From b5726a5d9cabba0bd8fb6c1b25a887bc7ea4650d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] ssh signing: preliminary refactoring and clean-up Openssh v8.2p1 added some new options to ssh-keygen for signature creation and verification. These allow us to use ssh keys for git signatures easily. In our corporate environment we use PIV x509 Certs on Yubikeys for email signing/encryption and ssh keys which I think is quite common (at least for the email part). This way we can establish the correct trust for the SSH Keys without setting up a separate GPG Infrastructure (which is still quite painful for users) or implementing x509 signing support for git (which lacks good forwarding mechanisms). Using ssh agent forwarding makes this feature easily usable in todays development environments where code is often checked out in remote VMs / containers. In such a setup the keyring & revocationKeyring can be centrally generated from the x509 CA information and distributed to the users. To be able to implement new signing formats this commit: - makes the sigc structure more generic by renaming "gpg_output" to "output" - introduces function pointers in the gpg_format structure to call format specific signing and verification functions - moves format detection from verify_signed_buffer into the check_signature api function and calls the format specific verify - renames and wraps sign_buffer to handle format specific signing logic as well Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- fmt-merge-msg.c | 6 +-- gpg-interface.c | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- gpg-interface.h | 2 +- log-tree.c | 8 ++-- pretty.c | 4 +- 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c index 0f66818e0f8..fb300bb4b67 100644 --- a/fmt-merge-msg.c +++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c @@ -526,11 +526,11 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out) buf = payload.buf; len = payload.len; if (check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, sig.buf, - sig.len, &sigc) && - !sigc.gpg_output) + sig.len, &sigc) && + !sigc.output) strbuf_addstr(&sig, "gpg verification failed.\n"); else - strbuf_addstr(&sig, sigc.gpg_output); + strbuf_addstr(&sig, sigc.output); } signature_check_clear(&sigc); diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c index 127aecfc2b0..db54b054162 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.c +++ b/gpg-interface.c @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ struct gpg_format { const char *program; const char **verify_args; const char **sigs; + int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc, + struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, + size_t payload_size, const char *signature, + size_t signature_size); + int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, + const char *signing_key); }; static const char *openpgp_verify_args[] = { @@ -35,14 +41,29 @@ static const char *x509_sigs[] = { NULL }; +static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, + struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, + size_t payload_size, const char *signature, + size_t signature_size); +static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, + const char *signing_key); + static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { - { .name = "openpgp", .program = "gpg", - .verify_args = openpgp_verify_args, - .sigs = openpgp_sigs + { + .name = "openpgp", + .program = "gpg", + .verify_args = openpgp_verify_args, + .sigs = openpgp_sigs, + .verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, + .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, }, - { .name = "x509", .program = "gpgsm", - .verify_args = x509_verify_args, - .sigs = x509_sigs + { + .name = "x509", + .program = "gpgsm", + .verify_args = x509_verify_args, + .sigs = x509_sigs, + .verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, + .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, }, }; @@ -72,7 +93,7 @@ static struct gpg_format *get_format_by_sig(const char *sig) void signature_check_clear(struct signature_check *sigc) { FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->payload); - FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->gpg_output); + FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->output); FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->gpg_status); FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->signer); FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->key); @@ -257,16 +278,16 @@ static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc) FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->key); } -static int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size, - const char *signature, size_t signature_size, - struct strbuf *gpg_output, - struct strbuf *gpg_status) +static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, + struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, + size_t payload_size, const char *signature, + size_t signature_size) { struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; - struct gpg_format *fmt; struct tempfile *temp; int ret; - struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf gpg_stdout = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf gpg_stderr = STRBUF_INIT; temp = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX"); if (!temp) @@ -279,10 +300,6 @@ static int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size, return -1; } - fmt = get_format_by_sig(signature); - if (!fmt) - BUG("bad signature '%s'", signature); - strvec_push(&gpg.args, fmt->program); strvec_pushv(&gpg.args, fmt->verify_args); strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, @@ -290,18 +307,22 @@ static int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size, "--verify", temp->filename.buf, "-", NULL); - if (!gpg_status) - gpg_status = &buf; - sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); - ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, - gpg_status, 0, gpg_output, 0); + ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, &gpg_stdout, 0, + &gpg_stderr, 0); sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); delete_tempfile(&temp); - ret |= !strstr(gpg_status->buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG "); - strbuf_release(&buf); /* no matter it was used or not */ + ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG "); + sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size); + sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL); + sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL); + + parse_gpg_output(sigc); + + strbuf_release(&gpg_stdout); + strbuf_release(&gpg_stderr); return ret; } @@ -309,35 +330,32 @@ static int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size, int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature, size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc) { - struct strbuf gpg_output = STRBUF_INIT; - struct strbuf gpg_status = STRBUF_INIT; + struct gpg_format *fmt; int status; sigc->result = 'N'; sigc->trust_level = -1; - status = verify_signed_buffer(payload, plen, signature, slen, - &gpg_output, &gpg_status); - if (status && !gpg_output.len) - goto out; - sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, plen); - sigc->gpg_output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_output, NULL); - sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_status, NULL); - parse_gpg_output(sigc); + fmt = get_format_by_sig(signature); + if (!fmt) + die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature); + + status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, payload, plen, signature, + slen); + + if (status && !sigc->output) + return !!status; + status |= sigc->result != 'G'; status |= sigc->trust_level < configured_min_trust_level; - out: - strbuf_release(&gpg_status); - strbuf_release(&gpg_output); - return !!status; } void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags) { - const char *output = flags & GPG_VERIFY_RAW ? - sigc->gpg_status : sigc->gpg_output; + const char *output = flags & GPG_VERIFY_RAW ? sigc->gpg_status : + sigc->output; if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload) fputs(sigc->payload, stdout); @@ -441,6 +459,12 @@ const char *get_signing_key(void) } int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key) +{ + return use_format->sign_buffer(buffer, signature, signing_key); +} + +static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, + const char *signing_key) { struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; int ret; diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h index 80567e48948..feac4decf8b 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.h +++ b/gpg-interface.