This is another step towards letting us remove the include of cache.h in
strbuf.c. It does mean that we also need to add includes of abspath.h
in a number of C files.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Dozens of files made use of gettext functions, without explicitly
including gettext.h. This made it more difficult to find which files
could remove a dependence on cache.h. Make C files explicitly include
gettext.h if they are using it.
However, while compat/fsmonitor/fsm-ipc-darwin.c should also gain an
include of gettext.h, it was left out to avoid conflicting with an
in-flight topic.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Platform-specific code that determines if a directory is OK to use
as a repository has been taught to report more details, especially
on Windows.
* js/safe-directory-plus:
mingw: handle a file owned by the Administrators group correctly
mingw: be more informative when ownership check fails on FAT32
mingw: provide details about unsafe directories' ownership
setup: prepare for more detailed "dubious ownership" messages
setup: fix some formatting
When verifying the ownership of the Git directory, we sometimes would
like to say a bit more about it, e.g. when using a platform-dependent
code path (think: Windows has the permission model that is so different
from Unix'), but only when it is a appropriate to actually say
something.
To allow for that, collect that information and hand it back to the
caller (whose responsibility it is to show it or not).
Note: We do not actually fill in any platform-dependent information yet,
this commit just adds the infrastructure to be able to do so.
Based-on-an-idea-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In preparation for touching code that was introduced in 3b0bf27049
(setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765, 2022-05-10) and
that was formatted differently than preferred in the Git project, fix
the indentation before actually modifying the code.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There is a known social engineering attack that takes advantage of the
fact that a working tree can include an entire bare repository,
including a config file. A user could run a Git command inside the bare
repository thinking that the config file of the 'outer' repository would
be used, but in reality, the bare repository's config file (which is
attacker-controlled) is used, which may result in arbitrary code
execution. See [1] for a fuller description and deeper discussion.
A simple mitigation is to forbid bare repositories unless specified via
`--git-dir` or `GIT_DIR`. In environments that don't use bare
repositories, this would be minimally disruptive.
Create a config variable, `safe.bareRepository`, that tells Git whether
or not to die() when working with a bare repository. This config is an
enum of:
- "all": allow all bare repositories (this is the default)
- "explicit": only allow bare repositories specified via --git-dir
or GIT_DIR.
If we want to protect users from such attacks by default, neither value
will suffice - "all" provides no protection, but "explicit" is
impractical for bare repository users. A more usable default would be to
allow only non-embedded bare repositories ([2] contains one such
proposal), but detecting if a repository is embedded is potentially
non-trivial, so this work is not implemented in this series.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/5b969c5e-e802-c447-ad25-6acc0b784582@github.com
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Use git_protected_config() to read `safe.directory` instead of
read_very_early_config(), making it 'protected configuration only'.
As a result, `safe.directory` now respects "-c", so update the tests and
docs accordingly. It used to ignore "-c" due to how it was implemented,
not because of security or correctness concerns [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqqlevabcsu.fsf@gitster.g/
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.35:
Git 2.35.4
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
8959555cee (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.
An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.
An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):
$ git -C /tmp init
To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.
This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.
Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.
While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
The reference given to users when the result of
setup_git_directory_gently_1() is unexpected is incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Cleber Rosa <crosa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Prior to Git 2.35.0, git could be run from an inaccessible working
directory so long as the git repository specified by options and/or
environment variables was accessible. For example:
git init repo
mkdir -p a/b
cd a/b
chmod u-x ..
git -C "${PWD%/a/b}/repo" status
If this example seems a bit contrived, consider running with the
repository owner as a substitute UID (e.g. with runuser(1) or sudo(8))
without ensuring the working directory is accessible by that user.
The code added by e6f8861bd4 ("setup: introduce
startup_info->original_cwd") to preserve the working directory attempts
to normalize the path using strbuf_realpath(). If that fails, as in the
case above, it is treated as a fatal error.
