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transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default

An earlier patch discussed and fixed a scenario where Git could be used
as a vector to exfiltrate sensitive data through a Docker container when
a potential victim clones a suspicious repository with local submodules
that contain symlinks.

That security hole has since been plugged, but a similar one still
exists.  Instead of convincing a would-be victim to clone an embedded
submodule via the "file" protocol, an attacker could convince an
individual to clone a repository that has a submodule pointing to a
valid path on the victim's filesystem.

For example, if an individual (with username "foo") has their home
directory ("/home/foo") stored as a Git repository, then an attacker
could exfiltrate data by convincing a victim to clone a malicious
repository containing a submodule pointing at "/home/foo/.git" with
`--recurse-submodules`. Doing so would expose any sensitive contents in
stored in "/home/foo" tracked in Git.

For systems (such as Docker) that consider everything outside of the
immediate top-level working directory containing a Dockerfile as
inaccessible to the container (with the exception of volume mounts, and
so on), this is a violation of trust by exposing unexpected contents in
the working copy.

To mitigate the likelihood of this kind of attack, adjust the "file://"
protocol's default policy to be "user" to prevent commands that execute
without user input (including recursive submodule initialization) from
taking place by default.

Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
This commit is contained in:
Taylor Blau 2022-07-29 15:22:13 -04:00
parent f4a32a550f
commit a1d4f67c12
2 changed files with 4 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
protocol.allow::
If set, provide a user defined default policy for all protocols which
don't explicitly have a policy (`protocol.<name>.allow`). By default,
if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file) have a
if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh) have a
default policy of `always`, known-dangerous protocols (ext) have a
default policy of `never`, and all other protocols have a default
policy of `user`. Supported policies:
default policy of `never`, and all other protocols (including file)
have a default policy of `user`. Supported policies:
+
--

View File

@ -964,8 +964,7 @@ static enum protocol_allow_config get_protocol_config(const char *type)
if (!strcmp(type, "http") ||
!strcmp(type, "https") ||
!strcmp(type, "git") ||
!strcmp(type, "ssh") ||
!strcmp(type, "file"))
!strcmp(type, "ssh"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS;
/* known scary; err on the side of caution */