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ enum signature_trust_level { struct signature_check { char *payload; - char *gpg_output; + char *output; char *gpg_status; /* diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c index 7b823786c2c..20af9bd1c82 100644 --- a/log-tree.c +++ b/log-tree.c @@ -513,10 +513,10 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit) status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf, signature.len, &sigc); - if (status && !sigc.gpg_output) + if (status && !sigc.output) show_sig_lines(opt, status, "No signature\n"); else - show_sig_lines(opt, status, sigc.gpg_output); + show_sig_lines(opt, status, sigc.output); signature_check_clear(&sigc); out: @@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit, /* could have a good signature */ status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf, signature.len, &sigc); - if (sigc.gpg_output) - strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.gpg_output); + if (sigc.output) + strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.output); else strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, "No signature\n"); signature_check_clear(&sigc); diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c index b1ecd039cef..daa71394efd 100644 --- a/pretty.c +++ b/pretty.c @@ -1432,8 +1432,8 @@ static size_t format_commit_one(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */ check_commit_signature(c->commit, &(c->signature_check)); switch (placeholder[1]) { case 'G': - if (c->signature_check.gpg_output) - strbuf_addstr(sb, c->signature_check.gpg_output); + if (c->signature_check.output) + strbuf_addstr(sb, c->signature_check.output); break; case '?': switch (c->signature_check.result) { From 64625c728fc281181e6dc6c0b8b538f0fbe47a30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] ssh signing: add test prereqs Generate some ssh keys and a allowedSignersFile for testing Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- t/lib-gpg.sh | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh index 9fc5241228e..f99ef3e859d 100644 --- a/t/lib-gpg.sh +++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh @@ -87,6 +87,34 @@ test_lazy_prereq RFC1991 ' echo | gpg --homedir "${GNUPGHOME}" -b --rfc1991 >/dev/null ' +GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY="${GNUPGHOME}/ed25519_ssh_signing_key" +GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY="${GNUPGHOME}/rsa_2048_ssh_signing_key" +GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED="${GNUPGHOME}/untrusted_ssh_signing_key" +GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE="${GNUPGHOME}/protected_ssh_signing_key" +GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE="super_secret" +GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS="${GNUPGHOME}/ssh.all_valid.allowedSignersFile" + +GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED='Good "git" signature for' +GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED='Good "git" signature with' +GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED="No principal matched" +GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE="Signature verification failed" + +test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH ' + ssh_version=$(ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -n "git" 2>&1) + test $? != 127 || exit 1 + echo $ssh_version | grep -q "find-principals:missing signature file" + test $? = 0 || exit 1; + mkdir -p "${GNUPGHOME}" && + chmod 0700 "${GNUPGHOME}" && + ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >/dev/null && + echo "\"principal with number 1\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -N "" -C "git rsa2048 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}" >/dev/null && + echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null && + echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null +' + sanitize_pgp() { perl -ne ' /^-----END PGP/ and $in_pgp = 0; From 29b315778e958417a411f02b6d4b5a0fc9d731e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] ssh signing: add ssh key format and signing code Implements the actual sign_buffer_ssh operation and move some shared cleanup code into a strbuf function Set gpg.format = ssh and user.signingkey to either a ssh public key string (like from an authorized_keys file), or a ssh key file. If the key file or the config value itself contains only a public key then the private key needs to be available via ssh-agent. gpg.ssh.program can be set to an alternative location of ssh-keygen. A somewhat recent openssh version (8.2p1+) of ssh-keygen is needed for this feature. Since only ssh-keygen is needed it can this way be installed seperately without upgrading your system openssh packages. Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- Documentation/config/gpg.txt | 4 +- Documentation/config/user.txt | 5 ++ gpg-interface.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt index d94025cb368..88531b15f0f 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt @@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ gpg.program:: gpg.format:: Specifies which key format to use when signing with `--gpg-sign`. - Default is "openpgp" and another possible value is "x509". + Default is "openpgp". Other possible values are "x509", "ssh". gpg..program:: Use this to customize the program used for the signing format you chose. (see `gpg.program` and `gpg.format`) `gpg.program` can still be used as a legacy synonym for `gpg.openpgp.program`. The default - value for `gpg.x509.program` is "gpgsm". + value for `gpg.x509.program` is "gpgsm" and `gpg.ssh.program` is "ssh-keygen". gpg.minTrustLevel:: Specifies a minimum trust level for signature verification. If diff --git a/Documentation/config/user.txt b/Documentation/config/user.txt index 59aec7c3aed..2155128957c 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/user.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/user.txt @@ -36,3 +36,8 @@ user.signingKey:: commit, you can override the default selection with this variable. This option is passed unchanged to gpg's --local-user parameter, so you may specify a key using any method that gpg supports. + If gpg.format is set to "ssh" this can contain the literal ssh public + key (e.g.: "ssh-rsa XXXXXX identifier") or a file which contains it and + corresponds to the private key used for signing. The private key + needs to be available via ssh-agent. Alternatively it can be set to + a file containing a private key directly. diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c index db54b054162..7ca682ac6d6 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.c +++ b/gpg-interface.c @@ -41,12 +41,20 @@ static const char *x509_sigs[] = { NULL }; +static const char *ssh_verify_args[] = { NULL }; +static const char *ssh_sigs[] = { + "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----", + NULL +}; + static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, size_t payload_size, const char *signature, size_t signature_size); static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key); +static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, + const char *signing_key); static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { { @@ -65,6 +73,14 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, }, + { + .name = "ssh", + .program = "ssh-keygen", + .verify_args = ssh_verify_args, + .sigs = ssh_sigs, + .verify_signed_buffer = NULL, /* TODO */ + .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh + }, }; static struct gpg_format *use_format = &gpg_format[0]; @@ -443,6 +459,9 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.x509.program")) fmtname = "x509"; + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.program")) + fmtname = "ssh"; + if (fmtname) { fmt = get_format_by_name(fmtname); return git_config_string(&fmt->program, var, value); @@ -463,12 +482,30 @@ int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *sig return use_format->sign_buffer(buffer, signature, signing_key); } +/* + * Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. + * NEEDSWORK: make it trim only CRs before LFs and rename + */ +static void remove_cr_after(struct strbuf *buffer, size_t offset) +{ + size_t i, j; + + for (i = j = offset; i < buffer->len; i++) { + if (buffer->buf[i] != '\r') { + if (i != j) + buffer->buf[j] = buffer->buf[i]; + j++; + } + } + strbuf_setlen(buffer, j); +} + static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key) { struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; int ret; - size_t i, j, bottom; + size_t bottom; struct strbuf gpg_status = STRBUF_INIT; strvec_pushl(&gpg.args, @@ -494,13 +531,98 @@ static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, return error(_("gpg failed to sign the data")); /* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. */ - for (i = j = bottom; i < signature->len; i++) - if (signature->buf[i] != '\r') { - if (i != j) - signature->buf[j] = signature->buf[i]; - j++; - } - strbuf_setlen(signature, j); + remove_cr_after(signature, bottom); return 0; } + +static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, + const char *signing_key) +{ + struct