This commit treats strbuf_realpath() errors as non-fatal. If an error
occurs, setup_original_cwd() will continue without applying removal
prevention for cwd, resulting in the pre-2.35.0 behavior. The risk
should be minimal, since git will not operate on a repository with
inaccessible ancestors, this behavior is only known to occur when cwd is
a descendant of the repository, an ancestor of cwd is inaccessible, and
no ancestors of the repository are inaccessible.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name>
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Introduce and apply coccinelle rule to discourage an explicit
comparison between a pointer and NULL, and applies the clean-up to
the maintenance track.
* ep/maint-equals-null-cocci:
tree-wide: apply equals-null.cocci
tree-wide: apply equals-null.cocci
contrib/coccinnelle: add equals-null.cocci
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It seems that nothing is ever checking to make sure the safe directories
in the configs actually have the key safe.directory, so some unrelated
config that has a value with a certain directory would also make it a
safe directory.
Signed-off-by: Matheus Valadares <me@m28.io>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is difficult to change the ownership on a directory in our test
suite, so insert a new GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER environment
variable to trick Git into thinking we are in a differently-owned
directory. This allows us to test that the config is parsed correctly.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.2
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Use the same message when an invalid value is passed to a command line
option or a configuration variable.
Signed-off-by: Jean-Noël Avila <jn.avila@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Removing the current working directory causes all subsequent git
commands run from that directory to get confused and fail with a message
about being unable to read the current working directory:
$ git status
fatal: Unable to read current working directory: No such file or directory
Non-git commands likely have similar warnings or even errors, e.g.
$ bash -c 'echo hello'
shell-init: error retrieving current directory: getcwd: cannot access parent directories: No such file or directory
hello
This confuses end users, particularly since the command they get the
error from is not the one that caused the problem; the problem came from
the side-effect of some previous command.
We would like to avoid removing the current working directory of our
parent process; towards this end, introduce a new variable,
startup_info->original_cwd, that tracks the current working directory
that we inherited from our parent process. For convenience of later
comparisons, we prefer that this new variable store a path relative to
the toplevel working directory (thus much like 'prefix'), except without
the trailing slash.
Subsequent commits will make use of this new variable.
Acked-by: Derrick Stolee <stolee@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Replace the catch-all error message with specific ones for opening and
duplicating by calling the wrappers xopen and xdup. The code becomes
easier to follow when error handling is reduced to two letters.
Remove the unnecessary mode parameter while at it -- we expect /dev/null
to already exist.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Prepare the internals for lazily fetching objects in submodules
from their promisor remotes.
* jt/partial-clone-submodule-1:
promisor-remote: teach lazy-fetch in any repo
run-command: refactor subprocess env preparation
submodule: refrain from filtering GIT_CONFIG_COUNT
promisor-remote: support per-repository config
repository: move global r_f_p_c to repo struct
Move repository_format_partial_clone, which is currently a global
variable, into struct repository. (Full support for per-repository
partial clone config will be done in a subsequent commit - this is split
into its own commit because of the extent of the changes needed.)
The new repo-specific variable cannot be set in
check_repository_format_gently() (as is currently), because that
function does not know which repo it is operating on (or even whether
the value is important); therefore this responsibility is delegated to
the outermost caller that knows. Of all the outermost callers that know
(found by looking at all functions that call clear_repository_format()),
I looked at those that either read from the main Git directory or write
into a struct repository. These callers have been modified accordingly
(write to the_repository in the former case and write to the given
struct repository in the latter case).
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Tan <jonathantanmy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The "prefix" was precomposed for macOS in commit 5c327502 (MacOS:
precompose_argv_prefix(), 2021-02-03).
However, this commit forgot to update "startup_info->prefix" after
precomposing.
Move the (possible) precomposition towards the end of
setup_git_directory_gently(), so that precompose_string_if_needed()
can use git_config_get_bool("core.precomposeunicode") correctly.
Keep prefix, startup_info->prefix and GIT_PREFIX_ENVIRONMENT all in sync.
And as a result, the prefix no longer needs to be precomposed in git.c
Reported-by: Dmitry Torilov <d.torilov@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Torsten Bögershausen <tboegi@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The final leg of SHA-256 transition.
