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git/gpg-interface.h

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#ifndef GPG_INTERFACE_H
#define GPG_INTERFACE_H
struct strbuf;
#define GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE 1
#define GPG_VERIFY_RAW 2
#define GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS 4
gpg-interface: add minTrustLevel as a configuration option Previously, signature verification for merge and pull operations checked if the key had a trust-level of either TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED in verify_merge_signature(). If that was the case, the process die()d. The other code paths that did signature verification relied entirely on the return code from check_commit_signature(). And signatures made with a good key, irregardless of its trust level, was considered valid by check_commit_signature(). This difference in behavior might induce users to erroneously assume that the trust level of a key in their keyring is always considered by Git, even for operations where it is not (e.g. during a verify-commit or verify-tag). The way it worked was by gpg-interface.c storing the result from the key/signature status *and* the lowest-two trust levels in the `result` member of the signature_check structure (the last of these status lines that were encountered got written to `result`). These are documented in GPG under the subsection `General status codes` and `Key related`, respectively [1]. The GPG documentation says the following on the TRUST_ status codes [1]: """ These are several similar status codes: - TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token> - TRUST_NEVER <error_token> - TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]] - TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]] - TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]] For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature. The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm. """ My interpretation is that the trust level is conceptionally different from the validity of the key and/or signature. That seems to also have been the assumption of the old code in check_signature() where a result of 'G' (as in GOODSIG) and 'U' (as in TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED) were both considered a success. The two cases where a result of 'U' had special meaning were in verify_merge_signature() (where this caused git to die()) and in format_commit_one() (where it affected the output of the %G? format specifier). I think it makes sense to refactor the processing of TRUST_ status lines such that users can configure a minimum trust level that is enforced globally, rather than have individual parts of git (e.g. merge) do it themselves (except for a grace period with backward compatibility). I also think it makes sense to not store the trust level in the same struct member as the key/signature status. While the presence of a TRUST_ status code does imply that the signature is good (see the first paragraph in the included snippet above), as far as I can tell, the order of the status lines from GPG isn't well-defined; thus it would seem plausible that the trust level could be overwritten with the key/signature status if they were stored in the same member of the signature_check structure. This patch introduces a new configuration option: gpg.minTrustLevel. It consolidates trust-level verification to gpg-interface.c and adds a new `trust_level` member to the signature_check structure. Backward-compatibility is maintained by introducing a special case in verify_merge_signature() such that if no user-configurable gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then the old behavior of rejecting TRUST_UNDEFINED and TRUST_NEVER is enforced. If, on the other hand, gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then that value overrides the old behavior. Similarly, the %G? format specifier will continue show 'U' for signatures made with a key that has a trust level of TRUST_UNDEFINED or TRUST_NEVER, even though the 'U' character no longer exist in the `result` member of the signature_check structure. A new format specifier, %GT, is also introduced for users that want to show all possible trust levels for a signature. Another approach would have been to simply drop the trust-level requirement in verify_merge_signature(). This would also have made the behavior consistent with other parts of git that perform signature verification. However, requiring a minimum trust level for signing keys does seem to have a real-world use-case. For example, the build system used by the Qubes OS project currently parses the raw output from verify-tag in order to assert a minimum trust level for keys used to sign git tags [2]. [1] https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=doc/doc/DETAILS;h=bd00006e933ac56719b1edd2478ecd79273eae72;hb=refs/heads/master [2] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/blob/9674c1991deef45b1a1b1c71fddfab14ba50dccf/scripts/verify-git-tag#L43 Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2019-12-27 14:55:57 +01:00
enum signature_trust_level {
TRUST_UNDEFINED,
TRUST_NEVER,
TRUST_MARGINAL,
TRUST_FULLY,
TRUST_ULTIMATE,
};
ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits. This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply ignore this flag and use the current time. Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8. Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature. However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later. Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct. - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct signature_check - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the payload type - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all ssh-keygen verification calls - Set the payload type when verifying commits - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date outside of key validity as well as within Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2021-12-09 09:52:45 +01:00
enum payload_type {
SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED,
SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT,
SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG,
SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT,
};
struct signature_check {
char *payload;
size_t payload_len;
ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits. This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply ignore this flag and use the current time. Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8. Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature. However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later. Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct. - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct signature_check - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the payload type - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all ssh-keygen verification calls - Set the payload type when verifying commits - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date outside of key validity as well as within Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2021-12-09 09:52:45 +01:00