child_process signer = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; + int ret = -1; + size_t bottom, keylen; + struct strbuf signer_stderr = STRBUF_INIT; + struct tempfile *key_file = NULL, *buffer_file = NULL; + char *ssh_signing_key_file = NULL; + struct strbuf ssh_signature_filename = STRBUF_INIT; + + if (!signing_key || signing_key[0] == '\0') + return error( + _("user.signingkey needs to be set for ssh signing")); + + if (starts_with(signing_key, "ssh-")) { + /* A literal ssh key */ + key_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_signing_key_tmpXXXXXX"); + if (!key_file) + return error_errno( + _("could not create temporary file")); + keylen = strlen(signing_key); + if (write_in_full(key_file->fd, signing_key, keylen) < 0 || + close_tempfile_gently(key_file) < 0) { + error_errno(_("failed writing ssh signing key to '%s'"), + key_file->filename.buf); + goto out; + } + ssh_signing_key_file = strbuf_detach(&key_file->filename, NULL); + } else { + /* We assume a file */ + ssh_signing_key_file = expand_user_path(signing_key, 1); + } + + buffer_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_signing_buffer_tmpXXXXXX"); + if (!buffer_file) { + error_errno(_("could not create temporary file")); + goto out; + } + + if (write_in_full(buffer_file->fd, buffer->buf, buffer->len) < 0 || + close_tempfile_gently(buffer_file) < 0) { + error_errno(_("failed writing ssh signing key buffer to '%s'"), + buffer_file->filename.buf); + goto out; + } + + strvec_pushl(&signer.args, use_format->program, + "-Y", "sign", + "-n", "git", + "-f", ssh_signing_key_file, + buffer_file->filename.buf, + NULL); + + sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + ret = pipe_command(&signer, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &signer_stderr, 0); + sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); + + if (ret) { + if (strstr(signer_stderr.buf, "usage:")) + error(_("ssh-keygen -Y sign is needed for ssh signing (available in openssh version 8.2p1+)")); + + error("%s", signer_stderr.buf); + goto out; + } + + bottom = signature->len; + + strbuf_addbuf(&ssh_signature_filename, &buffer_file->filename); + strbuf_addstr(&ssh_signature_filename, ".sig"); + if (strbuf_read_file(signature, ssh_signature_filename.buf, 0) < 0) { + error_errno( + _("failed reading ssh signing data buffer from '%s'"), + ssh_signature_filename.buf); + } + unlink_or_warn(ssh_signature_filename.buf); + + /* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. */ + remove_cr_after(signature, bottom); + +out: + if (key_file) + delete_tempfile(&key_file); + if (buffer_file) + delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); + strbuf_release(&signer_stderr); + strbuf_release(&ssh_signature_filename); + FREE_AND_NULL(ssh_signing_key_file); + return ret; +} From fd9e226776d1874af36b6b02fb2002b917af42fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] ssh signing: retrieve a default key from ssh-agent If user.signingkey is not set and a ssh signature is requested we call gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand (typically "ssh-add -L") and use the first key we get Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- Documentation/config/gpg.txt | 6 +++ Documentation/config/user.txt | 4 +- gpg-interface.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt index 88531b15f0f..9b95dd280c3 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt @@ -33,3 +33,9 @@ gpg.minTrustLevel:: * `marginal` * `fully` * `ultimate` + +gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: + This command that will be run when user.signingkey is not set and a ssh + signature is requested. On successful exit a valid ssh public key is + expected in the first line of its output. To automatically use the first + available key from your ssh-agent set this to "ssh-add -L". diff --git a/Documentation/config/user.txt b/Documentation/config/user.txt index 2155128957c..ad78dce9ecb 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/user.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/user.txt @@ -40,4 +40,6 @@ user.signingKey:: key (e.g.: "ssh-rsa XXXXXX identifier") or a file which contains it and corresponds to the private key used for signing. The private key needs to be available via ssh-agent. Alternatively it can be set to - a file containing a private key directly. + a file containing a private key directly. If not set git will call + gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand (e.g.: "ssh-add -L") and try to use the first + key available. diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c index 7ca682ac6d6..3a0cca1b1d2 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.c +++ b/gpg-interface.c @@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ #include "gpg-interface.h" #include "sigchain.h" #include "tempfile.h" +#include "alias.h" static char *configured_signing_key; +static const char *ssh_default_key_command; static enum signature_trust_level configured_min_trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; struct gpg_format { @@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ struct gpg_format { size_t signature_size); int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key); + const char *(*get_default_key)(void); }; static const char *openpgp_verify_args[] = { @@ -56,6 +59,8 @@ static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key); +static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void); + static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { { .name = "openpgp", @@ -64,6 +69,7 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .sigs = openpgp_sigs, .verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, + .get_default_key = NULL, }, { .name = "x509", @@ -72,6 +78,7 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .sigs = x509_sigs, .verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, + .get_default_key = NULL, }, { .name = "ssh", @@ -79,7 +86,8 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .verify_args = ssh_verify_args, .sigs = ssh_sigs, .verify_signed_buffer = NULL, /* TODO */ - .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh + .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh, + .get_default_key = get_default_ssh_signing_key, }, }; @@ -453,6 +461,12 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) return 0; } + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.defaultkeycommand")) { + if (!value) + return config_error_nonbool(var); + return git_config_string(&ssh_default_key_command, var, value); + } + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.program") || !strcmp(var, "gpg.openpgp.program")) fmtname = "openpgp"; @@ -470,11 +484,63 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) return 0; } +/* Returns the first public key from an ssh-agent to use for signing */ +static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void) +{ + struct child_process ssh_default_key = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; + int ret = -1; + struct strbuf key_stdout = STRBUF_INIT, key_stderr = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf **keys; + char *key_command = NULL; + const char **argv; + int n; + char *default_key = NULL; + + if (!ssh_default_key_command) + die(_("either user.signingkey or gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand needs to be configured")); + + key_command = xstrdup(ssh_default_key_command); + n = split_cmdline(key_command, &argv); + + if (n < 0) + die("malformed build-time gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: %s", + split_cmdline_strerror(n)); + + strvec_pushv(&ssh_default_key.args, argv); + ret = pipe_command(&ssh_default_key, NULL, 0, &key_stdout, 0, + &key_stderr, 0); + + if (!ret) { + keys = strbuf_split_max(&key_stdout, '\n', 2); + if (keys[0] && starts_with(keys[0]->buf, "ssh-")) { + default_key = strbuf_detach(keys[0], NULL); + } else { + warning(_("gpg.ssh.defaultKeycommand succeeded but returned no keys: %s %s"), + key_stderr.buf, key_stdout.buf); + } + + strbuf_list_free(keys); + } else { + warning(_("gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand failed: %s %s"), + key_stderr.buf, key_stdout.buf); + } + + free(key_command); + free(argv); + strbuf_release(&key_stdout); + + return default_key; +} + const char *get_signing_key(void) { if (configured_signing_key) return configured_signing_key; - return git_committer_info(IDENT_STRICT|IDENT_NO_DATE); + if (use_format->get_default_key) { + return use_format->get_default_key(); + } + + return git_committer_info(IDENT_STRICT | IDENT_NO_DATE); } int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key) From 4838f62c8caffbfe5d7d39cad4e8aeb2a2d57da8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] ssh signing: provide a textual signing_key_id For ssh the user.signingkey can be a filename/path or even a literal ssh pubkey. In push certs and textual output we prefer the ssh fingerprint instead. Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- gpg-interface.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ gpg-interface.h | 6 ++++++ send-pack.c | 8 +++---- 3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c index 3a0cca1b1d2..0f1c6a02e53 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.c +++ b/gpg-interface.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct gpg_format { int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key); const char *(*get_default_key)(void); + const char *(*get_key_id)(void); }; static const char *openpgp_verify_args[] = { @@ -61,6 +62,8 @@ static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void); +static const char *get_ssh_key_id(void); + static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { { .name = "openpgp", @@ -70,6 +73,7 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, .get_default_key = NULL, + .get_key_id = NULL, }, { .name = "x509", @@ -79,6 +83,7 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer, .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg, .get_default_key = NULL, + .get_key_id = NULL, }, { .name = "ssh", @@ -88,6 +93,7 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .verify_signed_buffer = NULL, /* TODO */ .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh, .get_default_key = get_default_ssh_signing_key, + .get_key_id = get_ssh_key_id, }, }; @@ -484,6 +490,41 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) return 0; } +static char *get_ssh_key_fingerprint(const char *signing_key) +{ + struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; + int ret = -1; + struct strbuf fingerprint_stdout = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf **fingerprint; + + /* + * With SSH Signing this can contain a filename or a public key + * For textual representation we usually want a fingerprint + */ + if (starts_with(signing_key, "ssh-")) { + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen", "-lf", "-", NULL); + ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, signing_key, + strlen(signing_key), &fingerprint_stdout, 0, + NULL, 0); + } else { + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen", "-lf", + configured_signing_key, NULL); + ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &fingerprint_stdout, 0, + NULL, 0); + } + + if (!!ret) + die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"), + signing_key); + + fingerprint = strbuf_split_max(&fingerprint_stdout, ' ', 3); + if (!fingerprint[1]) + die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"), + signing_key); + + return strbuf_detach(fingerprint[1], NULL); +} + /* Returns the first public key from an ssh-agent to use for signing */ static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void) { @@ -532,6 +573,21 @@ static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void) return default_key; } +static const char *get_ssh_key_id(void) { + return get_ssh_key_fingerprint(get_signing_key()); +} + +/* Returns a textual but unique representation of the signing key */ +const char *get_signing_key_id(void) +{ + if (use_format->get_key_id) { + return use_format->get_key_id(); + } + + /* GPG/GPGSM only store a key id on this variable */ + return get_signing_key(); +} + const char *get_signing_key(void) { if (configured_signing_key) diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h index feac4decf8b..beefacbb1e9 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.h +++ b/gpg-interface.h @@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, int git_gpg_config(const char *, const char *, void *); void set_signing_key(const char *); const char *get_signing_key(void); + +/* + * Returns a textual unique representation of the signing key in use + * Either a GPG KeyID or a SSH Key Fingerprint + */ +const char *get_signing_key_id(void); int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature, size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc); diff --git a/send-pack.c b/send-pack.c index 5a79e0e7110..50cca7e439b 100644 --- a/send-pack.c +++ b/send-pack.c @@ -341,13 +341,13 @@ static int generate_push_cert(struct strbuf *req_buf, { const struct ref *ref; struct string_list_item *item; - char *signing_key = xstrdup(get_signing_key()); + char *signing_key_id = xstrdup(get_signing_key_id()); const char *cp, *np; struct strbuf cert = STRBUF_INIT; int update_seen = 0; strbuf_addstr(&cert, "certificate version 0.1\n"); - strbuf_addf(&cert, "pusher %s ", signing_key); + strbuf_addf(&cert, "pusher %s ", signing_key_id); datestamp(&cert); strbuf_addch(&cert, '\n'); if (args->url && *args->url) { @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static int generate_push_cert(struct strbuf *req_buf, if (!update_seen) goto free_return; - if (sign_buffer(&cert, &cert, signing_key)) + if (sign_buffer(&cert, &cert, get_signing_key())) die(_("failed to sign the push certificate")); packet_buf_write(req_buf, "push-cert%c%s", 0, cap_string); @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static int generate_push_cert(struct strbuf *req_buf, packet_buf_write(req_buf, "push-cert-end\n"); free_return: - free(signing_key); + free(signing_key_id); strbuf_release(&cert); return update_seen; } From facca53ac3c2e8a5e2a4fe54c9c15de656c72de1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] ssh signing: verify signatures using ssh-keygen To verify a ssh signature we first call ssh-keygen -Y find-principal to look up the signing principal by their public key from the allowedSignersFile. If the key is found then we do a verify. Otherwise we only validate the signature but can not verify the signers identity. Verification uses the gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile (see ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED SIGNERS") which contains valid public keys and a principal (usually user@domain). Depending on the environment this file can be managed by the individual developer or for example generated by the central repository server from known ssh keys with push access. This file is usually stored outside the repository, but if the repository only allows signed commits/pushes, the user might choose to store it in the repository. To revoke a key put the public key without the principal prefix into gpg.ssh.revocationKeyring or generate a KRL (see ssh-keygen(1) "KEY REVOCATION LISTS"). The same considerations about who to trust for verification as with the allowedSignersFile apply. Using SSH CA Keys with these files is also possible. Add "cert-authority" as key option between the principal and the key to mark it as a CA and all keys signed by it as valid for this CA. See "CERTIFICATES" in ssh-keygen(1). Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- Documentation/config/gpg.txt | 35 ++++++ builtin/receive-pack.c | 4 + gpg-interface.c | 215 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 252 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt index 9b95dd280c3..51a756b2f15 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt @@ -39,3 +39,38 @@ gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: signature is requested. On successful exit a valid ssh public key is expected in the first line of its output. To automatically use the first available key from your ssh-agent set this to "ssh-add -L". + +gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile:: + A file containing ssh public keys which you are willing to trust. + The file consists of one or more lines of principals followed by an ssh + public key. + e.g.: user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1... + See ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED SIGNERS" for details. + The principal is only used to identify the key and is available when + verifying a signature. ++ +SSH has no concept of trust levels like gpg does. To be able to differentiate +between valid signatures and trusted signatures the trust level of a signature +verification is set to `fully` when the public key is present in the allowedSignersFile. +Therefore to only mark fully trusted keys as verified set gpg.minTrustLevel to `fully`. +Otherwise valid but untrusted signatures will still verify but show no principal +name of the signer. ++ +This file can be set to a location outside of the repository and every developer +maintains their own trust store. A central repository server could generate this +file automatically from ssh keys with push access to verify the code against. +In a corporate setting this file is probably generated at a global location +from automation that already handles developer ssh keys. ++ +A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file +in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree. +This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring. ++ +Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option +(see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid. + +gpg.ssh.revocationFile:: + Either a SSH KRL or a list of revoked public keys (without