* bc/sha-256-part-3: (39 commits)
t: remove test_oid_init in tests
docs: add documentation for extensions.objectFormat
ci: run tests with SHA-256
t: make SHA1 prerequisite depend on default hash
t: allow testing different hash algorithms via environment
t: add test_oid option to select hash algorithm
repository: enable SHA-256 support by default
setup: add support for reading extensions.objectformat
bundle: add new version for use with SHA-256
builtin/verify-pack: implement an --object-format option
http-fetch: set up git directory before parsing pack hashes
t0410: mark test with SHA1 prerequisite
t5308: make test work with SHA-256
t9700: make hash size independent
t9500: ensure that algorithm info is preserved in config
t9350: make hash size independent
t9301: make hash size independent
t9300: use $ZERO_OID instead of hard-coded object ID
t9300: abstract away SHA-1-specific constants
t8011: make hash size independent
...
With the base fix to 2.27 regresion, any new extensions in a v0
repository would still be silently honored, which is not quite
right. Instead, complain and die loudly.
* jk/reject-newer-extensions-in-v0:
verify_repository_format(): complain about new extensions in v0 repo
The transition plan specifies extensions.objectFormat as the indication
that we're using a given hash in a certain repo. Read this as one of
the extensions we support. If the user has specified an invalid value,
fail.
Ensure that we reject the extension if the repository format version is
0.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In 2.28-rc0, we corrected a bug that some repository extensions are
honored by mistake even in a version 0 repositories (these
configuration variables in extensions.* namespace were supposed to
have special meaning in repositories whose version numbers are 1 or
higher), but this was a bit too big a change.
* jn/v0-with-extensions-fix:
repository: allow repository format upgrade with extensions
Revert "check_repository_format_gently(): refuse extensions for old repositories"
We made the mistake in the past of respecting extensions.* even when the
repository format version was set to 0. This is bad because forgetting
to bump the repository version means that older versions of Git (which
do not know about our extensions) won't complain. I.e., it's not a
problem in itself, but it means your repository is in a state which does
not give you the protection you think you're getting from older
versions.
For compatibility reasons, we are stuck with that decision for existing
extensions. However, we'd prefer not to extend the damage further. We
can do that by catching any newly-added extensions and complaining about
the repository format.
Note that this is a pretty heavy hammer: we'll refuse to work with the
repository at all. A lesser option would be to ignore (possibly with a
warning) any new extensions. But because of the way the extensions are
handled, that puts the burden on each new extension that is added to
remember to "undo" itself (because they are handled before we know
for sure whether we are in a v1 repo or not, since we don't insist on a
particular ordering of config entries).
So one option would be to rewrite that handling to record any new
extensions (and their values) during the config parse, and then only
after proceed to handle new ones only if we're in a v1 repository. But
I'm not sure if it's worth the trouble:
- ignoring extensions is likely to end up with broken results anyway
(e.g., ignoring a proposed objectformat extension means parsing any
object data is likely to encounter errors)
- this is a sign that whatever tool wrote the extension field is
broken. We may be better off notifying immediately and forcefully so
that such tools don't even appear to work accidentally.
The only downside is that fixing the situation is a little tricky,
because programs like "git config" won't want to work with the
repository. But:
git config --file=.git/config core.repositoryformatversion 1
should still suffice.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Now that we officially permit repository extensions in repository
format v0, permit upgrading a repository with extensions from v0 to v1
as well.
For example, this means a repository where the user has set
"extensions.preciousObjects" can use "git fetch --filter=blob:none
origin" to upgrade the repository to use v1 and the partial clone
extension.
To avoid mistakes, continue to forbid repository format upgrades in v0
repositories with an unrecognized extension. This way, a v0 user
using a misspelled extension field gets a chance to correct the
mistake before updating to the less forgiving v1 format.
While we're here, make the error message for failure to upgrade the
repository format a bit shorter, and present it as an error, not a
warning.
Reported-by: Huan Huan Chen <huanhuanchen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This reverts commit 14c7fa269e.
The core.repositoryFormatVersion field was introduced in ab9cb76f66
(Repository format version check., 2005-11-25), providing a welcome
bit of forward compatibility, thanks to some welcome analysis by
Martin Atukunda. The semantics are simple: a repository with
core.repositoryFormatVersion set to 0 should be comprehensible by all
Git implementations in active use; and Git implementations should
error out early instead of trying to act on Git repositories with
higher core.repositoryFormatVersion values representing new formats
that they do not understand.
