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Merge branch 'master' of github.com:git/git

* 'master' of github.com:git/git: (25 commits)
  Git 2.36-rc2
  i18n: fix some badly formatted i18n strings
  Git 2.36-rc1
  t9902: split test to run on appropriate systems
  ls-tree doc: document interaction with submodules
  Documentation: add --batch-command to cat-file synopsis
  git-ls-tree.txt: fix the name of "%(objectsize:padded)"
  submodule-helper: fix usage string
  doc: replace "--" with {litdd} in credential-cache/fsmonitor
  contrib/scalar: fix 'all' target in Makefile
  Documentation/Makefile: fix "make info" regression in dad9cd7d51
  configure.ac: fix HAVE_SYNC_FILE_RANGE definition
  git-compat-util: really support openssl as a source of entropy
  ls-tree: `-l` should not imply recursive listing
  Git 2.35.2
  Git 2.34.2
  Git 2.33.2
  Git 2.32.1
  Git 2.31.2
  Git 2.30.3
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Jiang Xin 2022-04-13 14:51:53 +08:00
commit 61de00a321
31 changed files with 332 additions and 49 deletions

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@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ gitman.texi: $(MAN_XML) cat-texi.perl texi.xsl
$(RM) $@+
gitman.info: gitman.texi
$(QUIET_MAKEINFO)$(MAKEINFO) --no-split --no-validate $*.texi
$(QUIET_MAKEINFO)$(MAKEINFO) --no-split --no-validate $<
$(patsubst %.txt,%.texi,$(MAN_TXT)): %.texi : %.xml
$(QUIET_DB2TEXI)$(DOCBOOK2X_TEXI) --to-stdout $*.xml >$@

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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
Git v2.30.2 Release Notes
=========================
This release addresses the security issue CVE-2022-24765.
Fixes since v2.30.2
-------------------
* Build fix on Windows.
* Fix `GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES` with Windows-style root directories.
* CVE-2022-24765:
On multi-user machines, Git users might find themselves
unexpectedly in a Git worktree, e.g. when another user created a
repository in `C:\.git`, in a mounted network drive or in a
scratch space. Merely having a Git-aware prompt that runs `git
status` (or `git diff`) and navigating to a directory which is
supposedly not a Git worktree, or opening such a directory in an
editor or IDE such as VS Code or Atom, will potentially run
commands defined by that other user.
Credit for finding this vulnerability goes to 俞晨东; The fix was
authored by Johannes Schindelin.

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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
Git v2.31.2 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.3 to address
the security issue CVE-2022-24765; see the release notes for that
version for details.

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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
Git v2.32.1 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.3 and
v2.31.2 to address the security issue CVE-2022-24765; see the
release notes for these versions for details.

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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
Git v2.33.2 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.3, v2.31.2
and v2.32.1 to address the security issue CVE-2022-24765; see
the release notes for these versions for details.
In addition, it contains the following fixes:
* Squelch over-eager warning message added during this cycle.
* A bug in "git rebase -r" has been fixed.
* One CI task based on Fedora image noticed a not-quite-kosher
construct recently, which has been corrected.

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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
Git v2.34.2 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.3, v2.31.2,
v2.32.1 and v2.33.2 to address the security issue CVE-2022-24765;
see the release notes for these versions for details.

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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
Git v2.35.2 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.3,
v2.31.2, v2.32.1, v2.33.2 and v2.34.2 to address the security
issue CVE-2022-24765; see the release notes for these versions
for details.

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@ -397,6 +397,8 @@ Fixes since v2.35
entry it moved.
(merge b7f9130a06 vd/mv-refresh-stat later to maint).
* Fix for CVE-2022-24765 has been merged up from 2.35.2 and others.
* Other code cleanup, docfix, build fix, etc.
(merge cfc5cf428b jc/find-header later to maint).
(merge 40e7cfdd46 jh/p4-fix-use-of-process-error-exception later to maint).