the principal prefix). + See ssh-keygen(1) for details. + If a public key is found in this file then it will always be treated + as having trust level "never" and signatures will show as invalid. diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c index a34742513ac..f17c7d2246b 100644 --- a/builtin/receive-pack.c +++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c @@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ static int receive_pack_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) { int status = parse_hide_refs_config(var, value, "receive"); + if (status) + return status; + + status = git_gpg_config(var, value, NULL); if (status) return status; diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c index 0f1c6a02e53..433482307c0 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.c +++ b/gpg-interface.c @@ -3,13 +3,14 @@ #include "config.h" #include "run-command.h" #include "strbuf.h" +#include "dir.h" #include "gpg-interface.h" #include "sigchain.h" #include "tempfile.h" #include "alias.h" static char *configured_signing_key; -static const char *ssh_default_key_command; +static const char *ssh_default_key_command, *ssh_allowed_signers, *ssh_revocation_file; static enum signature_trust_level configured_min_trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; struct gpg_format { @@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, size_t payload_size, const char *signature, size_t signature_size); +static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, + struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, + size_t payload_size, const char *signature, + size_t signature_size); static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key); static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, @@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = { .program = "ssh-keygen", .verify_args = ssh_verify_args, .sigs = ssh_sigs, - .verify_signed_buffer = NULL, /* TODO */ + .verify_signed_buffer = verify_ssh_signed_buffer, .sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh, .get_default_key = get_default_ssh_signing_key, .get_key_id = get_ssh_key_id, @@ -357,6 +362,200 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, return ret; } +static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc) +{ + const char *line, *principal, *search; + char *key = NULL; + + /* + * ssh-keygen output should be: + * Good "git" signature for PRINCIPAL with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT + * + * or for valid but unknown keys: + * Good "git" signature with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT + * + * Note that "PRINCIPAL" can contain whitespace, "RSA" and + * "SHA256" part could be a different token that names of + * the algorithms used, and "FINGERPRINT" is a hexadecimal + * string. By finding the last occurence of " with ", we can + * reliably parse out the PRINCIPAL. + */ + sigc->result = 'B'; + sigc->trust_level = TRUST_NEVER; + + line = xmemdupz(sigc->output, strcspn(sigc->output, "\n")); + + if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature for ", &line)) { + /* Valid signature and known principal */ + sigc->result = 'G'; + sigc->trust_level = TRUST_FULLY; + + /* Search for the last "with" to get the full principal */ + principal = line; + do { + search = strstr(line, " with "); + if (search) + line = search + 1; + } while (search != NULL); + sigc->signer = xmemdupz(principal, line - principal - 1); + } else if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature with ", &line)) { + /* Valid signature, but key unknown */ + sigc->result = 'G'; + sigc->trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED; + } else { + return; + } + + key = strstr(line, "key"); + if (key) { + sigc->fingerprint = xstrdup(strstr(line, "key") + 4); + sigc->key = xstrdup(sigc->fingerprint); + } else { + /* + * Output did not match what we expected + * Treat the signature as bad + */ + sigc->result = 'B'; + } +} + +static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc, + struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload, + size_t payload_size, const char *signature, + size_t signature_size) +{ + struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT; + struct tempfile *buffer_file; + int ret = -1; + const char *line; + size_t trust_size; + char *principal; + struct strbuf ssh_principals_out = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT; + + if (!ssh_allowed_signers) { + error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification")); + return -1; + } + + buffer_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX"); + if (!buffer_file) + return error_errno(_("could not create temporary file")); + if (write_in_full(buffer_file->fd, signature, signature_size) < 0 || + close_tempfile_gently(buffer_file) < 0) { + error_errno(_("failed writing detached signature to '%s'"), + buffer_file->filename.buf); + delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); + return -1; + } + + /* Find the principal from the signers */ + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program, + "-Y", "find-principals", + "-f", ssh_allowed_signers, + "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, + NULL); + ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0, + &ssh_principals_err, 0); + if (ret && strstr(ssh_principals_err.buf, "usage:")) { + error(_("ssh-keygen -Y find-principals/verify is needed for ssh signature verification (available in openssh version 8.2p1+)")); + goto out; + } + if (ret || !ssh_principals_out.len) { + /* + * We did not find a matching principal in the allowedSigners + * Check without validation + */ + child_process_init(&ssh_keygen); + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program, + "-Y", "check-novalidate", + "-n", "git", + "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, + NULL); + pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size, + &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0); + + /* + * Fail on unknown keys + * we still call check-novalidate to display the signature info + */ + ret = -1; + } else { + /* Check every principal we found (one per line) */ + for (line = ssh_principals_out.buf; *line; + line = strchrnul(line + 1, '\n')) { + while (*line == '\n') + line++; + if (!*line) + break; + + trust_size = strcspn(line, "\n"); + principal = xmemdupz(line, trust_size); + + child_process_init(&ssh_keygen); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err); + strvec_push(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program); + /* + * We found principals + * Try with each until we find a match + */ + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-Y", "verify", + "-n", "git", + "-f", ssh_allowed_signers, + "-I", principal, + "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf, + NULL); + + if (ssh_revocation_file) { + if (file_exists(ssh_revocation_file)) { + strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-r", + ssh_revocation_file, NULL); + } else { + warning(_("ssh signing revocation file configured but not found: %s"), + ssh_revocation_file); + } + } + + sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size, + &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0); + sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE); + + FREE_AND_NULL(principal); + + if (!ret) + ret = !starts_with(ssh_keygen_out.buf, "Good"); + + if (!ret) + break; + } + } + + sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size); + strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0); + strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0); + /* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */ + strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_principals_err.buf, ssh_principals_err.len); + strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_keygen_err.buf, ssh_keygen_err.len); + sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&ssh_keygen_out, NULL); + sigc->gpg_status = xstrdup(sigc->output); + + parse_ssh_output(sigc); + +out: + if (buffer_file) + delete_tempfile(&buffer_file); + strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_out); + strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out); + strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err); + + return ret; +} + int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature, size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc) { @@ -473,6 +672,18 @@ int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb) return git_config_string(&ssh_default_key_command, var, value); } + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.allowedsignersfile")) { + if (!value) + return config_error_nonbool(var); + return git_config_pathname(&ssh_allowed_signers, var, value); + } + + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.revocationfile")) { + if (!value) + return config_error_nonbool(var); + return git_config_pathname(&ssh_revocation_file, var, value); + } + if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.program") || !strcmp(var, "gpg.openpgp.program")) fmtname = "openpgp"; From 3326a783f1cb309d438adea3d94a0448c4a21304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] ssh signing: duplicate t7510 tests for commits Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh | 398 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 398 insertions(+) create mode 100755 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh diff --git a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000000..badf3ed3204 --- /dev/null +++ b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +test_description='ssh signed commit tests' +GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME=main +export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME + +. ./test-lib.sh +GNUPGHOME_NOT_USED=$GNUPGHOME +. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-gpg.sh" + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed commits' ' + test_oid_cache <<-\EOF && + header sha1:gpgsig + header sha256:gpgsig-sha256 + EOF + + test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" && + test_config gpg.format ssh && + test_config user.signingkey "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" && + + echo 1 >file && git add file && + test_tick && git commit -S -m initial && + git tag initial && + git branch side && + + echo 2 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -S -m second && + git tag second && + + git checkout side && + echo 3 >elif && git add elif && + test_tick && git commit -m "third on side" && + + git checkout main && + test_tick && git merge -S side && + git tag merge && + + echo 4 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m "fourth unsigned" && + git tag fourth-unsigned && + + test_tick && git commit --amend -S -m "fourth signed" && + git tag fourth-signed && + + git config commit.gpgsign true && + echo 5 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m "fifth signed" && + git tag fifth-signed && + + git config commit.gpgsign false && + echo 6 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m "sixth" && + git tag sixth-unsigned && + + git config commit.gpgsign true && + echo 7 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m "seventh" --no-gpg-sign && + git tag seventh-unsigned && + + test_tick && git rebase -f HEAD^^ && git tag sixth-signed HEAD^ && + git tag seventh-signed && + + echo 8 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m eighth -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" && + git tag eighth-signed-alt && + + # commit.gpgsign is still on but this must not be signed + echo 9 | git commit-tree HEAD^{tree} >oid && + test_line_count = 1 oid && + git tag ninth-unsigned $(cat oid) && + # explicit -S of course must sign. + echo 10 | git commit-tree -S HEAD^{tree} >oid && + test_line_count = 1 oid && + git tag tenth-signed $(cat oid) && + + # --gpg-sign[=] must sign. + echo 11 | git commit-tree --gpg-sign HEAD^{tree} >oid && + test_line_count = 1 oid && + git tag eleventh-signed $(cat oid) && + echo 12 | git commit-tree --gpg-sign="${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" HEAD^{tree} >oid && + test_line_count = 1 oid && + git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid) +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show signatures' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + test_config gpg.mintrustlevel UNDEFINED && + ( + for commit in initial second merge fourth-signed \ + fifth-signed sixth-signed seventh-signed tenth-signed \ + eleventh-signed + do + git verify-commit $commit && + git show --pretty=short --show-signature $commit >actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $commit OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for commit in merge^2 fourth-unsigned sixth-unsigned \ + seventh-unsigned ninth-unsigned + do + test_must_fail git verify-commit $commit && + git show --pretty=short --show-signature $commit >actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $commit OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for commit in eighth-signed-alt twelfth-signed-alt + do + git show --pretty=short --show-signature $commit >actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual && + echo $commit OK || exit 1 + done + ) +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits failure on untrusted signature' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + test_must_fail git verify-commit eighth-signed-alt 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits success with matching minTrustLevel' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + test_config gpg.minTrustLevel fully && + git verify-commit sixth-signed +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits success with low minTrustLevel' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + test_config gpg.minTrustLevel marginal && + git verify-commit sixth-signed +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits failure with high minTrustLevel' ' + test_config gpg.minTrustLevel ultimate && + test_must_fail git verify-commit eighth-signed-alt +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify signatures with --raw' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + ( + for commit in initial second merge fourth-signed fifth-signed sixth-signed seventh-signed + do + git verify-commit --raw $commit 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $commit OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for commit in merge^2 fourth-unsigned sixth-unsigned seventh-unsigned + do + test_must_fail git verify-commit --raw $commit 2>actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $commit OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for commit in eighth-signed-alt + do + test_must_fail git verify-commit --raw $commit 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $commit OK || exit 1 + done + ) +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'proper header is used for hash algorithm' ' + git cat-file commit fourth-signed >output && + grep "^$(test_oid header) -----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----" output +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show signed commit with signature' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git show -s initial >commit && + git show -s --show-signature initial >show && + git verify-commit -v initial >verify.1 2>verify.2 && + git cat-file commit initial >cat && + grep -v -e "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" -e "Warning: " show >show.commit && + grep -e "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" -e "Warning: " show >show.gpg && + grep -v "^ " cat | grep -v "^gpgsig.* " >cat.commit && + test_cmp show.commit commit && + test_cmp show.gpg verify.2 && + test_cmp cat.commit verify.1 +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged signature' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git cat-file commit seventh-signed >raw && + sed -e "s/^seventh/7th forged/" raw >forged1 && + git hash-object -w -t commit forged1 >forged1.commit && + test_must_fail git verify-commit $(cat forged1.commit) && + git show --pretty=short --show-signature $(cat forged1.commit) >actual1 && + grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual1 && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual1 && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual1 +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged signature with NUL' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git cat-file commit seventh-signed >raw && + cat raw >forged2 && + echo Qwik | tr "Q" "\000" >>forged2 && + git hash-object -w -t commit forged2 >forged2.commit && + test_must_fail git verify-commit $(cat forged2.commit) && + git show --pretty=short --show-signature $(cat forged2.commit) >actual2 && + grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual2 && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual2 +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'amending already signed commit' ' + test_config gpg.format ssh && + test_config user.signingkey "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" && + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git checkout fourth-signed^0 && + git commit --amend -S --no-edit && + git verify-commit HEAD && + git show -s --show-signature HEAD >actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show good signature with custom format' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + FINGERPRINT=$(ssh-keygen -lf "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" | awk "{print \$2;}") && + cat >expect.tmpl <<-\EOF && + G + FINGERPRINT + principal with number 1 + FINGERPRINT + + EOF + sed "s|FINGERPRINT|$FINGERPRINT|g" expect.tmpl >expect && + git log -1 --format="%G?%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" sixth-signed >actual && + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show bad signature with custom format' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + cat >expect <<-\EOF && + B + + + + + EOF + git log -1 --format="%G?