_errno("unable to write credential store");
}
static int is_rfc3986_unreserved(char ch)
{
return isalnum(ch) ||
ch == '-' || ch == '_' || ch == '.' || ch == '~';
}
static int is_rfc3986_reserved_or_unreserved(char ch)
{
if (is_rfc3986_unreserved(ch))
return 1;
switch (ch) {
case '!': case '*': case '\'': case '(': case ')': case ';':
case ':': case '@': case '&': case '=': case '+': case '$':
case ',': case '/': case '?': case '#': case '[': case ']':
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void store_credential_file(const char *fn, struct credential *c)
{
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s://", c->protocol);
strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->username, is_rfc3986_unreserved);
strbuf_addch(&buf, ':');
strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->password, is_rfc3986_unreserved);
strbuf_addch(&buf, '@');
if (c->host)
strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->host, is_rfc3986_unreserved);
if (c->path) {
strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->path,
is_rfc3986_reserved_or_unreserved);
}
rewrite_credential_file(fn, c, &buf, 0);
strbuf_release(&buf);
}
static void store_credential(const struct string_list *fns, struct credential *c)
{
struct string_list_item *fn;
/*
* Sanity check that what we are storing is actually sensible.
* In particular, we can't make a URL without a protocol field.
* Without either a host or pathname (depending on the scheme),
* we have no primary key. And without a username and password,
* we are not actually storing a credential.
*/
if (!c->protocol || !(c->host || c->path) || !c->username || !c->password)
return;
for_each_string_list_item(fn, fns)
if (!access(fn->string, F_OK)) {
store_credential_file(fn->string, c);
return;
}
/*
* Write credential to the filename specified by fns->items[0], thus
* creating it
*/
if (fns->nr)
store_credential_file(fns->items[0].string, c);
}
static void remove_credential(const struct string_list *fns, struct credential *c)
{
struct string_list_item *fn;
/*
* Sanity check that we actually have something to match
* against. The input we get is a restrictive pattern,
* so technically a blank credential means "erase everything".
* But it is too easy to accidentally send this, since it is equivalent
* to empty input. So explicitly disallow it, and require that the
* pattern have some actual content to match.
*/
if (!c->protocol && !c->host && !c->path && !c->username)
return;
for_each_string_list_item(fn, fns)
if (!access(fn->string, F_OK))
rewrite_credential_file(fn->string, c, NULL, 1);
}
static void lookup_credential(const struct string_list *fns, struct credential *c)
{
struct string_list_item *fn;
for_each_string_list_item(fn, fns)
if (parse_credential_file(fn->string, c, print_entry, NULL, 0))
return; /* Found credential */
}
int cmd_credential_store(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
{
const char * const usage[] = {
"git credential-store [<options>] <action>",
NULL
};
const char *op;
struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
struct string_list fns = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
char *file = NULL;
struct option options[] = {
OPT_STRING(0, "file", &file, "path",
"fetch and store credentials in <path>"),
OPT_END()
};
umask(077);
argc = parse_options(argc, (const char **)argv, prefix, options, usage, 0);
if (argc != 1)
usage_with_options(usage, options);
op = argv[0];
if (file) {
string_list_append(&fns, file);
} else {
if ((file = interpolate_path("~/.git-credentials", 0)))
string_list_append_nodup(&fns, file);
file = xdg_config_home("credentials");
if (file)
string_list_append_nodup(&fns, file);
}
if (!fns.nr)
die("unable to set up default path; use --file");
if (credential_read(&c, stdin, CREDENTIAL_OP_HELPER) < 0)
die("unable to read credential");
if (!strcmp(op, "get"))
lookup_credential(&fns, &c);
else if (!strcmp(op, "erase"))
remove_credential(&fns, &c);
else if (!strcmp(op, "store"))
store_credential(&fns, &c);
else
; /* Ignore unknown operation. */
string_list_clear(&fns, 0);
return 0;
}