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@ -495,6 +495,8 @@ include::config/repack.txt[]
include::config/rerere.txt[]
include::config/safe.txt[]
include::config/sendemail.txt[]
include::config/sequencer.txt[]

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@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ core.protectNTFS::
core.fsmonitor::
If set to true, enable the built-in file system monitor
daemon for this working directory (linkgit:git-fsmonitor--daemon[1]).
daemon for this working directory (linkgit:git-fsmonitor{litdd}daemon[1]).
+
Like hook-based file system monitors, the built-in file system monitor
can speed up Git commands that need to refresh the Git index

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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
safe.directory::
These config entries specify Git-tracked directories that are
considered safe even if they are owned by someone other than the
current user. By default, Git will refuse to even parse a Git
config of a repository owned by someone else, let alone run its
hooks, and this config setting allows users to specify exceptions,
e.g. for intentionally shared repositories (see the `--shared`
option in linkgit:git-init[1]).
+
This is a multi-valued setting, i.e. you can add more than one directory
via `git config --add`. To reset the list of safe directories (e.g. to
override any such directories specified in the system config), add a
`safe.directory` entry with an empty value.
+
This config setting is only respected when specified in a system or global
config, not when it is specified in a repository config or via the command
line option `-c safe.directory=<path>`.
+
The value of this setting is interpolated, i.e. `~/<path>` expands to a
path relative to the home directory and `%(prefix)/<path>` expands to a
path relative to Git's (runtime) prefix.

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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ SYNOPSIS
'git cat-file' <type> <object>
'git cat-file' (-e | -p) <object>
'git cat-file' (-t | -s) [--allow-unknown-type] <object>
'git cat-file' (--batch | --batch-check) [--batch-all-objects]
'git cat-file' (--batch | --batch-check | --batch-command) [--batch-all-objects]
[--buffer] [--follow-symlinks] [--unordered]
[--textconv | --filters]
'git cat-file' (--textconv | --filters)

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
git-credential-cache--daemon(1)
===============================
git-credential-cache{litdd}daemon(1)
====================================
NAME
----
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ git-credential-cache--daemon - Temporarily store user credentials in memory
SYNOPSIS
--------
[verse]
git credential-cache--daemon [--debug] <socket>
'git credential-cache{litdd}daemon' [--debug] <socket>
DESCRIPTION
-----------

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
git-fsmonitor--daemon(1)
========================
git-fsmonitor{litdd}daemon(1)
=============================
NAME
----
@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ git-fsmonitor--daemon - A Built-in File System Monitor
SYNOPSIS
--------
[verse]
'git fsmonitor--daemon' start
'git fsmonitor--daemon' run
'git fsmonitor--daemon' stop
'git fsmonitor--daemon' status
'git fsmonitor{litdd}daemon' start
'git fsmonitor{litdd}daemon' run
'git fsmonitor{litdd}daemon' stop
'git fsmonitor{litdd}daemon' status
DESCRIPTION
-----------

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@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ names can be used:
objectmode::
The mode of the object.
objecttype::
The type of the object (`blob` or `tree`).
The type of the object (`commit`, `blob` or `tree`).
objectname::
The name of the object.
objectsize[:padded]::
The size of the object ("-" if it's a tree).
It also supports a padded format of size with "%(size:padded)".
The size of a `blob` object ("-" if it's a `commit` or `tree`).
It also supports a padded format of size with "%(objectsize:padded)".
path::
The pathname of the object.

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@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ This feature is intended to speed up git operations for repos that have
large working directories.
It enables git to work together with a file system monitor (see
linkgit:git-fsmonitor--daemon[1]
linkgit:git-fsmonitor{litdd}daemon[1]
and the
"fsmonitor-watchman" section of linkgit:githooks[5]) that can
inform it as to what files have been modified. This enables git to avoid

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh
GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE
DEF_VER=v2.36.0-rc0
DEF_VER=v2.36.0-rc2
LF='
'

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@ -1972,6 +1972,7 @@ endif
ifneq ($(findstring openssl,$(CSPRNG_METHOD)),)
BASIC_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_OPENSSL_CSPRNG
EXTLIBS += -lcrypto -lssl
endif
ifneq ($(PROCFS_EXECUTABLE_PATH),)

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@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static int show_tree_long(const struct object_id *oid, struct strbuf *base,
printf("%06o %s %s %7s\t", data.mode, type_name(data.type),
find_unique_abbrev(data.oid, abbrev), size_text);
show_tree_common_default_long(base, pathname, data.base->len);
return 1;
return recurse;
}
static int show_tree_name_only(const struct object_id *oid, struct strbuf *base,