%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" $(cat forged1.commit) >actual && + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show untrusted signature with custom format' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + cat >expect.tmpl <<-\EOF && + U + FINGERPRINT + + FINGERPRINT + + EOF + git log -1 --format="%G?%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" eighth-signed-alt >actual && + FINGERPRINT=$(ssh-keygen -lf "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" | awk "{print \$2;}") && + sed "s|FINGERPRINT|$FINGERPRINT|g" expect.tmpl >expect && + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show untrusted signature with undefined trust level' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + cat >expect.tmpl <<-\EOF && + undefined + FINGERPRINT + + FINGERPRINT + + EOF + git log -1 --format="%GT%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" eighth-signed-alt >actual && + FINGERPRINT=$(ssh-keygen -lf "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" | awk "{print \$2;}") && + sed "s|FINGERPRINT|$FINGERPRINT|g" expect.tmpl >expect && + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show untrusted signature with ultimate trust level' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + cat >expect.tmpl <<-\EOF && + fully + FINGERPRINT + principal with number 1 + FINGERPRINT + + EOF + git log -1 --format="%GT%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" sixth-signed >actual && + FINGERPRINT=$(ssh-keygen -lf "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" | awk "{print \$2;}") && + sed "s|FINGERPRINT|$FINGERPRINT|g" expect.tmpl >expect && + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'show lack of signature with custom format' ' + cat >expect <<-\EOF && + N + + + + + EOF + git log -1 --format="%G?%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" seventh-unsigned >actual && + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log.showsignature behaves like --show-signature' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + test_config log.showsignature true && + git show initial >actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'check config gpg.format values' ' + test_config gpg.format ssh && + test_config user.signingkey "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" && + test_config gpg.format ssh && + git commit -S --amend -m "success" && + test_config gpg.format OpEnPgP && + test_must_fail git commit -S --amend -m "fail" +' + +test_expect_failure GPGSSH 'detect fudged commit with double signature (TODO)' ' + sed -e "/gpgsig/,/END PGP/d" forged1 >double-base && + sed -n -e "/gpgsig/,/END PGP/p" forged1 | \ + sed -e "s/^$(test_oid header)//;s/^ //" | gpg --dearmor >double-sig1.sig && + gpg -o double-sig2.sig -u 29472784 --detach-sign double-base && + cat double-sig1.sig double-sig2.sig | gpg --enarmor >double-combined.asc && + sed -e "s/^\(-.*\)ARMORED FILE/\1SIGNATURE/;1s/^/$(test_oid header) /;2,\$s/^/ /" \ + double-combined.asc > double-gpgsig && + sed -e "/committer/r double-gpgsig" double-base >double-commit && + git hash-object -w -t commit double-commit >double-commit.commit && + test_must_fail git verify-commit $(cat double-commit.commit) && + git show --pretty=short --show-signature $(cat double-commit.commit) >double-actual && + grep "BAD signature from" double-actual && + grep "Good signature from" double-actual +' + +test_expect_failure GPGSSH 'show double signature with custom format (TODO)' ' + cat >expect <<-\EOF && + E + + + + + EOF + git log -1 --format="%G?%n%GK%n%GS%n%GF%n%GP" $(cat double-commit.commit) >actual && + test_cmp expect actual +' + + +test_expect_failure GPGSSH 'verify-commit verifies multiply signed commits (TODO)' ' + git init multiply-signed && + cd multiply-signed && + test_commit first && + echo 1 >second && + git add second && + tree=$(git write-tree) && + parent=$(git rev-parse HEAD^{commit}) && + git commit --gpg-sign -m second && + git cat-file commit HEAD && + # Avoid trailing whitespace. + sed -e "s/^Q//" -e "s/^Z/ /" >commit <<-EOF && + Qtree $tree + Qparent $parent + Qauthor A U Thor 1112912653 -0700 + Qcommitter C O Mitter 1112912653 -0700 + Qgpgsig -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- + QZ + Q iHQEABECADQWIQRz11h0S+chaY7FTocTtvUezd5DDQUCX/uBDRYcY29tbWl0dGVy + Q QGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAoJEBO29R7N3kMNd+8AoK1I8mhLHviPH+q2I5fIVgPsEtYC + Q AKCTqBh+VabJceXcGIZuF0Ry+udbBQ== + Q =tQ0N + Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- + Qgpgsig-sha256 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- + QZ + Q iHQEABECADQWIQRz11h0S+chaY7FTocTtvUezd5DDQUCX/uBIBYcY29tbWl0dGVy + Q QGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAoJEBO29R7N3kMN/NEAn0XO9RYSBj2dFyozi0JKSbssYMtO + Q AJwKCQ1BQOtuwz//IjU8TiS+6S4iUw== + Q =pIwP + Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- + Q + Qsecond + EOF + head=$(git hash-object -t commit -w commit) && + git reset --hard $head && + git verify-commit $head 2>actual && + grep "Good signature from" actual && + ! grep "BAD signature from" actual +' + +test_done From f265f2d630c498fd256d5da9d8b742efaf0cba8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] ssh signing: tests for logs, tags & push certs Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- t/t4202-log.sh | 23 +++++ t/t5534-push-signed.sh | 101 +++++++++++++++++++ t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 285 insertions(+) create mode 100755 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh diff --git a/t/t4202-log.sh b/t/t4202-log.sh index 39e746fbcbe..79702716549 100755 --- a/t/t4202-log.sh +++ b/t/t4202-log.sh @@ -1616,6 +1616,16 @@ test_expect_success GPGSM 'setup signed branch x509' ' git commit -S -m signed_commit ' +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'setup sshkey signed branch' ' + test_config gpg.format ssh && + test_config user.signingkey "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" && + test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" && + git checkout -b signed-ssh main && + echo foo >foo && + git add foo && + git commit -S -m signed_commit +' + test_expect_success GPGSM 'log x509 fingerprint' ' echo "F8BF62E0693D0694816377099909C779FA23FD65 | " >expect && git log -n1 --format="%GF | %GP" signed-x509 >actual && @@ -1628,6 +1638,13 @@ test_expect_success GPGSM 'log OpenPGP fingerprint' ' test_cmp expect actual ' +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log ssh key fingerprint' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + ssh-keygen -lf "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" | awk "{print \$2\" | \"}" >expect && + git log -n1 --format="%GF | %GP" signed-ssh >actual && + test_cmp expect actual +' + test_expect_success GPG 'log --graph --show-signature' ' git log --graph --show-signature -n1 signed >actual && grep "^| gpg: Signature made" actual && @@ -1640,6 +1657,12 @@ test_expect_success GPGSM 'log --graph --show-signature x509' ' grep "^| gpgsm: Good signature" actual ' +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log --graph --show-signature ssh' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git log --graph --show-signature -n1 signed-ssh >actual && + grep "${GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual +' + test_expect_success GPG 'log --graph --show-signature for merged tag' ' test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" && git checkout -b plain main && diff --git a/t/t5534-push-signed.sh b/t/t5534-push-signed.sh index bba768f5ded..24d374adbae 100755 --- a/t/t5534-push-signed.sh +++ b/t/t5534-push-signed.sh @@ -137,6 +137,53 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'signed push sends push certificate' ' test_cmp expect dst/push-cert-status ' +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'ssh signed push sends push certificate' ' + prepare_dst && + mkdir -p dst/.git/hooks && + git -C dst config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git -C dst config receive.certnonceseed sekrit && + write_script dst/.git/hooks/post-receive <<-\EOF && + # discard the update list + cat >/dev/null + # record the push certificate + if test -n "${GIT_PUSH_CERT-}" + then + git cat-file blob $GIT_PUSH_CERT >../push-cert + fi && + + cat >../push-cert-status <expect && + + noop=$(git rev-parse noop) && + ff=$(git rev-parse ff) && + noff=$(git rev-parse noff) && + grep "$noop $ff refs/heads/ff" dst/push-cert && + grep "$noop $noff refs/heads/noff" dst/push-cert && + test_cmp expect dst/push-cert-status +' + test_expect_success GPG 'inconsistent push options in signed push not allowed' ' # First, invoke receive-pack with dummy input to obtain its preamble. prepare_dst && @@ -276,6 +323,60 @@ test_expect_success GPGSM 'fail without key and heed user.signingkey x509' ' test_cmp expect dst/push-cert-status ' +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'fail without key and heed user.signingkey ssh' ' + test_config gpg.format ssh && + prepare_dst && + mkdir -p dst/.git/hooks && + git -C dst config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git -C dst config receive.certnonceseed sekrit && + write_script dst/.git/hooks/post-receive <<-\EOF && + # discard the update list + cat >/dev/null + # record the push certificate + if test -n "${GIT_PUSH_CERT-}" + then + git cat-file blob $GIT_PUSH_CERT >../push-cert + fi && + + cat >../push-cert-status <expect && + + noop=$(git rev-parse noop) && + ff=$(git rev-parse ff) && + noff=$(git rev-parse noff) && + grep "$noop $ff refs/heads/ff" dst/push-cert && + grep "$noop $noff refs/heads/noff" dst/push-cert && + test_cmp expect dst/push-cert-status +' + test_expect_success GPG 'failed atomic push does not execute GPG' ' prepare_dst && git -C dst config receive.certnonceseed sekrit && diff --git a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000000..06c9dd6c933 --- /dev/null +++ b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +test_description='signed tag tests' +GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME=main +export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME + +. ./test-lib.sh +. