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tex: extend, reword intro, rm vision section

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surtur 2023-08-23 20:06:44 +02:00
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2 changed files with 57 additions and 68 deletions

@ -7,62 +7,76 @@ are complex and at least twelve characters long. They are only ever used in the
one place they were created for. And they are definitely getting rotated at
least once a year. Or are they?
A token so ubiquitous that it becomes tiring for human being to keep track of
all the places where it is required in some form or another. At some point, it
A token so ubiquitous that it becomes tiring for a human being to keep track of
all the places where it is required in one form or another. At some point, it
almost feels easier to stop caring and use the password intended for \emph{the
other site} for this one, too. What harm could that possibly do. The answer is
unimaginable, depending on the services in question, its relevance to the
person being discussed, and also on \emph{how many other} services also share
this password. A service requires a registration? No problem, the password will
be the name of the cat plus current year, so as to make it more secure. It is
the password rotation day again this month, a handful of logins will be
disabled if their passwords are not changed in the next couple of hours. No
worries, it is already covered by a combination of the current month and the
name of the specific service for each of them. A neat system. But just in case
they got forgotten in the fragments of this hectic lifestyle, they need to be
written down on a sticker note. Not to worry, nobody knows, it is hidden under
the keyboard, it is practically invisible.
other site} for this one, too. What harm could that possibly do. The answer
might well be ``unimaginable'', depending on the service in question, its
relevance to the person being discussed, and also on \emph{how many other}
services happen to share this password. Does a service require registration? No
problem, the password will be the name of the cat (or dog, or the youngest
child) plus current year, so as to make it more \emph{secure}. It is the
password rotation day again this month, a handful of logins will be disabled if
their passwords are not changed in the next couple of hours. No worries, it is
already covered by a combination of the current month and the name of the
specific service for each of them. A neat system. But just in case it got
forgotten and lost in the fragments of this hectic lifestyle, the passwords
need to be written down on a sticker note. Not to worry, nobody knows, it is
hidden under the keyboard, it is practically invisible.
These are all examples of poor password practices on user's side; some might
have been circumstantially helped to, such as the too frequently forced
password rotation, others can be ascribed to users not being sufficiently
well-versed in the intricacies of password hygiene.
have been circumstantially helped to, such as the too frequent forced password
rotation, others could be ascribed to users not being sufficiently well-versed
in the intricacies of password hygiene.
Inevitably, these passwords are going to get appropriately treated in the form
of misuse, be it from a nosy colleague that finds the sticker note, or if the
Inevitably, these passwords are going to get appropriately treated, be in the
form of misuse from a nosy colleague that finds the sticker note, or if the
user account is ever a target of an attack, the password's \emph{only} role, to
protect the access, will likely not stand much chance.
gate the access, will likely not stand much of a chance.
This thesis tangentially covers user-relating issues like the ones described
above, but rather than attempting to go for prevention, it mainly focuses on
dealing with the acute consequence of such behaviour: a password breach. The
thesis consists of two parts. The theoretical one offers an overview of
password-related topics and frames the password as well as security topics in
the web context in order to provide necessary context for the second part of
the thesis. Cryptography topics such as hashing, encryption and entropy are
mentioned, and within the browser context a special spotlight is given to the
protocols powering the web: HTTP and TLS.
above, but rather than attempting to remedy them with prevention, it mainly
focuses on dealing with the acute consequence of such behaviour: a password
breach. The thesis consists of two parts: a theoretical one, which provides
theoretical background to concepts and processes used in the so called
\emph{practical} part, which describes what exactly has been done and how.
In the theoretical part, password hash functions and hash cracking are mentioned,
and within the browser context a special spotlight is given to Content Security
Policy and Cross-site scripting. Program's configuration schema is conceived,
the choices of local and online data sources are explained, and recommended
deployment set-up is described.
The practical part discusses the architecture, decision making, implementation
details and validation methods utilised when building a web application that
enables users to monitor the breach status of their credentials by utilising an
online API service and local data imported into the program by the operators of
the tool. The program does not have many dependencies and is relatively
lightweight, which means that anybody with even little experience should be
able to potentially run their own private instance, if they so choose.
The practical part discusses application architecture decisions, development
process, implementation details and validation methods utilised when building
the subject web application. The program does not have too many
dependencies and is relatively lightweight, which means that anybody with even
little experience should be able to potentially run their own private instance,
if they so choose.
The purpose of the program is to allow users to learn if their credentials were
breached, while the reason for the breach might even be considered secondary in
importance. Breach data is not a publicly traded commodity and is relatively
The purpose of the program is to allow users to learn if they were breached,
and the application developed as an integral part of this thesis should enable
them to quickly and privately check potential compromise status against
configured local and online data sources. Of course the quality of the
compromise monitoring depends on access to quality data, which is partially in
the purview of the application operator.
Breach data is not exactly a publicly traded commodity and can be relatively
hard to make sense of, given that we are talking about literal
\emph{terrabytes} of data available, if there is even the slightest interest to
find it online. Breaches happen, and of course, can inform the decision to stay
or leave the service, but there is not always a choice element involved, or
only a limited amount. Either way, knowledge is light and as such precedes
\emph{terrabytes} of data available, if there is even a slightest interest to
find it online. Breaches do happen, and can, of course, inform the decision to
stay or leave the service, but there is not always a choice element involved,
or only a limited amount. Either way, knowledge is light and as such precedes
informed decision-making. Abstracting away the ugly parts and offering users an
understandable interface would likely result in their improved security
understandable interface might likely result in their improved security
posture, if anything.
As per the security posture of the users, in order not to weaken it, the
in-application administrative-level users should only be able to configure
online and local data sources and initially set up user accounts but should
\emph{not} have access to users' search queries or credential entries.
Sensitive user data should be encrypted at rest and not even
administrative-level users should be able to read them.
The author has been striving to utilise modern tooling and development
practices in an effort to build a maintainable and long-lasting piece of
software that serves its users well. When deployed, it could provide real

@ -1,33 +1,8 @@
% =========================================================================== %
\part{Theoretical part}
\n{1}{Vision}
The thesis consists of two main parts: a theoretical one that provides
theoretical background to concepts and processes used in the other one - so
called \emph{practical} part, which then describes what exactly has been done
and how.
The application developed as part of this thesis should enable users to quickly
and privately check their credentials' compromise status against configured
local and online data sources. Of course the compromise monitoring depends on
access to quality data, which is in the purview of the application
administrator.
In-application administrative-level user is able to configure online and local
data sources, initially set up user accounts but does not have the access
users' search queries or credential entries, or more broadly, is not able to
read sensitive user information. This is enabled by the architectural decisions
the application has taken, whereby sensitive user data is encrypted and not
even administrative-level users are able to read them.
\n{1}{Cryptography primer}\label{sec:cryptographyprimer}
\n{2}{Encryption}
\textbf{TODO:} add \emph{why} we care and how it's going to be used.
\n{2}{Hash functions}
Hash functions are algorithms used to help with a number of things: integrity