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@ -1902,7 +1902,7 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
const char *const git_submodule_helper_usage[] = {
N_("git submodule--helper clone [--prefix=<path>] [--quiet] "
"[--reference <repository>] [--name <name>] [--depth <depth>] "
"[--single-branch] [--filter <filter-spec>]"
"[--single-branch] [--filter <filter-spec>] "
"--url <url> --path <path>"),
NULL
};
@ -3082,7 +3082,7 @@ static int module_create_branch(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
OPT_END()
};
const char *const usage[] = {
N_("git submodule--helper create-branch [-f|--force] [--create-reflog] [-q|--quiet] [-t|--track] [-n|--dry-run] <name> <start_oid> <start_name>"),
N_("git submodule--helper create-branch [-f|--force] [--create-reflog] [-q|--quiet] [-t|--track] [-n|--dry-run] <name> <start-oid> <start-name>"),
NULL
};

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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
#include "../git-compat-util.h"
#include "win32.h"
#include <aclapi.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <wchar.h>
#include "../strbuf.h"
@ -2645,6 +2646,92 @@ static void setup_windows_environment(void)
}
}
static PSID get_current_user_sid(void)
{
HANDLE token;
DWORD len = 0;
PSID result = NULL;
if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token))
return NULL;
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &len)) {
TOKEN_USER *info = xmalloc((size_t)len);
if (GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, info, len, &len)) {
len = GetLengthSid(info->User.Sid);
result = xmalloc(len);
if (!CopySid(len, result, info->User.Sid)) {
error(_("failed to copy SID (%ld)"),
GetLastError());
FREE_AND_NULL(result);
}
}
FREE_AND_NULL(info);
}
CloseHandle(token);
return result;
}
int is_path_owned_by_current_sid(const char *path)
{
WCHAR wpath[MAX_PATH];
PSID sid = NULL;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR descriptor = NULL;
DWORD err;
static wchar_t home[MAX_PATH];
int result = 0;
if (xutftowcs_path(wpath, path) < 0)
return 0;
/*
* On Windows, the home directory is owned by the administrator, but for
* all practical purposes, it belongs to the user. Do pretend that it is
* owned by the user.
*/
if (!*home) {
DWORD size = ARRAY_SIZE(home);
DWORD len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"HOME", home, size);
if (!len || len > size)
wcscpy(home, L"::N/A::");
}
if (!wcsicmp(wpath, home))
return 1;
/* Get the owner SID */
err = GetNamedSecurityInfoW(wpath, SE_FILE_OBJECT,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
&sid, NULL, NULL, NULL, &descriptor);
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
error(_("failed to get owner for '%s' (%ld)"), path, err);
else if (sid && IsValidSid(sid)) {
/* Now, verify that the SID matches the current user's */
static PSID current_user_sid;
if (!current_user_sid)
current_user_sid = get_current_user_sid();
if (current_user_sid &&
IsValidSid(current_user_sid) &&
EqualSid(sid, current_user_sid))
result = 1;
}
/*
* We can release the security descriptor struct only now because `sid`
* actually points into this struct.
*/
if (descriptor)
LocalFree(descriptor);
return result;
}
int is_valid_win32_path(const char *path, int allow_literal_nul)
{
const char *p = path;

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@ -456,6 +456,13 @@ char *mingw_query_user_email(void);
#include <inttypes.h>
#endif
/**
* Verifies that the specified path is owned by the user running the
* current process.
*/
int is_path_owned_by_current_sid(const char *path);
#define is_path_owned_by_current_user is_path_owned_by_current_sid
/**
* Verifies that the given path is a valid one on Windows.
*

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@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ GIT_CONF_SUBST([HAVE_CLOCK_MONOTONIC])
# Define HAVE_SYNC_FILE_RANGE=YesPlease if sync_file_range is available.
GIT_CHECK_FUNC(sync_file_range,
[HAVE_SYNC_FILE_RANGE=YesPlease],
[HAVE_SYNC_FILE_RANGE])
[HAVE_SYNC_FILE_RANGE=])
GIT_CONF_SUBST([HAVE_SYNC_FILE_RANGE])
#