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-gpg.sh" + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed tags ssh' ' + test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" && + test_config gpg.format ssh && + test_config user.signingkey "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" && + + echo 1 >file && git add file && + test_tick && git commit -m initial && + git tag -s -m initial initial && + git branch side && + + echo 2 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m second && + git tag -s -m second second && + + git checkout side && + echo 3 >elif && git add elif && + test_tick && git commit -m "third on side" && + + git checkout main && + test_tick && git merge -S side && + git tag -s -m merge merge && + + echo 4 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -S -m "fourth unsigned" && + git tag -a -m fourth-unsigned fourth-unsigned && + + test_tick && git commit --amend -S -m "fourth signed" && + git tag -s -m fourth fourth-signed && + + echo 5 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m "fifth" && + git tag fifth-unsigned && + + git config commit.gpgsign true && + echo 6 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m "sixth" && + git tag -a -m sixth sixth-unsigned && + + test_tick && git rebase -f HEAD^^ && git tag -s -m 6th sixth-signed HEAD^ && + git tag -m seventh -s seventh-signed && + + echo 8 >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m eighth && + git tag -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m eighth eighth-signed-alt +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + ( + for tag in initial second merge fourth-signed sixth-signed seventh-signed + do + git verify-tag $tag 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $tag OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for tag in fourth-unsigned fifth-unsigned sixth-unsigned + do + test_must_fail git verify-tag $tag 2>actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $tag OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for tag in eighth-signed-alt + do + test_must_fail git verify-tag $tag 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual && + echo $tag OK || exit 1 + done + ) +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged ssh signature' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git cat-file tag seventh-signed >raw && + sed -e "/^tag / s/seventh/7th forged/" raw >forged1 && + git hash-object -w -t tag forged1 >forged1.tag && + test_must_fail git verify-tag $(cat forged1.tag) 2>actual1 && + grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual1 && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual1 && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual1 +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify ssh signatures with --raw' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + ( + for tag in initial second merge fourth-signed sixth-signed seventh-signed + do + git verify-tag --raw $tag 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $tag OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for tag in fourth-unsigned fifth-unsigned sixth-unsigned + do + test_must_fail git verify-tag --raw $tag 2>actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $tag OK || exit 1 + done + ) && + ( + for tag in eighth-signed-alt + do + test_must_fail git verify-tag --raw $tag 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo $tag OK || exit 1 + done + ) +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify signatures with --raw ssh' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + git verify-tag --raw sixth-signed 2>actual && + grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual && + ! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual && + echo sixth-signed OK +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify multiple tags ssh' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + tags="seventh-signed sixth-signed" && + for i in $tags + do + git verify-tag -v --raw $i || return 1 + done >expect.stdout 2>expect.stderr.1 && + grep "^${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" expect.stderr && + git verify-tag -v --raw $tags >actual.stdout 2>actual.stderr.1 && + grep "^${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual.stderr && + test_cmp expect.stdout actual.stdout && + test_cmp expect.stderr actual.stderr +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verifying tag with --format - ssh' ' + test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" && + cat >expect <<-\EOF && + tagname : fourth-signed + EOF + git verify-tag --format="tagname : %(tag)" "fourth-signed" >actual && + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verifying a forged tag with --format should fail silently - ssh' ' + test_must_fail git verify-tag --format="tagname : %(tag)" $(cat forged1.tag) >actual-forged && + test_must_be_empty actual-forged +' + +test_done From 1bfb57f642d34dc4b65be3602bb429abd9f32b58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Stelzer Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 20:07:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] ssh signing: test that gpg fails for unknown keys Test that verify-commit/tag will fail when a gpg key is completely unknown. To do this we have to generate a key, use it for a signature and delete it from our keyring aferwards completely. Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- t/t7510-signed-commit.sh | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/t/t7510-signed-commit.sh b/t/t7510-signed-commit.sh index 8df5a74f1db..d65a0171f29 100755 --- a/t/t7510-signed-commit.sh +++ b/t/t7510-signed-commit.sh @@ -71,7 +71,25 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'create signed commits' ' git tag eleventh-signed $(cat oid) && echo 12 | git commit-tree --gpg-sign=B7227189 HEAD^{tree} >oid && test_line_count = 1 oid && - git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid) + git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid) && + + cat >keydetails <<-\EOF && + Key-Type: RSA + Key-Length: 2048 + Subkey-Type: RSA + Subkey-Length: 2048 + Name-Real: Unknown User + Name-Email: unknown@git.com + Expire-Date: 0 + %no-ask-passphrase + %no-protection + EOF + gpg --batch --gen-key keydetails && + echo 13 >file && git commit -a -S"unknown@git.com" -m thirteenth && + git tag thirteenth-signed && + DELETE_FINGERPRINT=$(gpg -K --with-colons --fingerprint --batch unknown@git.com | grep "^fpr" | head -n 1 | awk -F ":" "{print \$10;}") && + gpg --batch --yes --delete-secret-keys $DELETE_FINGERPRINT && + gpg --batch --yes --delete-keys unknown@git.com ' test_expect_success GPG 'verify and show signatures' ' @@ -110,6 +128,13 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'verify and show signatures' ' ) ' +test_expect_success GPG 'verify-commit exits failure on unknown signature' ' + test_must_fail git verify-commit thirteenth-signed 2>actual && + ! grep "Good signature from" actual && + ! grep "BAD signature from" actual && + grep -q -F -e "No public key" -e "public key not found" actual +' + test_expect_success GPG 'verify-commit exits success on untrusted signature' ' git verify-commit eighth-signed-alt 2>actual && grep "Good signature from" actual && @@ -338,6 +363,8 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'show double signature with custom format' ' ' +# NEEDSWORK: This test relies on the test_tick commit/author dates from the first +# 'create signed commits' test even though it creates its own test_expect_success GPG 'verify-commit verifies multiply signed commits' ' git init multiply-signed && cd multiply-signed &&