A new repository format did not need to be defined until 00a09d57eb
(introduce "extensions" form of core.repositoryformatversion,
2015-06-23). This provided a finer-grained extension mechanism for
Git repositories. In a repository with core.repositoryFormatVersion
set to 1, Git implementations can act on "extensions.*" settings that
modify how a repository is interpreted. In repository format version
1, unrecognized extensions settings cause Git to error out.
What happens if a user sets an extension setting but forgets to
increase the repository format version to 1? The extension settings
were still recognized in that case; worse, unrecognized extensions
settings do *not* cause Git to error out. So combining repository
format version 0 with extensions settings produces in some sense the
worst of both worlds.
To improve that situation, since 14c7fa269e
(check_repository_format_gently(): refuse extensions for old
repositories, 2020-06-05) Git instead ignores extensions in v0 mode.
This way, v0 repositories get the historical (pre-2015) behavior and
maintain compatibility with Git implementations that do not know about
the v1 format. Unfortunately, users had been using this sort of
configuration and this behavior change came to many as a surprise:
- users of "git config --worktree" that had followed its advice
to enable extensions.worktreeConfig (without also increasing the
repository format version) would find their worktree configuration
no longer taking effect
- tools such as copybara[*] that had set extensions.partialClone in
existing repositories (without also increasing the repository format
version) would find that setting no longer taking effect
The behavior introduced in 14c7fa269e might be a good behavior if we
were traveling back in time to 2015, but we're far too late. For some
reason I thought that it was what had been originally implemented and
that it had regressed. Apologies for not doing my research when
14c7fa269e was under development.
Let's return to the behavior we've had since 2015: always act on
extensions.* settings, regardless of repository format version. While
we're here, include some tests to describe the effect on the "upgrade
repository version" code path.
[*] ca76c0b1e1
Reported-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
SHA-256 migration work continues.
* bc/sha-256-part-2: (44 commits)
remote-testgit: adapt for object-format
bundle: detect hash algorithm when reading refs
t5300: pass --object-format to git index-pack
t5704: send object-format capability with SHA-256
t5703: use object-format serve option
t5702: offer an object-format capability in the test
t/helper: initialize the repository for test-sha1-array
remote-curl: avoid truncating refs with ls-remote
t1050: pass algorithm to index-pack when outside repo
builtin/index-pack: add option to specify hash algorithm
remote-curl: detect algorithm for dumb HTTP by size
builtin/ls-remote: initialize repository based on fetch
t5500: make hash independent
serve: advertise object-format capability for protocol v2
connect: parse v2 refs with correct hash algorithm
connect: pass full packet reader when parsing v2 refs
Documentation/technical: document object-format for protocol v2
t1302: expect repo format version 1 for SHA-256
builtin/show-index: provide options to determine hash algo
t5302: modernize test formatting
...
Previously, extensions were recognized regardless of repository format
version. If the user sets an undefined "extensions" value on a
repository of version 0 and that value is used by a future git version,
they might get an undesired result.
Because all extensions now also upgrade repository versions, tightening
the check would help avoid this for future extensions.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <delphij@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In version 1 of repository format, "extensions" gained special meaning
and it is safer to avoid upgrading when there are pre-existing
extensions.
Make list-objects-filter to use the helper function instead of setting
repository version directly as a prerequisite of exposing the upgrade
capability.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <delphij@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When we're checking the repository's format, set the hash algorithm at
the same time. This ensures that we perform a suitable initialization
early enough to avoid confusing any parts of the code. If we defer
until later, we can end up with portions of the code which are confused
about the hash algorithm, resulting in segfaults when working with
SHA-256 repositories.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Elijah Newren
Junio C Hamano
Johannes Schindelin
Glen Choo
Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón
Cleber Rosa
Kevin Locke
Derrick Stolee
Matheus Valadares
Jean-Noël Avila
René Scharfe
Jonathan Tan
Alex Henrie
Torsten Bögershausen
brian m. carlson
Jeff King
Jonathan Nieder
Xin Li