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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ include ../../config.mak.uname
TARGETS = scalar$(X) scalar.o
GITLIBS = ../../common-main.o ../../libgit.a ../../xdiff/lib.a
all: scalar$(X) ../../bin-wrappers/scalar
all:: scalar$(X) ../../bin-wrappers/scalar
$(GITLIBS):
$(QUIET_SUBDIR0)../.. $(QUIET_SUBDIR1) $(subst ../../,,$@)

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@ -436,6 +436,18 @@ static inline int git_offset_1st_component(const char *path)
#define is_valid_path(path) 1
#endif
#ifndef is_path_owned_by_current_user
static inline int is_path_owned_by_current_uid(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
if (lstat(path, &st))
return 0;
return st.st_uid == geteuid();
}
#define is_path_owned_by_current_user is_path_owned_by_current_uid
#endif
#ifndef find_last_dir_sep
static inline char *git_find_last_dir_sep(const char *path)
{
@ -525,6 +537,10 @@ void warning_errno(const char *err, ...) __attribute__((format (printf, 1, 2)));
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#endif /* NO_OPENSSL */
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CSPRNG
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#endif
/*
* Let callers be aware of the constant return value; this can help
* gcc with -Wuninitialized analysis. We restrict this trick to gcc, though,

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@ -2096,10 +2096,9 @@ sub validate_patch {
chdir($cwd_save) or die("chdir: $!");
}
if ($hook_error) {
$hook_error = sprintf(__("fatal: %s: rejected by %s hook\n" .
$hook_error . "\n" .
"warning: no patches were sent\n"),
$fn, $hook_name);
$hook_error = sprintf(
__("fatal: %s: rejected by %s hook\n%s\nwarning: no patches were sent\n"),
$fn, $hook_name, $hook_error);
die $hook_error;
}
}

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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#include "exec-cmd.h"
#include "run-command.h"
#include "parse-options.h"
#ifdef NO_OPENSSL
#if defined(NO_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CSPRNG)
typedef void *SSL;
#endif
#ifdef USE_CURL_FOR_IMAP_SEND

14
path.c
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@ -1225,11 +1225,15 @@ int longest_ancestor_length(const char *path, struct string_list *prefixes)
const char *ceil = prefixes->items[i].string;
int len = strlen(ceil);
if (len == 1 && ceil[0] == '/')
len = 0; /* root matches anything, with length 0 */
else if (!strncmp(path, ceil, len) && path[len] == '/')
; /* match of length len */
else
/*
* For root directories (`/`, `C:/`, `//server/share/`)
* adjust the length to exclude the trailing slash.
*/
if (len > 0 && ceil[len - 1] == '/')
len--;
if (strncmp(path, ceil, len) ||
path[len] != '/' || !path[len + 1])
continue; /* no match */
if (len > max_len)

57
setup.c
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@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include "string-list.h"
#include "chdir-notify.h"
#include "promisor-remote.h"
#include "quote.h"
static int inside_git_dir = -1;
static int inside_work_tree = -1;
@ -1090,6 +1091,42 @@ static int canonicalize_ceiling_entry(struct string_list_item *item,
}
}
struct safe_directory_data {
const char *path;
int is_safe;
};
static int safe_directory_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d)
{
struct safe_directory_data *data = d;
if (!value || !*value)
data->is_safe = 0;
else {
const char *interpolated = NULL;
if (!git_config_pathname(&interpolated, key, value) &&
!fspathcmp(data->path, interpolated ? interpolated : value))
data->is_safe = 1;
free((char *)interpolated);
}
return 0;
}
static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *path)
{
struct safe_directory_data data = { .path = path };
if (is_path_owned_by_current_user(path))
return 1;
read_very_early_config(safe_directory_cb, &data);
return data.is_safe;
}
enum discovery_result {
GIT_DIR_NONE = 0,
GIT_DIR_EXPLICIT,
@ -1098,7 +1135,8 @@ enum discovery_result {
/* these are errors */
GIT_DIR_HIT_CEILING = -1,
GIT_DIR_HIT_MOUNT_POINT = -2,
GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE = -3
GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE = -3,
GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP = -4
};
/*
@ -1188,11 +1226,15 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir,
}
strbuf_setlen(dir, offset);
if (gitdirenv) {
if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf))
return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
strbuf_addstr(gitdir, gitdirenv);
return GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED;
}
if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) {
if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf))
return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
strbuf_addstr(gitdir, ".");
return GIT_DIR_BARE;
}
@ -1324,6 +1366,19 @@ const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok)
dir.buf);
*nongit_ok = 1;
break;
case GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP:
if (!nongit_ok) {
struct strbuf quoted = STRBUF_INIT;
sq_quote_buf_pretty(&quoted, dir.buf);
die(_("unsafe repository ('%s' is owned by someone else)\n"
"To add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
"\n"
"\tgit config --global --add safe.directory %s"),
dir.buf, quoted.buf);
}
*nongit_ok = 1;
break;
case GIT_DIR_NONE:
/*
* As a safeguard against setup_git_directory_gently_1 returning

