This enhances core.sharedrepository to have additionally
specify that read and exec permissions to be given to others as
well. It is useful when serving a repository via gitweb and
git-daemon that runs as a user outside the project group.
The configuration item can take the following values:
[core]
sharedrepository ; the same as "group"
sharedrepository = true ; ditto
sharedrepository = 1 ; ditto
sharedrepository = group ; allow rwx to group
sharedrepository = all ; allow rwx to group, allow rx to other
sharedrepository = umask ; not shared - use umask
It also extends "git init-db" to take "--shared=all" and friends
from the command line.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
There were a few calls to adjust_shared_perm() that were
missing:
- init-db creates refs, refs/heads, and refs/tags before
reading from templates that could specify sharedrepository in
the config file;
- updating config file created it under user's umask without
adjusting;
- updating refs created it under user's umask without
adjusting;
- switching branches created .git/HEAD under user's umask
without adjusting.
This moves adjust_shared_perm() from sha1_file.c to path.c,
since a few SIMPLE_PROGRAM need to call repository configuration
functions which in turn need to call adjust_shared_perm().
sha1_file.c needs to link with SHA1 computation library which
is usually not linked to SIMPLE_PROGRAM.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
After daemon, upload-pack and receive-pack find out where the
git directory is and chdir() there, make sure that repository is
in a format we understand, after putenv("GIT_DIR=.") so that it
knows to pick up the configuration file from there.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
We wanted --strict to mean "do not DWIM", but the code required to
see absolute path. daemon does its own path verification and chdirs
to the verified repository, so enter_repo() called from upload-pack
will always enter ".". Requiring absolute path does not make any sense.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
Make some functions static and convert func() function prototypes to to
func(void). Fix declaration after statement, missing declaration and
redundant declaration warnings.
Signed-off-by: Timo Hirvonen <tihirvon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
This should force git-daemon administrator's job a bit harder
because the exact paths need to be given in the whitelist, but
at the same time makes the auditing easier.
This moves validate_symref() from refs.c to path.c, because we
need to link path.c with git-daemon for its "enter_repo()", but
we do not want to link the daemon with the rest of git libraries
and its requirements.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
This patch provides the work-horse of the user-relative paths feature,
using Linus' idea of a blind chdir() and getcwd() which makes it
remarkably simple.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Ericsson <ae@op5.se>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
We have deprecated the old environment variable names for quite a
while and now it's time to remove them. Gone are:
SHA1_FILE_DIRECTORIES AUTHOR_DATE AUTHOR_EMAIL AUTHOR_NAME
COMMIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL COMMIT_AUTHOR_NAME SHA1_FILE_DIRECTORY
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
Omitting the first branch in ?: is a GNU extension. Cute,
but not supported by other compilers. Replaced mostly
by explicit tests. Calls to getenv() simply are repeated
on non-GNU compilers.
Signed-off-by: Jason Riedy <ejr@cs.berkeley.edu>
git_mkstemp() attempted to use TMPDIR environment variable, but it botched
copying the templates.
[jc: Holger, please add your own Signed-off-by line, and also if you can,
send in future patches as non attachments.]
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
Junio C Hamano
Peter Eriksen
Timo Hirvonen
Andreas Ericsson
Sven Verdoolaege
Jason Riedy
Holger Eitzenberger
Linus Torvalds