enum payload_type payload_type;
timestamp_t payload_timestamp;
char *output;
char *gpg_status;
/*
* possible "result":
* 0 (not checked)
* N (checked but no further result)
* G (good)
* B (bad)
*/
char result;
char *signer;
char *key;
char *fingerprint;
char *primary_key_fingerprint;
gpg-interface: add minTrustLevel as a configuration option Previously, signature verification for merge and pull operations checked if the key had a trust-level of either TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED in verify_merge_signature(). If that was the case, the process die()d. The other code paths that did signature verification relied entirely on the return code from check_commit_signature(). And signatures made with a good key, irregardless of its trust level, was considered valid by check_commit_signature(). This difference in behavior might induce users to erroneously assume that the trust level of a key in their keyring is always considered by Git, even for operations where it is not (e.g. during a verify-commit or verify-tag). The way it worked was by gpg-interface.c storing the result from the key/signature status *and* the lowest-two trust levels in the `result` member of the signature_check structure (the last of these status lines that were encountered got written to `result`). These are documented in GPG under the subsection `General status codes` and `Key related`, respectively [1]. The GPG documentation says the following on the TRUST_ status codes [1]: """ These are several similar status codes: - TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token> - TRUST_NEVER <error_token> - TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]] - TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]] - TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]] For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature. The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm. """ My interpretation is that the trust level is conceptionally different from the validity of the key and/or signature. That seems to also have been the assumption of the old code in check_signature() where a result of 'G' (as in GOODSIG) and 'U' (as in TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED) were both considered a success. The two cases where a result of 'U' had special meaning were in verify_merge_signature() (where this caused git to die()) and in format_commit_one() (where it affected the output of the %G? format specifier). I think it makes sense to refactor the processing of TRUST_ status lines such that users can configure a minimum trust level that is enforced globally, rather than have individual parts of git (e.g. merge) do it themselves (except for a grace period with backward compatibility). I also think it makes sense to not store the trust level in the same struct member as the key/signature status. While the presence of a TRUST_ status code does imply that the signature is good (see the first paragraph in the included snippet above), as far as I can tell, the order of the status lines from GPG isn't well-defined; thus it would seem plausible that the trust level could be overwritten with the key/signature status if they were stored in the same member of the signature_check structure. This patch introduces a new configuration option: gpg.minTrustLevel. It consolidates trust-level verification to gpg-interface.c and adds a new `trust_level` member to the signature_check structure. Backward-compatibility is maintained by introducing a special case in verify_merge_signature() such that if no user-configurable gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then the old behavior of rejecting TRUST_UNDEFINED and TRUST_NEVER is enforced. If, on the other hand, gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then that value overrides the old behavior. Similarly, the %G? format specifier will continue show 'U' for signatures made with a key that has a trust level of TRUST_UNDEFINED or TRUST_NEVER, even though the 'U' character no longer exist in the `result` member of the signature_check structure. A new format specifier, %GT, is also introduced for users that want to show all possible trust levels for a signature. Another approach would have been to simply drop the trust-level requirement in verify_merge_signature(). This would also have made the behavior consistent with other parts of git that perform signature verification. However, requiring a minimum trust level for signing keys does seem to have a real-world use-case. For example, the build system used by the Qubes OS project currently parses the raw output from verify-tag in order to assert a minimum trust level for keys used to sign git tags [2]. [1] https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=doc/doc/DETAILS;h=bd00006e933ac56719b1edd2478ecd79273eae72;hb=refs/heads/master [2] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/blob/9674c1991deef45b1a1b1c71fddfab14ba50dccf/scripts/verify-git-tag#L43 Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2019-12-27 14:55:57 +01:00
enum signature_trust_level trust_level;
};
void signature_check_clear(struct signature_check *sigc);
/*
* Look at a GPG signed tag object. If such a signature exists, store it in
* signature and the signed content in payload. Return 1 if a signature was
* found, and 0 otherwise.
*/
int parse_signature(const char *buf, size_t size, struct strbuf *payload, struct strbuf *signature);
/*
* Look at GPG signed content (e.g. a signed tag object), whose
* payload is followed by a detached signature on it. Return the
* offset where the embedded detached signature begins, or the end of
* the data when there is no such signature.
*/
size_t parse_signed_buffer(const char *buf, size_t size);
/*
* Create a detached signature for the contents of "buffer" and append
* it after "signature"; "buffer" and "signature" can be the same
* strbuf instance, which would cause the detached signature appended
* at the end. Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure.
*/
int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
const char *signing_key);
/*
* Returns corresponding string in lowercase for a given member of
* enum signature_trust_level. For example, `TRUST_ULTIMATE` will
* return "ultimate".
*/
const char *gpg_trust_level_to_str(enum signature_trust_level level);
void set_signing_key(const char *);
const char *get_signing_key(void);
/*
* Returns a textual unique representation of the signing key in use
* Either a GPG KeyID or a SSH Key Fingerprint
*/
const char *get_signing_key_id(void);
int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
const char *signature, size_t slen);
void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc,
unsigned flags);
#endif