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@ -55,12 +55,15 @@ fi
ancestor() {
# We do some math with the expected ancestor length.
expected=$3
if test -n "$rootoff" && test "x$expected" != x-1; then
expected=$(($expected-$rootslash))
test $expected -lt 0 ||
expected=$(($expected+$rootoff))
fi
test_expect_success "longest ancestor: $1 $2 => $expected" \
case "$rootoff,$expected,$2" in
*,*,//*) ;; # leave UNC paths alone
[0-9]*,[0-9]*,/*)
# On Windows, expect MSYS2 pseudo root translation for
# Unix-style absolute paths
expected=$(($expected-$rootslash+$rootoff))
;;
esac
test_expect_success $4 "longest ancestor: $1 $2 => $expected" \
"actual=\$(test-tool path-utils longest_ancestor_length '$1' '$2') &&
test \"\$actual\" = '$expected'"
}
@ -156,6 +159,11 @@ ancestor /foo/bar /foo 4
ancestor /foo/bar /foo:/bar 4
ancestor /foo/bar /bar -1
# Windows-specific: DOS drives, network shares
ancestor C:/Users/me C:/ 2 MINGW
ancestor D:/Users/me C:/ -1 MINGW
ancestor //server/share/my-directory //server/share/ 14 MINGW
test_expect_success 'strip_path_suffix' '
test c:/msysgit = $(test-tool path-utils strip_path_suffix \
c:/msysgit/libexec//git-core libexec/git-core)

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@ -1529,28 +1529,45 @@ test_expect_success 'cone mode sparse-checkout completes directory names with sp
)
'
# use FUNNYNAMES to avoid running on Windows, which doesn't permit backslashes or tabs in paths
test_expect_success FUNNYNAMES 'cone mode sparse-checkout completes directory names with backslashes and tabs' '
# use FUNNYNAMES to avoid running on Windows, which doesn't permit tabs in paths
test_expect_success FUNNYNAMES 'cone mode sparse-checkout completes directory names with tabs' '
# reset sparse-checkout
git -C sparse-checkout sparse-checkout disable &&
(
cd sparse-checkout &&
mkdir "$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")" &&
>"$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")/randomfile" &&
git add . &&
git commit -m "Add directory with tabs" &&
git sparse-checkout set --cone \
"$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")" &&
test_completion "git sparse-checkout add dir" <<-\EOF &&
directory with tabs/
EOF
rm -rf "$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")" &&
git add . &&
git commit -m "Remove directory with tabs"
)
'
# use FUNNYNAMES to avoid running on Windows, and !CYGWIN for Cygwin, as neither permit backslashes in paths
test_expect_success FUNNYNAMES,!CYGWIN 'cone mode sparse-checkout completes directory names with backslashes' '
# reset sparse-checkout
git -C sparse-checkout sparse-checkout disable &&
(
cd sparse-checkout &&
mkdir "directory\with\backslashes" &&
mkdir "$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")" &&
>"directory\with\backslashes/randomfile" &&
>"$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")/randomfile" &&
git add . &&
git commit -m "Add directory with backslashes and directory with tabs" &&
git sparse-checkout set --cone "directory\with\backslashes" \
"$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")" &&
git commit -m "Add directory with backslashes" &&
git sparse-checkout set --cone \
"directory\with\backslashes" &&
test_completion "git sparse-checkout add dir" <<-\EOF &&
directory\with\backslashes/
directory with tabs/
EOF
rm -rf "directory\with\backslashes" &&
rm -rf "$(printf "directory\twith\ttabs")" &&
git add . &&
git commit -m "Remove directory with backslashes and directory with tabs"
git commit -m "Remove directory with backslashes"
)
'